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Introduction
This thesis is an in depth investigation of the impact of social capital on socio-
economic outcomes such as innovation, growth and crime. There has been a recent
surge in the literature on social economics and social interactions (e.g., Becker and
Murphy, 2000; Scheinkman, 2008). Along those lines the concept of social capital
has received extensive attention as it is accepted to “facilitate the achievement
of goals that could not be achieved in its absence or could be achieved only at
a higher cost” (Coleman, 1990, p.304). Mediating via the information channel
and by reducing transaction costs, social capital is believed to increase eﬃciency
of social exchange. How does social capital relate to physical and human capital?
How does social capital aﬀect economic outcomes? Can innovation be regarded as
a mechanism that transforms social capital to income growth? Is it only the eco-
nomic exchange that social capital improves, or are there other (social) outcomes
that could be explained by presence or absence of social capital? Before going into
depth and providing answers to such questions, it is important to see how social
capital was utilized in European history.
The historical examples below highlight several important aspects that are cen-
tral to the concept of social capital and show that this phenomenon is actually
nothing new, only that the label ‘social capital’ has carried the discussion to an-
other level. The examples are taken from British history because starting from the
late 18th century the United Kingdom witnessed a massive economic and social
change that, in some circumstances, produced its own informal social organiza-
tions. For instance, about 350 years ago the Royal Society of London played an
important role in the development of science and technology by codifying infor-
mation and by making information gathering less costly. Royal Society started
from informal voluntary meetings that later turned into a semi-formal institution,
which was complementary to the existing traditional universities in the 17th and
18th century. Its role as an information channel and its relation with formal in-
stitutions displays astonishing resemblance to how social capital is conceptualized
nowadays. In a similar vein, English private prosecution societies that emerged in
12 Introduction
the mid 18th century due to ineﬃcient law enforcement played an important role
in making the criminal justice system more accessible, thus indirectly aﬀecting
criminality in 18th and 19th century Britain.
1.1 From informal societies to social capital
In mid 17th century Europe, there were over 160 universities in 150 cities. Beside
their role in creating human capital, universities were also viewed as institutions
of culture, thus acted as repositories where national (regional) identity and values
were cultivated (Readings, 1996). Most universities were supported by the state,
heavily relied on public funding, and were extensively controlled by the church.
The existing ‘traditional’ university system witnessed a major organizational inno-
vation in the second half of the 17th century. The emergence of academic learned
societies brought a major change in how scholarly activities were organized and
how information was disseminated. Learned societies sprang from informal meet-
ings where philosophical discussions were held regarding the need for a new exper-
imental design of research. This necessity created many learned societies within
a short period of time. By the beginning of the 18th century there were already
more than 25 learned societies operational in about 20 cities across Europe, such
as Acad´ emie Fran¸ caise (1635), Royal Society of London (1660), Acad´ emie des Sci-
ences (1666) and Accademia dei Dissonanti di Modena (1683). Although learned
societies were based on a new approach and seemed distanced from traditional
institutions, they were by and large complementary to universities.
Learned societies were a merger of two organizational structures (Hall, 1975).
On the one hand, informal societies functioned as clubs where intellectuals met to
discuss subjects relating to the natural philosophy and experimental science of the
time. They were not based on an established organizational structure with rules,
customs and ﬁxed membership. On the other hand, some were more formal as they
were given certain privileges by the governing bodies. The Royal Society of London
is a good example to illustrate the crucial role that learned societies played in the
17th and 18th century. The Royal Society rose as an amateur body, an ‘assembly
of Gentlemen’, but was also legitimized by Royal Charter as an incorporated body
(Hunter, 1976). Its success was partially based on the reliance on experimental
science and partially on the social background that brought people from diﬀerent
occupations and origins together setting up a collective environment where people
share information.1 But what really made the Royal Society a success story was its
emphasis on collection and dissemination of information. The society also acted
as an intermediary among scientists who live abroad and nothing existed in that
1 For instance, the membership structure in the ﬁrst phase shows that there were more
than 200 members by 1670, 10 percent of whom were foreigners. Of the English fellows, 15
percent were politicians or diplomats; 14 percent were gentlemen scientists who were self-funding
scientist with private means such as Robert Boyle; 14 percent were medical doctors; 13 percent
were aristocrats; 10 percent were professional scholars or writers; 6 percent were merchants and
4 percent were lawyers (Hunter, 1976).1.1 From informal societies to social capital 3
period that came close to this function. Without the Royal Society, gathering
information about discoveries and scientiﬁc advancements in other countries was
either impossible or possible only at a higher economic cost. Three tools were used
for assembling and disseminating information: the regular meetings, letters and
oﬃcial publications.
The Society held meetings every week. However, the informal structure fre-
quently showed itself as the meetings were not as organized as they seemed and
there were signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in attendance (Hunter, 1976). The meetings
were based on informal discussions about new methods in experimental science
and natural philosophy, which occasionally involved presentations by local and
foreign scientists. One particularly interesting feature that shows the informality
were the presentations on natural curiosities, which were referred as ‘learned en-
tertainments’ (da Costa, 2002). These presentations that involved abnormalities
in nature that fed curiosity, were highly informal and the presenter was often dis-
turbed for questions and further elaborations like the custom at seminars today.
For instance, anatomical preparations by physicians and surgeons of ‘weird’ and
‘monstrous’ births constitute a good example for learning with entertainment. Al-
though the topics were most of the time extraordinary, it was quite common to
see prominent scientists, such as Isaac Newton participating in the discussions.2
However, the presentations were taken seriously and there was a common belief
that the ‘curiosities’ were useful as they blend entertainment, diﬀusion of knowl-
edge and learning. At some point the curiosities became so popular that the chief
curator of experiments was asked to hold presentations in London coﬀeehouses
and inns (da Costa, 2002).
Another interesting channel of communication was the letters. The letters
received from researchers around the world were read out loud in the meetings
followed by a discussion on the subject matter. A thorough investigation of the
archives of the Royal Society reveals that starting from the early 1660s there
were practical steps towards sharing information by means of letters.3 At ﬁrst
the information exchange was handled informally until Henry Oldenburg4 put
eﬀort in developing a more methodological recording system. All letters received
and replies sent were recorded in the Letter Book. According to Hall (1975)
this was of particular signiﬁcance as it implied transmission as well as reception
and collection of knowledge. As a further illustration of the signiﬁcance of these
letters, the ﬁrst communication of Isaac Newton’s mathematical work was made by
Oldenburg to Ren´ e Fran¸ cois de Sluse (1622-1685), who was a prominent Belgian
2 Sometimes the entertainment element was more pronounced as was in a case of a dog that
‘pronounced several words in English, French and High Dutch and repeated all letters of the
Alphabet very distinctly’ (cited in da Costa, 2002, p. 152).
3 For instance, on 4 September 1661 “Sir Kenelme Digby...read...a French letter from Monsieur
Frenicle to himself, dated at Paris, 31 August 1661, concerning that gentleman’s hypothesis of
the motion of Saturn; and was desired to write to Mr. Frenicle, and to return him the thanks of
the society” (cited in Hall, 1975, p. 178).
4 Henry Oldenburg served as the ﬁrst secretary of the Royal Society of London and was the
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mathematician of the period (Hall, 1975). Oldenburg was also an intermediary
between Newton and Leibniz for quite a long time until Leibniz visited England
in 1673 and presented in the Royal Society meetings.5
One of the most interesting components towards codifying knowledge was the
‘history of trades’ programme, which was started in 1660 (e.g., Houghton, 1941).
The mastermind behind the programme was Francis Bacon, who suggested forming
‘histories of trade’ to improve industrial practices. He argued that “the researchers
who viewed nature through the lens of the crafts could more easily gain knowledge
and improve the arts” (Ochs, 1985, p. 131). The ‘histories’ described a certain
production process in detail based on facts, practical observations, accounts of
travellers and craftsmen’s techniques (Ochs, 1985). The aim was to codify knowl-
edge of craftsmen that would transfer applied knowledge to science and, to a certain
extent, the industry. In 1660 six histories began followed by eleven others in 1661
(Ochs, 1985). For instance, William Petty was given the task of writing a history
of wool cloth and Christopher Merrett produced a history of glass. Individual
contributions such as letters, comments and questions as well as the information
arising from joint experiments were collected. All these were then merged with
the partial history to form a complete history of trade.
Despite the eﬀorts and involvement of scientists, such as Robert Boyle and
William Petty, the programme failed to reach its immediate projections and did
not beneﬁt the contemporary industry of the period. There were various reasons
for this: the ‘histories’ were very complex; the craftsmen were often diﬃcult to
communicate with and reluctant to share sensitive knowledge. Moreover the indus-
trial structure operating in craft fashion lacked the absorptive capacity to acquire
information. However, this does not necessarily mean that the programme was
unsuccessful. For instance, Petty described the silk production and dyeing process
in great detail in a partial history titled “Apparatus to the History of the Common
Practices of Dying”, which was followed by other partial histories on textile (for
details see Ochs, 1985). The impact on industrial practice was not immediate but
it deﬁnitely provided useful insights that eventually resulted in England’s indus-
trial revolution a century later. As codiﬁed information, especially on innovative
techniques, the ‘histories’ promoted transfer of manufacturing knowledge from the
craftsman to the engineer and ﬁrms and moreover helped to create a receptive
innovation-prone environment in England compared to other European countries
(e.g., Ochs, 1985). It is an interesting irony to observe that scholars still try to
understand the science-industry link, about 350 years after the histories of trade
programme.
In some cases informal societies dealt with community wide problems such as
5 There were other means of codiﬁed communication such as the oﬃcial publications. It was
common for members to send letters, research notes, book reviews and accounts drawn from
foreign journals to support information collection (Hall, 1975) which were summarized and put
together. This informal practice soon led to a formal publication, the Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society. Started in 1665, the Philosophical Transactions was important in setting
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criminality. Private prosecution (or felons) societies as an extralegal approach to
crime control are particular examples to this (Little and Sheﬃeld, 1983). The
industrial revolution in Britain had massive social and economic implications due
to the creation of a large working class, mobile populations and increased urban-
ization. The criminal justice system in that period was unable to adapt to these
changes, which created ineﬃciencies in dealing with the threat and treatment of
crime. This was mainly due to the lack of personnel, the high (private) cost of
prosecution and the lack of a central police authority (Frank, 1989; Emsley, 1996).
The prosecution costs had to be covered by the victim, which by and large meant
that only wealthy citizens had the opportunity to access legal authorities. More-
over, the increase in the number of oﬀenses in the ﬁrst half of the 19th century
caused a huge increase in the burden on courts.
Private prosecution societies evolved as a community reﬂex to such an envi-
ronment. There were about a thousand societies in the mid 17th century and
the number increased after 1780 (Emsley, 1996). How these societies functioned
was similar to how contemporary rotating savings and credit associations function
(e.g., Geertz, 1962; Ardener, 1964). The monetary resources of the members were
pooled and then used to assist members who became victims of crime. The costs
of apprehension and prosecution through the legal criminal justice system were
paid from this amount hence giving some form of insurance to members. As Little
and Sheﬃeld (1983) argue these societies were important in making the legal jus-
tice system accessible thus improving the enforcement of existing laws.6 Another
function of the societies was to share information on suspicious acts or criminal-
ity against members. As in the previous example these informal societies were
complementary to formal institutions by increasing access to the judicial system
by sharing information about felonies and reducing the cost of prosecution. The
private prosecution societies slowly became redundant in the second half of the
19th century with the establishment of the more eﬀective police force and justice
system (Taylor, 1998).
The disappearance of the private prosecution societies does not necessarily
mean that they were ineﬀective. As has been emphasized, these informal societies
complement the existing institutions, enabling the poor to access legal system.
Extensive reform in the justice system surmounted the ineﬃciencies and these
societies lost their main purpose of existence. However, most of them evolved
through time and function in a diﬀerent manner. Past and current world provide
many examples of similar associations, such as the neighbourhood (or crime) watch.
Crime watch is an informal organization formed by citizens who are devoted to
the prevention of crime and vandalism. The major role of these organizations is
to prevent crime and to make neighborhoods safer by working together with the
6 These societies were very diﬀerent from their American counterparts. It was not in the form
of vigilantism in which the law was exercised by the community from prosecution to punishment.
Among thousands of cases in England there were only few instances reported where punishment
was also exercised in the society meetings.6 Introduction
police, legal authorities and other voluntary organizations. Such associations are
operational in many countries especially in the US and the UK.7 This constitutes
a good example for the existence of informal institutions even in environments
where formal institutions function well.
The historical cases above illustrate how social capital improved eﬃciency cen-
turies ago. Turning back to the contemporary world, the next section brieﬂy
discusses four hypotheses that this work is based on. The main contributions
summarized in the conclusion also stem from these hypothesis. The research out-
line is presented in section 1.3.
1.2 Main argument
Economists have long been interested in explaining economic growth (e.g., Solow,
1956; Swan, 1956) and advancements in the literature emphasize the role of tech-
nical change in understanding economic growth (e.g., Romer, 1990; Grossman and
Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992, and the two-volume Handbook of Eco-
nomic Growth edited by Aghion and Durlauf, 2005). In this literature the role of
social interactions is limited and economic behaviour is based on utility maximiz-
ing homogeneous agents disengaged from social interactions. Nowadays, however,
technological change and economic growth are understood within a socio-economic
framework composed of interacting agents (e.g., Cowan and Jonard, 2004). Ac-
cording to systems perspectives, innovations emerge in complex systems composed
of interacting actors that share knowledge and resources such as ﬁrms, customers,
research agencies, universities and the government (e.g., Lundvall, 1992). This
understanding is supported by a large body of research on repeated interactions.
For instance, economists and biologists emphasize the role of repeated social in-
teractions in solving free-rider problems and in reducing opportunistic and selﬁsh
behaviour (e.g., Abreu, 1988; Bowles and Gintis, 2004). By the same token, the
“embeddedness” idea stresses the role of interpersonal interactions and networks of
relations in comprehending how economic systems function, by generating norms,
sanctions and trust (e.g., Granovetter, 1985).
To facilitate this multilevel and interdisciplinary research agenda, the borders of
sociology and political science may shelter interesting contributions to the research
on economic growth as Temple (1999) argues. In line with this argument, an
important development in social science in the last decade is “the rise of interest
in social capital as a mechanism for understanding socio-economic phenomena”
(Durlauf, 2002, p. 459). It is believed that inter-agent interactions that form
social capital are essential and have become more important for understanding
socio-economic outcomes and further explaining social phenomena. Because they
7 See for instance the webpage of National Neighborhood watch Institute,
http://www.nnwi.org/ for US and http://www.neighbourhoodwatch.net/ for UK. For a
more organized version see Netherlands Centre for Crime Prevention and Community Safety
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can substitute missing institutions and complement existing ones in facilitating
innovation and economic development.
Investigation of this complex interplay between institutions, social capital, in-
novation and socio-economic outcomes necessitates an understanding of how social
capital aﬀects outcomes. Where do the eﬃciency gains from social capital come
from? For social capital to render socially and economically eﬃcient outcomes the
current state should not be a Pareto optimum (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005).
The existence of information asymmetries and coordination failures creates room
for social capital to improve eﬃciency. There are two major channels of eﬃciency
gains. First, social capital addresses information problems that hinder trade and
exchange of information. Second, it could reduce transaction costs, such as search
and monitoring costs. Search and trust are fundamental elements of economic
exchange (e.g., Hayek, 1945; Akerlof, 1970). Zak and Knack (2001) have shown
that ﬁnding trade partners is costly as agents incur search costs while collect-
ing information regarding the reputation of an agent to assess trustworthiness.
Even after engaging transactions, lack of trust may further constrain economic
exchange. Similarly, in environments where institutions are not binding trust is
a lubricant that increases eﬃciency in economic exchange (e.g., Fafchamps and
Minten, 1999). The importance of social networks in diﬀusing information on
labour market opportunities (e.g., Granovetter, 1974) constitutes a good example
of how social capital could create new ways for information exchange. Barr (2000),
for instance, argues that social networks among small ﬁrms play a crucial role in
exchanging information about new technological developments in Ghana. A third
possible channel is that social norms and community codes may alter individual
behaviour. We argue that this is an important channel that ties social capital
to innovation. Mechanisms like shame, damage to reputation and guilt could act
like social constraints that may cause changes in individual attitude (i.e., behav-
ing cooperatively due to morality, telling the truth to build up reputation). As
discussed in chapter 6, information exchange is also crucial to maintain social
order. For instance, exchange of information on malignant behaviour could pre-
vent future criminal behaviour which is only possible in communities with dense
social relations and informal social control (e.g., Sampson, Morenoﬀ, and Earls,
1999; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001). This discussion leads to our ﬁrst
assertion.
Hypothesis 1: Social capital leads to positive socio-economic outcomes by reduc-
ing transaction costs, creating new forms of information exchange and by inducing
change in individual attitudes.
The economics literature has identiﬁed social capital as an important deter-
minant in explaining diﬀerences in income. Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak
and Knack (2001) have shown for a cross-section of countries that countries with
higher levels of measured trust are richer. Since the seminal work of Putnam,8 Introduction
Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) the social capital-growth link has undergone sev-
eral investigations (e.g., Helliwell and Putnam, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997;
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanez, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Whiteley, 2000; Zak and
Knack, 2001; Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater, 2002; Beugelsdijk, de Groot,
and van Schaik, 2004; Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005a; Iyer, Kitson, and Toh,
2005). However, these papers mainly investigate correlations between growth and
social capital, but it is still not clear how social capital improves economic out-
comes.
In contrast to the existing literature, the research in this study focuses on
social capital by analyzing its impact on innovation and through the channel of
innovation on economic growth. It is widely accepted that economic performance
is positively correlated with innovative activities, such as expenditure for research
and development (R&D) and patent applications (e.g., Grossman and Helpman,
1994; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Acs, 2003). Additionally, it is known that societies
in which people enjoy each other’s conﬁdence experience a higher level of economic
performance. By enabling information exchange and reducing transaction costs
social capital may induce more eﬀort toward inventive activity (chapter 3). The
combination of these observations has not received attention but could imply that
societies with a higher level of social capital are better able to manage the process
of innovation and that creative eﬀort will be more richly rewarded in relatively
trusting societies.
Assume a scenario where entrepreneurs seek funding to conduct R&D and/or to
commercialize invention. The process is characterized by information asymmetries
and risk because the true quality of the project is only known by the entrepreneur.
The venture capitalist incurs formidable risks because there may not be suﬃcient
parameters to judge the real quality of the project and the trustworthiness of
the entrepreneur. The venture capitalist would like to assess the quality of the
idea and the capacity of the entrepreneur by asking questions, such as: Have you
applied for a patent? Can you ensure that it is not possible to copy this product?
How long did it take you to develop this product? How much does it cost to
produce? How much have you spent so far to develop this product? What is
the amount of turnover you expect in the next three years? What is the market
for this product? Have you approached any major retailers or companies, if so
are they interested? What is your background? Are you the sole owner of this
project? Is this the only product of your company? If not how much time would
you allocate only to develop for this product?8 The entrepreneur somehow has
to signal that the project is worthy to invest by answering such questions and by
revealing sensitive (technical) information regarding the project. Investing time
8 Such questions and many others are part of usual conversations between entrepreneurs
and venture capitalists in a television programme on the BBC, Dragons’ Den. The pro-
gramme is based on negotiations between the entrepreneurs who seek funds to develop their
businesses and ﬁve venture capitalists who are willing to ﬁnance projects in return for a
share in the company, provided that the project is good enough. For more information see
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dragonsden/.1.2 Main argument 9
and money and revealing information that could be valuable to competitors would
eventually reduce the private return of the ﬁrm. Moreover inherited risks would
lead to underinvestment in R&D activities. Leland and Pyle (1977), Bhattacharya
and Ritter (1983), Myers and Majluf (1984), Boocock and Woods (1997), and
Bougheas (2004) are examples amongst others who have argued that risk aversion,
internal capital constraints, monitoring costs, information asymmetries and moral
hazard hinder R&D ﬁnancing.
Assume an extreme situation characterized by perfect trust i.e., the trustworthy
entrepreneurs reﬂect the true quality of the project and information gathering
is easy and free. In such a case there would not be any search and monitoring
costs, consequently funding would be directed toward projects with a higher future
stream of returns and moreover more funds would be available. When coupled
with the fact that the quality and the quantity of information in circulation would
increase due to social networks more innovative projects would be submitted and
funded. This situation would be Pareto superior to the original one.
As discussed in chapter 2 and in chapter 3, the basic premise is that social
capital induces innovation as it facilitates eﬃcient ways of information exchange,
reduces (or eliminates) transaction costs and as it alters the behavior of the en-
trepreneur and/or the venture capitalist. It could also reduce the element of risk
if the relation between the venture capitalist and inventor is trust building. In
certain situations (i.e., binding norms) it could even force agents to behave in
certain ways. For instance, entrepreneurs with weak projects may cease to mimic
entrepreneurs with good projects due to the fear of damaging their reputation.
Hence the second assertion follows.
Hypothesis 2: Higher social capital leads to higher innovation and innovation is
a channel that transforms social capital to growth.
Researchers in diﬀerent disciplines have identiﬁed several other social outcomes,
such as public health (e.g., Kawachi, Kim, Coutts, and Subramanian, 2004), in-
dividual mental health (e.g., Miller, Scheﬄer, Lam, Rosenberg, and Rupp, 2006),
suicide (e.g., Helliwell, 2007) and homicide (e.g., Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer,
2001) that could be aﬀected by social capital. A natural avenue to extend this
research is to link social capital to crime as crime is both a social and economic
phenomena. Crime is not only aﬀected by social and economic factors, such as
poverty, disadvantaged families and education but also has economic and social
consequences (i.e., expenditure on crime prevention, social exclusion and depri-
vation). For instance, it has been estimated that an average inhabitant spends
roughly 220 euros per year on crime prevention in the Netherlands.9 This amounts
to about 2.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which is slightly lower than the
total amount of investments in R&D. According to the Eurobarometer survey
9 The total cost of crime is estimated to be much higher about 14 billion euros every year
(Moolenaar, 2006).10 Introduction
2004, crime is the most important issue of concern (32%) according to Dutch res-
idents even more important than health care (30%) and integration of foreigners
(23%). To give a practical example of such concerns, TV series such as CSI: New
York, Numbers and Criminal Minds have become so popular in the Netherlands
that about 20 crime related TV series are broadcasted on Dutch TV channels.
The Netherlands is an interesting case to investigate the relation between social
capital and social dysfunction with regards to certain characteristics it possesses
such as low unemployment, better economic means, lower income inequality, high
concentration of foreigners and a free market for soft drugs. Despite these concerns
there has not been a thorough investigation regarding crime and social capital in
the Netherlands.
Social capital is linked to crime in three ways (chapters 2 to 4). First, social
capital increases the opportunity cost of crime. By extending previous models
on crime, Williams and Sickles (2002) show that social norms and stigma also
inﬂuence the decision to commit crime. When deciding to participate in crimi-
nal activity individuals incorporate both social consequences, such as divorce and
loss of social status as well as economic costs, such as loss of job, income and
gains from crime. Mechanisms of guilt and shame and community norms could
also prevent individuals from committing crime. These components constitute a
self-control mechanism that deters individuals from committing crime. Second,
there have been numerous studies arguing that communities with weak informal
social control face higher crime (e.g., Kornhauser, 1978; Taylor, Gottfredson, and
Brower, 1984; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Messner,
Baumer, and Rosenfeld, 2004). The idea is that, in communities where citizens are
less attached and where individuals participate less in community activities people
are unwilling to intervene in cases of crime (e.g., Sampson, Morenoﬀ, and Earls,
1999). Similarly, Hirschi (1969) argues that strong attachment and involvement in
community matters reduce the cost of conﬂict resolution and conﬂicts are there-
fore resolved in peaceful ways (which especially reduces non-property crimes by
preventing them at the ﬁrst place). This informal public control mediates via the
information channel which makes up the third link. In communities with dense so-
cial networks citizens and neighbours continuously and informally exchange infor-
mation on malignant behaviour which may facilitate active interference to prevent
possible criminal behaviour (especially youth crime) (e.g., Sampson, Morenoﬀ, and
Earls, 1999). These arguments build up to the third assumption.
Hypothesis 3: By enhancing information exchange via network eﬀects and by
increasing the opportunity cost of crime, higher social capital is associated with
lower crime.
One potentially interesting empirical contribution of the thesis is the role of
formal institutions in setting up a transient environment that is conducive to the
formation of common codes, cultural traits and thus social capital. As discussed1.3 Outline of the thesis 11
above, social exchange improves by eliminating or reducing search costs and by
fostering trust. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) argue that there are two ways that
this can be achieved: (i) through formal institutions (e.g., legal and political in-
stitutions, venture capital market, stock exchange etc.). There is a long tradition
of research on the role of formal institutions in facilitating economic exchange and
social outcomes (e.g., North, 1981; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001; Acemoglu, John-
son, and Robinson, 2005; Tabellini, 2005); or (ii) through informal institutions
(such as repeated interagent relations, reputation, enforceable norms, social trust
etc. e.g., Zucker, 1986; Platteau, 1994a,b; Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995).
The two could complement each other as in the case of developed countries. But
in most countries where formal institutions are not binding, informal institutions
satisfy the conditions (search and trust) for exchange (e.g., Akerlof, 1970). For in-
stance, in trade amongst Maghribi and Genoese traders in the 11th century, Greif
(1994, 2006) shows how informal channels work to circulate information regarding
breach of contract in the absence of formal institutions thus enabling cheaters to
be punished (in the form of degrading reputation and trustworthiness). Studies
by Douglas North and Daron Acemoglu show that institutions are crucial for eco-
nomic exchange. In a similar vein, there have been attempts to show the eﬀect of
literacy on economic development and crime. For instance, Sandberg (1982) shows
for a set of European countries that the literacy rates in 1850 are correlated with
per capita income in 1970 but not with per capita income in 1850s. Gillis (2004)
shows that rising levels of literacy in the 19th century caused a reduction in the
crime rates several decades later. Most of these works, however, are silent about
how institutions aﬀect outcome variables. We argue that past formal institutions
can explain variations in current social capital and their eﬀects on socio-economic
outcomes mediate via social capital. Thus formal institutions, such as education,
literacy, the political system, institutionalized religion and universities create in-
formal institutions in the long run. A policy recommendation that derives from
this argument that would achieve dual objectives both in the short and the long
run is then to foster formal institutions. Creating well-functioning and binding
institutions is a ﬁrst-best solution (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 2002).
Hypothesis 4: Current social capital is to a degree shaped by the extent of formal
institutions in the past.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
This thesis is an empirical investigation into the role of social capital in explaining
economic and social outcomes. It revolves around the four hypothesis highlighted
above and the structure of the thesis with short summaries of each chapter is
presented below.
The following chapter is an introductory literature review on social capital.12 Introduction
The chapter builds on four strands of research prior to the social capital literature
and, rather than deﬁning the concept, identiﬁes several elements that are common
to most contemporary deﬁnitions. This search for commonalities is complemented
by a detailed table comparing and contrasting physical, human and social capital.
There are three issues that the current debate on social capital revolves around:
(i) eﬃciency gains from social capital, (ii) social capital and institutions, and (iii)
measurement of social capital. These issues are brieﬂy discussed as this pave the
way to the main arguments of the thesis and enables a benchmark for further
elaboration. The chapter closes with an assessment of the social capital of social
capital researchers. Research on social capital spans various disciplines and the
concept has been further developed within each discipline with little communica-
tion between disciplines. This has led to multiple deﬁnitions, a certain level of
ambiguity and sometimes misinterpretations. For a better understanding more
cross-disciplinary work is necessary. This argument is illustrated by employing
a social network analysis on the co-authorship structure of researchers who work
on social capital. It is shown that cross-disciplinary collaboration is a rare phe-
nomenon.
Chapter 3 investigates the interplay between social capital, innovation and
per capita income growth in the European Union.10 Innovation is modelled and
identiﬁed as an important mechanism that transforms social capital into higher
income levels. In an empirical investigation of 102 European regions in the pe-
riod 1990-2002, it is shown that higher innovation performance is conducive to per
capita income growth and that social capital aﬀects growth indirectly by fostering
innovation. The estimates suggest that there is little direct role for social capital
to foster per capita income growth in this sample of European Union countries.
Another interesting ﬁnding is the role of past political and educational institutions
in inﬂuencing current social capital. It is shown that the state of political institu-
tions, literacy and universities in the 19th century in Europe formed the seedbeds
of current social capital.
In chapter 4 the focus is on the role of government intervention and social
capital in explaining diﬀerences in innovation output and economic growth in the
regions of the European Union in the period 1990-2002.11 Chapter 4 is organized
as an extension to chapter 3 in two ways. First, the association between social
capital and innovation is taken a step further as it is shown that social capital also
has impact on growth of innovation output as well as the levels. Second, despite
the amount of money involved in EU structural funds there has been little work
on the eﬀectiveness of these expenditures on innovation and growth. Using several
10 This chapter is based on the joint work with Bas ter Weel “Social capital, innovation and
growth: Evidence from Europe” appeared as UNU-MERIT working paper and IZA discussion
paper and is forthcoming in the European Economic Review. For details see Ak¸ comak and ter
Weel (2006, 2008d).
11 This chapter is based on the joint work with Bas ter Weel “How do social capital and
government support aﬀect innovation and growth? Evidence from the EU regional support
programmes” published as a book chapter in “Innovation Policy in Europe”. For details see
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measures of social capital and innovation and the European Union’s Objective 1,
2 and 5b ﬁgures for EU regional support, the estimates suggest that EU funding
does not signiﬁcantly contribute to economic outcomes, while social capital does.
Investigation of a possible complementary relationship between social capital and
government support reveals that regions with higher levels of social capital are
more likely to eﬀectively gain from EU regional support programmes. This result
implies that besides a direct eﬀect of social capital on economic outcomes, social
capital seems to be an important prerequisite for the eﬀective implementation
of government programmes. From a policy perspective it seems important to
stimulate education to foster human capital formation. In regions that are rich
in human and social capital, government policies are more likely to be eﬀective in
inﬂuencing economic outcomes.
A natural extension of the previous chapters is to see whether the main argu-
ments and the ﬁndings also hold for other socio-economic outcomes. So far the
focus is on economic outcomes such as innovation and economic growth. Chapter
5 investigates the relation between social capital and crime.12 Crime is a social
outcome with social and economic costs and driven by social as well as economic
factors. By employing current and historical data for Dutch municipalities and by
providing new indicators to measure social capital, it has been found that there is
a a causal link between social capital and crime. The estimation results suggest
that higher levels of social capital are associated with lower crime rates and that
municipalities’ historical states in terms of population heterogeneity, religion and
education aﬀect current levels of social capital.
Chapter 6 is organized as a case study and policy chapter building on the
previous ﬁndings that formal institutions aﬀect social capital formation in the
(medium) long run.13 The application of this argument to EU-Turkey relations
is interesting as one of the main arguments against Turkey’s membership is that
Turkey cannot adapt to European values and EU institutions. On the contrary,
by following an institutionalist approach, this chapter provides evidence that Eu-
ropean values relating to religion and democracy are not as common as they are
believed to be and that many of Turkey’s supposed cultural diﬀerences with the
rest of Europe are in fact unsubstantiated. These so-called common European val-
ues, cornerstones in many of the arguments against Turkey’s membership, diﬀer
greatly among the EU members and adding Turkey does not make any diﬀerence
to increase the heterogeneity. More signiﬁcant diﬀerences between Turkey and the
EU are of an economic and political nature and, as such, could only be addressed
through institutional capacity building with EU support in Turkey. The main
argument is that institutional change, deliberately supported by the EU, will per-
12 This chapter is based on the work with Bas ter Weel “The impact of social capital on crime:
Evidence from the Netherlands” appeared as UNU-MERIT working paper and IZA discussion
paper. For details see Ak¸ comak and ter Weel (2008b,c).
13 This chapter is partially based on the previous work with Saeed Parto “How ‘black’ is the
black sheep compared to all others: Turkey and the EU” appeared as UNU-MERIT working
paper. For details see Ak¸ comak and Parto (2006).14 Introduction
haps bring short term economic gains, but what matters is that it will also cause
societal values to change. The combined aﬀect of these two channels neutralizes
the two cornerstone arguments against Turkey’s membership (i.e., that Turkey is
economically underdeveloped and that Turkey is culturally diﬀerent).
The ﬁndings in chapters 2 to 6 are summarized in chapter 7 with further dis-
cussion on social capital and socio-economic outcomes. We conclude by presenting
various implications for further research.Chapter 2
Bridges in social capital: A
review of the literature and
the social capital of social
capital researchers
...plunged into a whiteness so luminous, so total, that it swallowed up
rather than absorbed, not just the colours, but the very things and
beings, thus making them twice as invisible.
Jose Saramago, Blindness
I found myself chasing a target that moved and multiplied at a pace
that deﬁed my capacity to catch up
Ben Fine, Social capital versus social theory
2.1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a massive interest in non-economic explanations
to economic phenomena that reach beyond neo-classical economics and the so-
called homo economicus. In this new world the individual is not a mere rational
agent disengaged from his social environment, but beyond that has the ability to
aﬀect the incentive structure that he faces by engaging in social interactions. The
individual is embedded in various social environments characterized by certain
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norms and values and therefore could act voluntarily in the virtue of these norms
and values contrary to the expected economic self interest. Individual egoistic
behavior could also be constrained by the social environment itself. Therefore, in
this world, community character is just as important as individual agents are. This
line of reasoning has led to a revival in research bridging economics to sociology
and in this respect the concept “social capital”, coined ﬁrst by Jacobs (1961) and
Loury (1977), has become a major point of focus for economists as well as other
social scientists. This revival could also be viewed as an awakening of the old
sociology-economics bond that tends to be forgotten in the neo-classical tradition.
The literature on social capital has grown at an exponential pace in the last
20 years. After Glenn Loury’s introduction of the term in 1977, further papers us-
ing diﬀerent deﬁnitions of social capital appeared in the late 1980s (e.g., DiMaggio
and Mohr, 1985; Bourdieu, 1986; Flap and De Graaf, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Fratoe,
1988). Since then about 2,500 papers have been published in the Social Sciences
Citation Index (SSCI) on the topic. Social capital is now associated with higher
economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997); higher education (e.g., Coleman,
1988); higher ﬁnancial development (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004);
better innovative outcomes (e.g., Ak¸ comak and ter Weel, 2006); lower homicide
rates (e.g., Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001); lower suicide rates (e.g., Hel-
liwell, 2007); better public health (e.g., Kawachi, Kim, Coutts, and Subramanian,
2004); and higher value creation by ﬁrms (e.g., Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1997).
Scholars have also mentioned the possible adverse eﬀects of social capital (e.g.,
Fukuyama, 1995; Gambetta, 1996; Portes, 1998). The literature is immense and
spans sociology, economics, organization, management, political science, planning
and development, and health sciences. Figure 2.1 shows the number of articles on
social capital in the SSCI and the citation records of these papers in the period
1988 to 2007. Panels (a) and (b) depict the absolute number of articles in “ti-
tle” and “topic” categories respectively. As visible from the graphs, prior to 1993,
when Putnam promoted the concept in his book “Making Democracy Work: Civic
traditions in Modern Italy”, there were only 10 papers on social capital. In the
last 15 years an average of 160 papers have appeared every year with, on average
about 1,500 citations to them.1 However the absolute numbers could be mislead-
ing as most likely other research topics display a similar trend. Therefore we also
collected information on the articles on “human capital”. Figure 2.1 panels (c)
and (d) replicate the graphs in panels (a) and (b) in terms of number of social
1 The search parameter ‘social capital’ in “topic” resulted in 2,556 articles from 1988 to the
end of 2007. The search parameter ‘human capital’ returned 3,020 articles over the same pe-
riod. The search for ‘social capital’ or ‘trust’ in “title” resulted in 1,594 hits and the search
for ‘human capital’ or ‘education’ in “title” returned 3,995 articles. The search is limited to 10
areas: economics, sociology, management, business, political science, interdisciplinary social sci-
ences, planning and development, business and ﬁnance, environmental studies and urban studies.
Extending the search to other areas such as geography and public health improves the results
and the increasing trend becomes much more visible. http://portal.isiknowledge.com/portal.cgi.
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capital articles per human capital article.2 This adjustment do not change the
qualitative results. 20 years ago there were about 0.1 social capital articles per
human capital article but now there are 1.2 social capital articles per human capital
article. This is an additional evidence of the extent of the social capital research.
Despite this interest, there has not been an agreement on what social capital
actually is. The concept is widely used both at the macro and micro level without
really specifying the sources of it which makes the concept rather vague. It has
been used as a catch-all term encompassing all social explanations to various socio-
economic phenomena. A number of scholars have already commented on the major
contradictions and weaknesses regarding social capital that have to be resolved,
clariﬁed and developed, respectively (e.g., Portes, 1998; Fine, 2001; Durlauf and
Fafchamps, 2005). The purpose of this chapter is to clarify certain aspects of social
capital which will serve as a guide for the following chapters. Given the size of
the literature, it is a tremendous task to review all the literature. This chapter
makes an attempt to (i) shed light on the origins of the concept of social capital;
and (ii) build an inventory of various deﬁnitions of the concept to ﬁnd elements
that are common to most deﬁnitions; (iii) compare and contrast diﬀerent forms of
capital; and (iv) elaborate on recent issues regarding social capital such as diﬀerent
approaches to measurement and how institutions aﬀect social capital.3
The next section highlights four streams of research that developed prior to
the concept of social capital, but very much in line with contemporary use of the
concept. Section 2.3 discusses the concept at length providing a detailed compar-
ison with other forms of capital. Section 2.4 highlights three issues that are novel
and central to the thesis: eﬃciency gains from social capital; measurement of so-
cial capital; institutions-social capital link. Section 2.5 presents a social network
analysis to assess social capital of social capital researchers. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Origins of social capital
Before deﬁning the concept of social capital, it is important to understand the ori-
gins of the concept. Therefore we summarize the ﬁndings of four diﬀerent streams
of research prior to the “social capital” literature that share common characteris-
tics with the concept of social capital. First, there is a well-developed literature
on whether interpersonal ties are conducive to better opportunities in the labour
market (e.g., Granovetter, 1973; Lin, Walter, and Vaughn, 1981; Lin, 1982; Flap
and De Graaf, 1986; Sprengers, Tazelaar, and Flap, 1988; De Graaf and Flap,
1988; Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988; Boxman, De Graaf, and Flap, 1991). More
2 The numbers in panels (c) and (d) are calculated by dividing the absolute number of articles
(or citations) on social capital by the absolute number of articles (or citations) on human capital.
3 The focus is on the literature linking social capital to economic growth, innovation, and
crime. Most of the literature on social capital in development and planning, organization, and
health sciences is discarded not because it is not important but simply because it is outside the
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speciﬁcally, this research argues that an individual’s family, friends and acquain-
tances form a social network that serves as a social resource, which can be utilized
to gather information on job opportunities and ﬁnd a new or better job. This
literature also provides evidence that not only close family and friends but also
“signiﬁcant others” (i.e., strength of weak ties) are important in gaining higher
status and income (e.g., Granovetter, 1973, 1974; Lin, Vaughn, and Walter, 1981).
In this early literature, the resources provided by the social network were labelled
as “social resources” (e.g., Lin, Walter, and Vaughn, 1981; Lin, Vaughn, and Wal-
ter, 1981; Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988) or as “social capital” (e.g., DiMaggio and
Mohr, 1985; Flap and De Graaf, 1986; Sprengers, Tazelaar, and Flap, 1988), and
the two terms were used almost as a perfect substitute to each other. 4
Second, the role of rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAS)5 in
pooling risk and achievement of certain economic means was common knowledge
in anthropology and sociology in the 1960s (e.g., Geertz, 1962; Ardener, 1964;
Granovetter, 1985). Economists have re-discovered the importance of ROSCAS at
a later stage (e.g., Besley, Coate, and Loury, 1993; Anderson and Baland, 2002;
Klonner, 2003). Members of this institution contribute ﬁxed amounts regularly.
The resulting sum is then allocated to one of the members on a random basis
(lottery) or on the basis of a bidding system. This process repeats itself until all
contributers have received the sum once. Of course the system strictly depends
on the existence of strong ties between members to enforce social sanctions and to
punish deviant behaviour. Hence, trustworthiness of the members is important as
it constitutes a guarantee that commitments will be kept. Geertz (1962) reviews
how such traditionalistic forms of social relationships are mobilized to achieve
certain economic functions in various countries,6 ranging from small-scale capital
formation (Ardener, 1964) to the purchase of goods like bicycles (Geertz, 1962).
Apart from enabling economic funds these institutions also strengthen solidarity in
the community. As noted by Granovetter (1995) “micro-lending”, better as known
as “micro-credit”, is almost a copy of rotating savings credit associations. As such
they could be labelled as the formalized version of these informal institutions.
Third, there is a large body of work on how social relationships aﬀect health
and well-being, both at the individual and community level (e.g., Cassel, 1976).
Several terms such as, social support, social networks, social ties, social activity,
social integration (House, Umberson, and Landis, 1988) were used to explain this
phenomena in the 1970s and 1980s. The basic argument of this body of work
is that social support inﬂuences human health via two channels, ﬁrst by reduc-
ing stress levels (or exposure to stress) in the presence of stress due to mental
4 At that time social capital was not conceptualized and was far from what we understand
nowadays. Social capital was mostly associated with resources deriving from social networks and
there was no diﬀerentiation between social capital and social resource.
5 As noted by Geertz (1962) many terms are used to denote rotating savings and credit
associations such as, contribution clubs, mutual lending societies, pooling clubs etc.
6 Especially in the last decade there has been extensive work on rotating savings and credit
associations: See Gugerty (2007) for Kenya, Guerin (2006) for Senegal, Scholten (2000) for
Germany and Austria, Kan (2000) for Taiwan and Tsai (2000) for China.20 Bridges in social capital: A review of the literature...
or physical illness (e.g., Cassel, 1976; Kaplan, Cassel, and Gore, 1977), and sec-
ond by enhancing health in general as the degree of embeddedness in a social
network (e.g., church membership, formal and informal group aﬃliations) is asso-
ciated with public health (e.g., Berkman and Breslow, 1979; Blazer, 1982). This
work on social support, especially the second channel, can also be viewed as the
ancestor of the current literature on social capital and (public) health and well-
being (e.g., Lochner, Kawachi, and Kennedy, 1999; Kawachi, Kennedy, and Glass,
1999). Scholars have shown that social capital is associated with higher levels
of public health (e.g., Kawachi, Kim, Coutts, and Subramanian, 2004; Veenstra,
2002; Poortinga, 2006), lower death rates from cardiovascular problems and cancer
(e.g., Kawachi, Kennedy, Lochner, and ProthrowStith, 1997) and lower depression
(e.g., Lin, Ye, and Ensel, 1999).
Fourth, within the literature of economic sociology there has been substantial
work on immigration and especially on immigrant entrepreneurs (e.g., Light, 1972;
Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Light and Bonacich, 1988; Borjas, 1992; Portes, 1995).
For instance, Baker and Faulkner (1991) argue that an ethnic community could
also be viewed as a social network that enables resources, such as cheap labour
and start-up capital (i.e., via rotating saving and credit association for example).
Immigrant entrepreneurs have privileges to utilize these resources for economic
means, which could not be explained by standard physical and human capital the-
ories (e.g., Wilson and Portes, 1980). The point that should be highlighted here is
that most resources available in these ethnic communities are based on (i) group
solidarity (For instance, see Portes (1995) on how the Cuban community prefers
exiles from Cuba for start-up funds); and (ii) enforceable trust arising from the
monitoring capacity and the eﬀectiveness of internal communication within the
ethnic groups (e.g., Light, 1972). As explained in detail in Portes and Sensenbren-
ner (1993), both enforceable trust and group solidarity, together with moral values
and reciprocity constitute sources of social capital.
To conclude, at least four sources of social capital can be identiﬁed from these
works: (i) individual’s social relations could play signiﬁcant role in status attain-
ment (or in the case of preserving mental health); (ii) identiﬁcation with a group
or a voluntary organization could generate positive outcomes by producing a sense
of belonging; (iii) solidarity that may render individuals to seek for community
well-being rather than individual self-interest; and (iv) enforceable trust mainly
arising from enhanced information exchange, social norms and monitoring capac-
ity in social networks (with closure). These four components are also important
elements of the concept of “social capital” that builds on this early literature.
2.3 Social capital
When Glenn Loury ﬁrst mentioned social capital perhaps he had not imagined
how popular the term would become. As an attempt to criticize neo-classical2.3 Social capital 21
treatment based on individual investment in human capital and skills in explaining
racial income inequalities, he wrote “An individual’s social origin has an obvious
and important eﬀect on the amount of resources that is ultimately invested in
his or her development. It may thus be useful to employ a concept of “social
capital” to represent the consequences of social position in facilitating acquisition
of the standard human capital characteristics”(Loury, 1977, p.176). He was well
aware of the inherent measurement problems, however he argued that such an
attempt would at the very least force scholars to seek other explanations for income
diﬀerentials diﬀerent from what neo-classical economics provide. Although Loury
did not go further to conceptualize the term “social capital”, there were signs in
his approach that he actually meant social resources that are useful in acquisition
of skills with economic value.7
2.3.1 Deﬁning social capital
Given the treatment above, it is best to start approaching the concept ﬁrst from
the micro level. Scholars have deﬁned social capital as;
“An individual’s personal social network, and all the resources he or
she is in a position to mobilize through this network, can be viewed as
his or her social capital.” (Flap and De Graaf, 1986, p.145)
“...someone’s network and all the resources a person gets access to
through this network can be interpreted more speciﬁcally as his “so-
cial capital” ...someone’s social capital is a function of the number of
people from whom one can expect support, and the resources those
people have at their disposal. Here social capital is seen as a means
of production, that can produce better conditions of life.” (Sprengers,
Tazelaar, and Flap, 1988, p.98)
“...social capital refers to friends, colleagues, and more general con-
tacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your ﬁnancial
and human capital...” (Burt, 1992, p.9)
“...resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or
mobilized in purposive actions” (Lin, 2001b, p.29)
“...investment in social relations by individuals through which they
gain access to embedded resources to enhance expected returns of in-
strumental and expressive actions” (Lin, 2001a, p.17)
7 This became clearer when at a later stage he asserted “...social capital refers to naturally
occurring social relationships among persons which promote or assist the acquisition of skills and
traits valued at the market place...it is an asset which maybe as signiﬁcant as ﬁnancial bequests
in accounting for the maintenance of inequality in our society” (Loury, 1992, p. 100, cited in
Woolcock (1998), footnote 2, p. 189). See also Portes (1998).22 Bridges in social capital: A review of the literature...
“...I take social capital to mean interpersonal networks. The advantage
of such a lean notion is that it does not prejudge the asset’s quality.
Just as a building can remain unused and a wetland can be misused, so
can a network remain inactive or be put to use in socially destructive
ways. There is nothing good or bad about interpersonal networks;
other things being equal, it is the use to which a network is put by
members, that determines its quality.” (Dasgupta, 2005, p.S10)
Tracing the commonalities in the deﬁnitions above results in the following list
of four elements: (i) social capital arises from social networks; (ii) the social net-
work itself is not social capital but utilizing it produces social capital (see Table
2.1); (iii) individuals can purposefully invest in social relations with an expected
return; and (iv) social capital may have a negative as well as a positive impact
on outcomes. Regarding the ﬁrst and second elements, it should be clear that for
social capital to arise the existence of a social network is a necessary but not a
suﬃcient condition. To utilize the resources made available by the network, indi-
viduals have to engage in actions. For social capital to exist, three components
-the social structure, resources and the action- must be present (Lin, 2001b) and
social capital depends on the amount and quality of these resources (Portes, 1998).
The third element highlights that one can actually invest in social relations which
means that the agent’s decision to act is calculative (see Table 2.1 (h)). In such
a setting social capital works as it enhances information exchange and as it inﬂu-
ences individual decision making. This strand of research on the concept treated
social capital as a social resource and as Portes (1998) argues, it stands “for the
ability of actors to secure beneﬁts by virtue of membership in social networks or
other social structures”(p.6). Although social capital is mostly associated with
positive outcomes, for instance job search and status attainment (e.g., Lin, Cook,
and Burt, 2001), social control (e.g., Coleman, 1988), and resources arising from
immigrant networks (e.g, Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993); it could also result in
negative outcomes by restricting others (outside the network) to access opportu-
nities (e.g, Waldinger, 1995) or by restricting an individual’s attempt to connect
to other social networks (i.e., restricting bridging social capital) (e.g, Portes and
Sensenbrenner, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; Beyerlein and Hipp, 2005).
At this stage we may consider two intermediary deﬁnitions. Deﬁnitions below
by Pierre Bourdieu and Alejandro Portes could be placed somewhere in between
the micro and macro level interpretations of social capital as they shelter char-
acteristics that could be associated with both levels. These early deﬁnitions are
important because they came very close to the economist point of view (e.g., Zak
and Knack, 2001; Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002).
“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources
which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less
institutionalized relationship of mutual acquaintance and recognition
-or in other words, to membership in a group- which provides each2.3 Social capital 23
of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a
“credential” which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the
word.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p.210)
“...those expectations of action within a collectivity that aﬀect the
economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members, even if these
expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere.” (Portes
and Sensenbrenner, 1993, p.1323)
Looking at these deﬁnitions, it is obvious that both reﬂect at least the ﬁrst
three elements discussed above: an individual’s action within a social network
could change the incentive structure and aﬀect the behaviour of other agents in
the social structure. For instance, enforceable trust and reciprocity may arise from
individual actions within a social structure.8 However what diﬀerentiates these
deﬁnitions from the ﬁrst set of six is that they also refer to terms like ‘collectivity’
and ‘credential’. This macro connotation is apparent especially in the last part of
Bourdieu’s deﬁnition as he bluntly writes “...a ‘credential’ which entitles them to
credit, in the various senses of the word.” Given this, a cautious reader could argue
that accessing this collectivity owned capital does not require a deliberate action
or investment. Once you are born to a social structure you may automatically
possess this social capital (see Table 2.1 (h)). For instance, Portes (1995) presents
various cases where ethnic business enclaves provide resources such as start-up
capital and easy access to markets as long as one is a member of that particular
ethnic community. Taking the concept a step further, among the four sources of
social capital Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) identiﬁed, norms and values and
solidarity are closer to the macro perspective.9 For example, if a Norwegian ﬁrm
deciding between employing a Swedish candidate or one from an African country,
the probability of the Swedish to be employed is higher not because of his/her
merits but perhaps because of the proximity of the Swedish norms and values to
the Norwegian norms and values. Here belonging to a community is an asset and
requires no particular sacriﬁce or investment from the individual (see Table 2.1 (i)
and (h)). In this sense, all the positive aspects deriving from norms, values and
solidarity could be viewed as a leasing from the social community to the individual
who belongs to that community. In the long run, the individual is expected to
behave in a certain manner to repay the leasing.
Turning to the macro level social capital, one could trace back the very origins
of it to Jane Jacobs. To explain the important role of neighbourhood networks
8 Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) argue that their deﬁnition (above) diﬀers from Coleman’s
deﬁnition (below) “where the emphasis is on social structures facilitating individual rational
pursuits”(p.1323).
9 Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) and Portes (1998) identify four sources of social capi-
tal: value introjection (i.e., values and norms that govern a community), bounded solidarity,
reciprocity of exchange and enforceable trust. Portes argues that ﬁrst two govern individual
behaviour by setting up the rules of the game or collective expectation, but last two need instru-
mental action to form.24 Bridges in social capital: A review of the literature...
in enabling self-governance she wrote “...networks are a city’s irreplaceable social
capital. Whenever the capital is lost...the income from it disappears never to
return, until and unless new capital is... accumulated” (Jacobs, 1961, p.138).
In various places in her book Jacobs mentions the importance of acquittance,
knowledge of neighbour behaviour, public respect and public trust which all arise
from social relations in a community but all at the same time have macro rather
than micro association.10 Keeping this in mind the following deﬁnitions at the
macro level arise:
“Social capital is deﬁned by its function. It is not a single entity, but a
variety of diﬀerent entities having two characteristics in common: They
all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate cer-
tain actions of individuals who are within the structure. (p.302)...social
organization constitutes social capital facilitating the achievement of
goals that could not be achieved in its absence or could be achieved
only at a higher cost” (Coleman, 1990, p.304)
“...features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks
that can improve the eﬃciency of society by facilitating coordinated
actions” (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993, p.167)
“Social capital generally refers to trust, concern for one’s associates,
a willingness to live by the norms of one’s community and to punish
those who do not” (Bowles and Gintis, 2002, p.F419)
From the above deﬁnitions we can identify three additional common elements
(v) norms, values and solidarity are sources of social capital, (vi) trust is a source of
social capital. It either originates from repeated interactions (personalized trust)
or it originates from enforceable community sanctions or knowledge common to
all actors in a community (generalized trust), (vii) whatever the source of social
capital, it is based on social networks and/or associations. Starting with (v),
despite the ongoing debate, there is a consensus that norms, values, solidarity and
trust are sources of social capital (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Portes and Sensenbrenner,
1993; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Durlauf and
Fafchamps, 2005). The main diﬀerence is that scholars who approach the concept
from a micro perspective put stress on the individual action (and investment) to
mobilize resources inherent in the social networks (e.g., De Graaf and Flap, 1988;
Fratoe, 1988; Portes, 1998; Lin, 2001b,a; Zak and Knack, 2001; Glaeser, Laibson,
and Sacerdote, 2002; Dasgupta, 2005), whereas scholars who view social capital
10 One can actually trace this track back to the writings of Tocqueville (1981)[1835] who
stressed the role of civic associations and civil society in the United States in bonding the
public for common purposes; Marx on how workers identify themselves with the working class
to support each other (cited in Portes, 1998, original in 1894); Durkheim on involvement and
participation in associations (cited in Portes, 1998, original in 1893); even to Weber (1958)[1905]























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.28 Bridges in social capital: A review of the literature...
as a communal asset highlight the role of community and social structure in fa-
cilitating (or constraining) certain individual behavior for the individual and/or
communal well-being (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993;
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Tabellini, 2005). Bourdieu’s and
Portes’ attempts are a bridge between the two strands. The approach taken here
is inclined towards the latter rather than the former school.
2.3.2 Is social capital a form of “capital”?
Another inexhaustible debate on social capital is whether social capital is “capital”,
in the sense that Marx refers to it. This issue received considerable attention
from researchers trying to unveil social capital (e.g., Arrow, 1999; Fine, 2001; Lin,
2001b) and some of them even suggested other names such as “social capacity”
(e.g., Smith and Kulynych, 2002) to denote what social capital is referring to.
In Kenneth Arrow’s short introduction to the edited volume of Dasgupta and
Serageldin (1999), he argues why it may not be correct to refer to social capital
as “capital” by listing its various diﬀerences from physical capital (see also Sobel,
2002). In a book length discussion on social capital, Fine (2001) discusses the
shortcomings of social capital in depth arguing that all forms of capital are social
in a sense and he questions the validity of labelling a form of capital as “social”. On
the other hand, Lin (2001b) neutralizes these contentions simply by deﬁning capital
as “an investment with expected returns in the marketplace” (p.6).11 Picking up
from this he deﬁnes social capital as “investment in social relations with expected
return in the marketplace” (p.19). In a recent assessment on whether social capital
is really capital Robison, Allan, and Siles (2002) list the capital like properties of
social capital and argue that social capital could be treated as capital.
Given the plenary discussions of these scholars one should avoid repetition
and a monotonous discussion. Therefore, the following table (Table 2.1) lists
commonalities and diﬀerences between physical, human and social capital. Social
capital could be treated as a form of capital similar to the treatment towards
human capital (e.g., Schultz, 1961; Becker, 1964). Knowing how social capital
forms creates a basis for discussing the capital features of social capital. Social
capital could form in several diﬀerent ways. It could form as (i) a by-product. For
example, due to higher status and education one’s social network resources extend;
(ii) arise as an endowment or inheritance. For instance, when an individual is born
with status; and (iii) form as a result of deliberate investment. The argument is
based brieﬂy on four characteristics of capital.
Capital is transformative. It converts an input to an output. Social capital is
productive in the sense that once utilized it is possible to achieve certain outcomes
11 The sources cited above provide thorough discussion on this issue. For instance, Lin (2001b)
starts with reviewing Marxian view of capital and continues with human, cultural and social
capital, all of which he refers to as neo-capital theory. Fine (2001) has much wider concerns as
he argues that the term “social capital” is just another expression (or evidence) to validate the
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with lower cost (Coleman, 1990). We have listed many examples where social
connections or community characteristics provide certain material beneﬁts. The
productive power of social capital comes from combining sympathetic relationships
with other inputs, such as human capital to provide beneﬁts and in some cases
preferential treatment (e.g., Robison, Allan, and Siles, 2002).
Capital also represents a forgone consumption or could be labelled as savings
for future use which makes it investable. In cases of physical and human capital,
current activities are delayed for future use. Both cases involve deliberate sacri-
ﬁce for future beneﬁts and investment is calculative. Social capital could also be
viewed as capital when one considers an important element in decision making:
time. Agents invest their time for setting up and strengthening relations for fu-
ture beneﬁts that are expected to accrue from this investment. Time (diverted
from other activities) is deliberately saved and then spent towards building social
capital. Utilizing the time element also neutralizes criticism by Arrow (1999) that
there is no material sacriﬁce in investing in social capital. Time could be converted
to material resources. It should be noted, however, that only in the case of a de-
liberate sacriﬁce is the investment calculative as modelled and shown in several
studies at the individual level (e.g, Zak and Knack, 2001; Glaeser, Laibson, and
Sacerdote, 2002).
Another feature of capital is that it involves opportunity cost. The opportunity
cost of investing in technology A could be technology B; amount that could be
earned if invested otherwise; current production etc. In a similar manner investing
in human capital has opportunity costs such as wages and leisure activities. It has
been argued that social capital lacks this feature (e.g., Baron and Hannon, 1994).
Referring once again to the time element social capital also has an opportunity
cost. Setting up and strengthening relations takes time and the forgone time could
be used in other useful ways, such as investing in human capital instead.
A ﬁnal element of capital is durability (and decay). Physical and human capital
are durable and their value depreciates if left idle and through time. This can be
extended to social capital as well. A relation with a friend loses its strength
in time if there is no particular attempt from either parties to continue face to
face interaction. Human and social capital do have another feature which is not
exactly shared by physical capital. Their values could also increase with use. For
instance, due to repetition people usually master certain skills (i.e., learning by
doing). Similarly, social capital appreciates with use and depreciates with disuse
(or misuse) (e.g., Hirschman, 1984; Ostrom, 1999). However what makes social
capital diﬀerent from the other two is that social capital resides in the relation not
on the nodes. This means that it is rather fragile when compared to physical and
human capital as it becomes obsolete if one party terminates the relationship.
To summarize the discussion Table 2.1 shows that social capital: is a productive
stock that arises from social interactions and community values and norms; resides
in the relation (or an asset of the community) rather than in the actor which
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convert to economic capital, nor is it easy to transfer ownership and it is therefore
characterized also by underinvestment.
2.3.3 “Adverse” social capital
As should be clear from the discussion above social capital could also have a neg-
ative impact on socio-economic outcomes. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) and
Portes (1998) list several cases ranging from strong norms, constraints on individ-
ual freedom to levelling pressures. For instance, the community may put pressure
on individuals to keep potentially mobile individuals at the same level as their
peers, in a way constraining them to reach a better opportunity set. In a related
way, Fukuyama (1995) argue that although solidarity and levels of trust are high
within communities in China, the same cannot be suggested in relations with peo-
ple outside the kinship group, which may eﬀect economic outcomes (e.g., Whitley,
1991). Collier and Garg (1999) argue that kinship groups have beneﬁcial eﬀects
on bonding social capital but they might also become a threat to the economy
as they might foster corruption. In research to diﬀerentiate between bonding and
bridging social capital Beyerlein and Hipp (2005) follow a similar line of argument
and show that Protestant groups such as the Calvinists have very high levels of
within group solidarity but have weak intercourse with the community (for exam-
ple, almost no voluntary work for the good of community). So what may be good
for a small community may not be good for the overall. Regularly cited examples,
such as the Klu Klux Klan and the Italian maﬁa have similar negative impacts on
the society. In the maﬁa case, for instance, within and between group competition
may destroy other forms of social capital, mainly due to violence imposed on the
larger community (e.g., Gambetta, 1996).
2.4 Issues on social capital
There are several issues regarding social capital that are lively debated in the
recent literature, and are central to the main idea of the thesis and the major
contributions stem from these debates.
2.4.1 Eﬃciency gains from social capital
How does social capital aﬀect outcomes? Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) argue
that for social capital to have a positive impact on economic outcomes the decen-
tralized equilibrium must not be a Pareto optimum. So, social capital works in
a second best world and it improves eﬃciency by ﬁxing an imperfect information
problem, by resolving a coordination failure or by altering individual incentives.
These eﬃciency gains could mostly be achieved via two channels: (i) social capital
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1988; Granovetter, 1995; Fafchamps and Minten, 1999; Barr, 2000; Lin, Cook, and
Burt, 2001, and also the literature on spillovers and regional economic development
e.g., Feldman, 2000; Glaeser, 2000; Porter, 2003; Iyer, Kitson, and Toh, 2005); and
(ii) social capital induces altruism and group identity (e.g., the literature on rota-
tion savings and credit associations discussed in the introduction or the literature
on trust experiments e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001). Most of the observed
beneﬁcial eﬀects of social capital broadly fall under one of these categories (e.g.,
use of reputation as signalling or gathering information through social networks
that is obtainable at a cost in the absence of social capital). The economics lit-
erature raises trust as a source of social capital. Both empirically (e.g., Knack
and Keefer, 1997; Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005a) and theoretically (e.g., Zak
and Knack, 2001) trust is shown to have eﬀect on economic growth. In a very
lax way trust could be deﬁned as an optimistic expectation regarding other agents
behavior (Fafchamps, 2004) or as Knack and Keefer (1997, p.1258) argue, trust
reﬂects “the percentage of people in a society who expects that most others will
act cooperatively in a prisoners dilemma context”. In this regard, eﬃciency gains
could also result simply because of trust between business partners. For instance,
collaboration on joint research is easier in the existence of trust between partners,
whereas absence of it may result in transaction costs due to monitoring. By way of
these mediating channels social capital could render positive eﬀects on individual
and community level economic outcomes.
Turning to the link between social capital and crime, social capital aﬀects crime
through three mechanisms. First, social capital provides informal control that
prevents crime in the ﬁrst place. Second, social capital could be viewed a source
of (family) support. The idea is that people lacking family or community support
are more easily involved in criminal activities. Finally, beneﬁts arising from social
networks make involvement in criminal activity more costly and less probable. For
instance, neighbourhoods in which people are involved in community activities face
lower levels of crime because the opportunity cost of committing crime is higher.
Social capital and innovation
The literature linking social capital to economic growth is silent on how social
capital transforms into growth. Innovation is identiﬁed as an important channel.
The main argument is that in additions to the direct impact, social capital aﬀects
growth indirectly through innovation. Research linking social capital to innovation
has taken oﬀ very recently and therefore is premature (e.g., Tura and Harmaako-
rpi, 2005; Hauser, Tappeiner, and Walde, 2007; Beugelsdijk, 2007). For instance,
Landry, Amara, and Lamari (2002) show that a ﬁrm’s social capital aﬀects both
the decision to innovate and the radicalness of the emerging innovation. In a sim-
ilar vein, Murphy (2002) highlights the role of trust in improving the quality of
information exchange and thereby enhancing innovation.
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information and resources arising from networks. Management scholars have ar-
gued that social network eﬀects such as acquaintance, reciprocal commitment and
trust are positively associated with learning, strategic knowledge transfer and dif-
fusion of information within large ﬁrms and in strategic alliances based on R&D
(e.g., Tsai, 1998; Bouty, 2000; Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Muthusamy and White,
2005). Moreover information (gathering, exchange and diﬀusion) plays an impor-
tant role in innovation and innovation is increasingly becoming a network phe-
nomena (e.g., Rutten and Boekema, 2007). One way to associate social capital
to innovation is to refer to the role of social interactions and trust in facilitat-
ing resource exchange and thereby aﬀecting innovation outcomes. However, the
argument in this study stems from a diﬀerent approach as it derives from the lit-
erature on how R&D is ﬁnanced. The novelty in the argument necessitates further
discussion.
R&D projects are risky, which causes ineﬃciencies in ﬁnancing R&D eﬀorts.
The investor may be unwilling to invest simply because of the high probability of
failure of the emerging innovation. Forming expectations regarding the result of
the R&D is challenging because it is not possible to deﬁne the nature of the R&D
ex ante (e.g., Jones and Williams, 2000). In more complex scenarios, information
asymmetries and moral hazard problems may severely hinder the ﬁnancing of
R&D. For instance, Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue
that investors are not fully able to diﬀerentiate between “good” and “bad” R&D
projects and this might constrain ﬁrms to attract external funding. Distinguishing
lemons, to paraphrase Akerlof (1970), might become easier if the ﬁrm reveals the
true quality of the R&D project. On the one hand, ﬁrms may disclose technological
information and enable investors to assess the R&D project more easily. But,
this information might be useful to other competitors and eventually decrease
the private returns of the ﬁrm. Bhattacharya and Ritter (1983) show that, when
the ﬁrm is large enough, it may choose to ﬁnance R&D projects internally to
avoid this cost. Yet, for most innovative ﬁrms such costs are unavoidable. On
the other hand, ﬁrms may reveal the quality of the project by investing more in
it (in terms of using own ﬁnancial resources or increasing eﬀort). Signalling in
this way would also produce a welfare loss resulting from investment in one’s own
project beyond the point that would be optimal if the true quality of the project
could be communicated without incurring costs. Nevertheless, R&D projects may
be ﬁnanced by outside capitalists, at the risk of ﬁrms misusing the funds made
available by the third party. Of course, one straightforward way to overcome such
a problem is to monitor the ﬁrm (or the research unit) and to control whether
the ﬁrm is investing in R&D rather than misusing the funds.12 However, high
monitoring cost may also make investors hesitant to invest in R&D projects as
shown by Boocock and Woods (1997). Given that venture capital markets are
critical for innovation (e.g., Kortum and Lerner, 2000), higher levels of social
12 Bougheas (2004) shows that there are strong incentives for banks to monitor their clients
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capital may alleviate these problems and yield higher innovation output by
• Preventing egoistic behaviour: This is mainly achieved through the enforcement
of informal norms. For instance ﬁrms with “bad” projects may cease to mimic
ﬁrms with “good” projects because of the fear that this will aﬀect their reputa-
tion.
• Changing expectations: Investors may ﬁnance an R&D project by considering
the reputation of the ﬁrm. For example, if a ﬁrm exhibits a reputable character
by signalling the true quality of its projects for a certain period, this would
increase the trustworthiness of the ﬁrm in the eyes of the investors. Investors
may change their expectations regarding the ﬁrm, which would increase the
probability of ﬁnancing the R&D project.
• Reducing transaction costs: Supposedly, if the relation between the ﬁnancier
and the ﬁrm is characterized by trust, monitoring costs are low. Hence, an
environment of trust would reduce monitoring costs. By the same token, it
may reduce the costs incurred by the ﬁnancier to gather information about the
quality of ﬁrms and the projects.
Social capital and crime
Economists argue that individuals involve in crime (especially property crime)
due to calculative cost-beneﬁt analysis (e.g., Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973). Recently
these models have been extended to incorporate social norms and stigma that may
also inﬂuence participation in criminal activity (Williams and Sickles, 2002). The
idea is that the individual gains utility from his/her social capital (for instance,
reputation, family etc.) so he/she would not risk loosing utility generating social
capital (loss of reputation, loss of a good job, divorce etc.) that may result from
involvement in criminal activity. In a related sense and similar to the eﬀects of
low education and poverty on crime, the lack of social capital may also increase
the probability of committing crime (e.g., Land, McCall, and Cohen, 1990).
As argued above social capital could be linked to crime in at least three ways.
The argument is based on Portes’ taxonomy regarding three functions of social
capital: (i) as a source of social control; (ii) as a source of family support; (iii) as
a source of social networks beneﬁts (Portes, 1998).
First, social disorganization theory supposes that crime results from weak in-
formal social controls (e.g., Kornhauser, 1978; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Bursik
and Grasmick, 1993). In disorganized communities people are unwilling to provide
informal monitoring therefore one can argue that communities with higher levels of
social capital provide better social control hence face lower crime rates. If formal
control is the issue, according to the systemic model of crime (e.g., Bursik and
Grasmick, 1993) the eﬀectiveness of law enforcement and public control is higher
in communities with extensive civic engagement. Additionally control is under-
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resulting from social attachment and bonds into their decisions (Williams and
Sickles, 2002). This utility generating social capital may deter an individual from
committing crime. Once aggregated, these individual decisions that incorporate
positive social network utility may lead to a well-connected community where civic
engagement is high. It has been shown that crime rates are lower in communities
where trust is high and civic engagement is widespread (e.g., Taylor, Gottfredson,
and Brower, 1984; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld,
2004)
Second, disadvantaged families and persons (e.g., Case and Katz, 1991) invest
less in the social community which they belong to. This may lead to disorganized
communities with weak informal social controls where individuals participate less
in community activities and are unwilling to intervene in cases of crime (e.g.,
Sampson, Morenoﬀ, and Earls, 1999). Mechanisms such as learning eﬀects, imita-
tion and taking the peers as a role model play role in this link (e.g., Manski, 2000;
Evans, Wallace, and Schwab, 1992). This is also partially due to changes in timing
and order of life-course events (for example, early marriage, young parenthood and
divorce). Macmillan (1995) and Sampson and Laub (1993) argue that changing
timing of these events aﬀect the transition from adolescence to adulthood and this
in turn weakens family support and informal social control mechanisms for late
teens and young adult which may lead to high juvenile crime.
Third, communities with strong attachments among citizens are better able
to deal with the threat of crime. This is because exchange of information on
malignant behaviour between citizens and neighbours may facilitate responsive
action to prevent possible criminal behaviour in the ﬁrst place (e.g., Sampson,
Morenoﬀ, and Earls, 1999). In these communities the cost of conﬂict resolution
decreases (or conﬂicts are resolved in peaceful ways) due to strong attachment and
involvement in community matters (e.g., Hirschi, 1969).
2.4.2 Social capital and formal institutions
Despite the growing literature on social capital the interplay between formal in-
stitutions and social capital (as an informal institution) has not been considered
as a major research area. This study emphasizes the role of formal institutions in
shaping social capital.
Throughout the thesis it is shown that historical institutions, such as education,
literacy, past political institutions, state of universities and religiosity are impor-
tant in forming current levels of social capital. This line of reasoning stems from
the seminal work by North (1981) who argues that institutions and history matters
for current economic outcomes and rests on recent empirical research by Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2005) and Tabellini (2005) who have veriﬁed the argu-
ments developed by Douglas North. This argument could also be supported by
the literature on experimental trust games (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe,
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to the expected Nash equilibrium Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) suggest
social history as an explanation since social history provides common knowledge
to agents.
Starting with the issue of trust, the approach in this study is based on the ef-
ﬁciency gains resulting from trust at the macro level. However how trust forms is
a complex issue as recently noted by Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) and Beugels-
dijk (2008a). The literature emphasized two sources. Trust could arise due to (a)
repeated interpersonal interactions between two agents that could be labelled as
individual (or micro) level trust; (b) enforceable community sanctions, norms or
common knowledge about the population of agents (e.g., Platteau, 1994a,b) that
could be labelled as generalized (or macro) trust. Chapters 3 and 4 suggest a third
source of trust which is not directly arising from social networks and/or associa-
tions: (c) well-functioning formal institutions in the past.The diﬀerence between
the ﬁrst two is that, “the former takes time and eﬀort to establish while the latter
is instantaneous” (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005, p.1646). On the other hand the
diﬀerence between the third and the ﬁrst two is that both (a) and (b) originate from
informal type of organizations such as social networks and associations, whereas
(c) originates from formal institutions such as the justice system, education, the
political institutions etc. In a related manner, Beugelsdijk (2006) argue that the
generalized trust question measures well-functioning institutions rather than trust
itself. This argument further led to a fruitful discussion on informal and formal
institutions (Beugelsdijk, 2008b; Uslaner, 2008). The discussion here rests on pre-
vious works on trust which are summarized in Zucker (1986). Zucker identiﬁes
three forms of trust: (i) process-based, where trust depends on history of inter-
personal exchanges; (ii) characteristic-based, where trust is associated with the
common codes and values of the community that a person belongs to (i.e., ethnic-
ity, family background etc.); and (iii) institutional-based, where trust is embodied
in formal societal structures such as certiﬁcation, legal and political institutions
and education. Zucker further argues that due to immigration, internal migration,
and instability in business corporations from mid 1800s to early 1900s processed
based trust is slowly replaced (or supplemented) by institutional based trust.
The approach in this thesis diﬀers from the rest of the literature in one impor-
tant aspect, as the argument is that the history of institutional settings (and their
evolution) plays a role in trust formation hence suggesting that (c) has an eﬀect
on (b) in the long run (due to see the empirical evidence provided in Chapters
3, 4 and 5). This approach also extends the argument of Williamson (2000) that
informal institutions impose constraint on formal institutions in a way suggesting
that informal institutions create formal institutions in an evolutionary setting. We
argue that the causality runs in both ways in the long-run. The relation between
informal and formal institutions is dynamic in the sense that informal institutions
are shaped by formal institutions, which are themselves long-run reﬂections of past
values, beliefs and norms.
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for social capital in general. When analyzing the social capital-crime link it is
shown that the levels of religiosity (protestant ethic) and education a century ago
are strongly correlated with current levels of social capital -measured by various
indicators such as blood donation, voluntary contributions to charity and voter
turnout.
This association between formal institutions and social capital has quite im-
portant implications for policy making as discussed in chapters 4 and 6. For
instance, by investing in political and legal institutions governments can achieve
dual objective at once: (i) ﬁrst, by directly aﬀecting economic structure as well-
functioning institutions are associated with better economic achievement in the
short and medium run (e.g., North, 1981); and (ii) second, by raising levels of
social capital in the medium and long-run which translates into economic growth
in the long-run, in a way institutionalizing economic well-being.
2.4.3 Measurement of social capital
Yet another major debate is on how to measure social capital (e.g., Paxton, 1999;
Narayan and Cassidy, 2001; Grootaert, Narayan, Jones, and Woolcock, 2003).
This is partly due to the fact that there has still not been a satisfactory deﬁnition
of the concept. Even the ‘generalized trust’ question that has been used in various
papers as a proxy to social capital led to a lively recent discussion (e.g., Beugelsdijk,
2006, 2008b; Uslaner, 2008). This study employs diﬀerent indicators that at ﬁrst
sight seem loosely related to each other but that measure diﬀerent aspects of social
capital.
Trust has always been identiﬁed as a source of social capital. Portes (1998)
argues that enforceable trust arising from enhanced information exchange, social
norms and monitoring capacity in social networks is one of the main sources of
social capital. Following the literature on social capital and growth we used ‘gen-
eralized trust’ as a proxy for social capital, which measures the degree of oppor-
tunistic behaviour (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). Knack
and Keefer (1997, p.1258) argue that trust “reﬂects the percentage of people in a
society who expect that most others will act cooperatively in a prisoner’s dilemma
context”. This trust indicator is obtained from the European Social Surveys and
constructed from the answer to the following statement: “Most people can be
trusted or you can’t be too careful”. The answer category ranges from (0) “you
can’t be too careful” to (10) “most people can be trusted”, with nine levels in be-
tween. The database also provides various other indicators that were used as social
capital indicators in various studies -such as membership to voluntary associations,
membership to Putnam and Olson groups etc. These secondary indicators are not
pivotal in this study. However analysing the robustness of these indicators yields
potentially interesting ﬁndings (chapter 4).
Besides the ‘generalized trust’ question several other indicators have been em-
ployed. First, electoral turnout is hypothesized to capture civic involvement and2.5 Social capital of social capital researchers 37
consequently participation in decision making. This indicator has been employed
previously as a proxy to social capital (e.g., Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993;
Putnam, 1995; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001). Second, voluntary con-
tributions to charity are supposed to capture the strength of intermediate social
structures such as charities, clubs and churches. Higher voter turnout and volun-
tary donations to charity contribute to a community’s social capital. Third, social
capital is higher when people care for each other or are more altruistic. To mea-
sure this dimension data on blood donations (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales,
2004) is used keeping in mind that people donate blood for altruistic reasons and
in the expectation that other compatriots will behave in a similar way.
The indicators above attempt to measure the presence of social capital However
as Fukuyama (1995) suggests one can also measure the absence of social capital
using traditional measures of population heterogeneity and family structure. Two
measures derive from the absence of informal controls and the extent of informal
contacts and acquaintances. First, social capital in single-parent households is
supposed to be low because of the fact that they lack the second parent at home.
Family support is a major source of social capital (e.g., Portes, 1998) therefore the
argument is that divorce reduces individual level social capital by breaking families,
indirectly breaking connections among acquaintances to the family members and
by limiting adult supervision. Second, population heterogeneity (or the percentage
of foreigners in a community) is an important factor that aﬀects social capital and
trust due to closure (e.g., Coleman, 1990).
The empirical approach to the measurement of social capital is to a degree new
as social capital is treated as a latent construct. In chapters 4 and 5 the indicators
explained above are reduced to a single dimension -social capital index- by means
of a principal component analysis.
2.5 Social capital of social capital researchers
Given the ambiguity in the deﬁnition(s) (section 2.3) and the measurement of social
capital how should we approach social capital to unveil this vagueness? Given the
multidimensional and interdisciplinary character of social capital can we propose a
better strategy that would result in concrete understanding and clariﬁcation? This
section shows that conducting cross-disciplinary work in terms of joint projects
and co-authorship is necessary for a better understanding of the concept. But
then what is the extent of current multi-disciplinary collaborations? What can we
say about the current degree of social capital of social capital researchers? Simple
social network analysis provides preliminary answers to such questions.
But ﬁrst, how is social capital perceived in diﬀerent disciplines? As we have
already stressed, social capital builds on diﬀerent concepts, most important of
which is social networks. In sociology social capital is generally perceived to be
a social resource deriving from social networks (e.g., Lin, 2001b). Other elements
such as trust, solidarity, values and norms were included in the deﬁnition at a later38 Bridges in social capital: A review of the literature...
stage (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1995; Portes, 1998). This expansion created a
certain degree of ambiguity. There was a tendency for diﬀerent disciplines to spe-
cialize on certain aspects of social capital. For instance, sociology literature builds
on social resources, solidarity and values, while economists focus on trust and other
elements of social capital are much less pronounced. On the other hand, research
on public health almost solely depend on the concepts such as sympathy, caring
and solidarity. Economists approach social capital in a calculative manner (i.e.,
beneﬁts accruing from a relation is calculable), whereas for sociologists, psycholo-
gists and political scientists social capital is not calculative but rather learned in
socialization (Robison, Allan, and Siles, 2002). Some management scholars argue
that social capital has distinct forms. For example, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1997)
diﬀerentiates between three forms: (i) structural social capital that arises from
social relations and networks; (ii) relational social capital which can be deﬁned as
elements that are rooted in the relations such as trust; and (iii) cognitive social
capital that is shared codes and values. Moreover, in a recent assessment Robison,
Allan, and Siles (2002) argue that the concept is vague because the deﬁnitions
often include what social capital can be used to achieve and where social capital
resides as well as what social capital is. Since each discipline focuses on a diﬀerent
element and since communication between disciplines is minimal (as shown below)
the issues of what social capital is and what it includes become blurry even for
researchers who work on social capital. This ambiguity could be reduced by in-
terdisciplinary collaborations. So then, what is the extent of collaboration among
disciplines?
Reviewing the literature one could come up with a framework like the one
displayed in Figure 2.3, which depicts the most inﬂuential researchers who work
on social capital in a time line starting from the seminal works of James Coleman
in 1988 and 1990.13 The ﬁrst 10 years in social capital literature led to a number
of articles that inﬂuenced research that followed. A detailed look at the citation
ﬁgures to these early works reveal interesting patterns. For instance, research by
James Coleman is a seminal work for sociologists (as indicated by a bold line) but
it was also inﬂuential for economists and management scholars (as indicated by
solid lines). In contrast, early works of Nan Lin were highly cited by economists
but not by management scholars. In a similar vein the management literature
on social capital mainly refers to Alejandro Portes, but economists seldom do.14
One of the ﬁrst reviews on social capital by Michael Woolcock is equally cited by
economists and sociologists but hardly cited by the management literature. This
is also true for Robert Putnam. His research is more valued by economists and
13 Other scholars that are mentioned in section 2.2 had inﬂuence on the development of the
concept. However, the starting point is taken as 1988 because Coleman’s work is accepted to be
the ﬁrst one that conceptualizes social capital.
14 Nan Lin engaged in research on social networks -for instance, on labour market outcomes
due to utilization of one’s social network- which may explain why economists tend to cite him.
Alejandro Portes is well-known for his research on immigrant networks and entrepreneurship
























Figure 2.2: Inﬂuential researchers in social capital
sociologists. Finally, outside the sociology literature only Ronald Burt seems to
attract the attention of sociologists (as indicated by a dashed line).
Following the framework above and identifying the most cited articles on social
capital nine researchers are selected as “inﬂuential” social capital scholars.15 Then
a snowball technique is employed to locate the co-authors of these inﬂuential re-
searchers and the co-authors of co-authors’ as well. Only the articles that include
“social capital” and/or “trust” in the title, abstract and keywords are included
in the analysis. This produces a network consisting of 147 researchers with 171
distinct articles also covering the most cited 25 articles on social capital. These
articles have received more than 10,000 citations and constitute roughly around 40
percent of the total citations to the literature. Figure 2.4 is a depiction of the net-
work where the width of the nodes reﬂects the central position of the researcher in
the network. We used betweenness centrality measure to reﬂect the intermediary
position of a researcher. Betweenness centrality measures the inﬂuence a node has
over the diﬀusion of information in a network and is calculated as the fraction of
shortest distance between any two nodes that pass through the node of interest.16
15 A search was conducted in ISI Web of Science for articles (in English) including the term
“social capital” in the keywords and then the articles were sorted according to the citations
they receive. As a double check a similar search was performed within disciplines (economics,
sociology, management and political science) to identify the most cited researches within each
discipline. The social capital researchers selected are: Ronald Burt, James Coleman, Sumantra
Ghoshal, Edward Glaeser, Stephen Knack, Nan Lin, Alejandro Portes, Robert Putnam and
Michael Woolcock.
16 This measure is more appropriate than other centrality measures that focus on reachability40 Bridges in social capital: A review of the literature...
Figure 2.3: Co-authorship network of inﬂuential social capital researchers
The most interesting observation in the network is the presence of isolates.
Nan Lin, Robert Putnam and Michael Woolcock have authored inﬂuential papers
on social capital but do not have co-authors.17 Another interesting ﬁnding is that,
despite the initial start with nine researchers within the disciplines of economics,
sociology and management/business the analysis have identiﬁed other disciplines
and star researchers in them. Among them two are worth mentioning. First, the
analysis identiﬁed Ichiro Kawachi (through a link with Putnam) and his network
who extensively published on social capital and public health. Second, the anal-
of a node in a network as we are interested in bridges. It is also similar to Bonacich power index
where the centrality is aﬀected not only by the central position of the node itself but also by the
centrality of its neighbours. The ﬁgure is obtained by energizing the network several times using
Kamada-Kawai option in Pajek. Loops are allowed which means that the papers that have one
author are also included in the analysis and could easily be seen from the ﬁgure as a line from a
node to itself. For Pajek see http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/
17 It should be noted that the results are for 1988-2007 and only regarding articles on social
capital and/or trust. For instance, Nan Lin has published extensively on social networks which
are not included in the analysis2.5 Social capital of social capital researchers 41
ysis identiﬁed Ernst Fehr (through a link via Paul Zak with Stephen Knack) and
his network who initiated a new line of research on human social behaviour, trust
and reciprocity using experimental designs and collaborating not only with other
economists but also with sociologists and psychologists. The most inﬂuential re-
searchers could easily be recognized in Figure 2.4 as the width of the node reﬂects











Figure 2.4: Co-authorship network: Partitioned in to disciplines
After depicting the simple network the partitions within the network are ana-
lyzed further. Using the available information in ISI Web of Science (and also by
web-searches) information was gathered on the aﬃliations of researchers. The net-
work is partitioned in to six disciplines: economics, sociology, management/business,
political science, health sciences (public health) and psychology.19 The ties be-
tween these disciplines could be seen in Figure 2.5. One can easily recognize the
18 Each color in Figure 2.4 represents a diﬀerent discipline. For the correspondence see Figure
2.5.
19 Economics include planning and development and urban studies. Psychology includes clin-
ical psychology.42 Bridges in social capital: A review of the literature...
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Figure 2.5: Co-authorship network: Bridges among disciplines
links between economics, psychology and health sciences (and to a degree political
science) largely initiated by Ernst Fehr. The research initiated by this network
is promising and it is helpful in understanding how trust and reciprocity forms.
Removing health sciences and psychology from the analysis tells a diﬀerent story
(see Figure 2.6). When only the links between economics, sociology, management
and political science are analyzed one can argue that the extent of collabora-
tion between disciplines is not as rich as it is expected to be (or it ought to be).
The collaborations between economics, sociology and political science are rare and
mainly initiated by scholars such as Ernst Fehr, John Helliwell, Stephen Knack
and Robert Putnam. Collaborations between management science, sociology and
economics are an exception rather than a rule of the game. To get a better picture
of the extent of co-authorship in economics the network is reduced to one discipline
and focused only on economics taking in to account the aggregated ties to other
disciplines. Figure 2.7 clearly shows the bridges between disciplines strengthening
the ﬁndings in Figure 2.6.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics on the overall co-authorship network
in economics, sociology, management and political science between 1988-2007.20
20 The data for this is gathered from ISI Web of Science by using the program
made available by Loet Leydesdorﬀ. For the ﬁrst two rows the search parameter used
is “social capital” in the “title” category. The network also include articles having





Figure 2.6: Co-authorship network: Contextual view of economics
The second column lists the number of researchers in each discipline who work
on social capital. The next two columns present two widely used statistics to
assess the density of a network. Density of a network is deﬁned as the number
of ties in a network as a proportion of all possible ties. The higher the number
the denser the network. Density measures when loops (articles with one author)
are removed are also presented in the table for robustness reasons. At ﬁrst sight
it seems that political science and economics are much denser than sociology and
management. However density measures are not appropriate in this case as they
are negatively correlated with the size of the network. Since the size of each group
diﬀers substantially an alternative measure is presented in the last column based
http://users.fmg.uva.nl/lleydesdorﬀ/software/coauth/index.htm.44 Bridges in social capital: A review of the literature...
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of co-authorship network on social capital
no of density density researchers % of average
nodes loops loops not with max no isolates degree of
allowed allowed of co-authors nodes
All 1988-2000 224 0.00530 0.00532 6 29.02 2.37
All 2001-2007 758 0.00241 0.00241 11 20.18 3.64
Economics 231 0.00603 0.00606 7 24.4 2.78
Sociology 319 0.00590 0.00591 11 22.8 3.76
Management 525 0.00349 0.00350 12 10.8 3.66
Political science 131 0.00921 0.00928 5 32.8 2.41
on the degree of nodes. The degree of a node is the number of ties associated with
it (i.e., the number of co-authors that a researcher works with). Since a higher
degree of nodes represents denser networks the average degree of all nodes is a
reliable measure to compare disciplines. As can be seen from the table the social
capital of social capital researchers in sociology and management is signiﬁcantly
higher than in economics and political science. One interesting ﬁnding is that
when the network is divided in two, as before and after 2000, we see that co-
authorship is increasing through time. A researcher currently working on social
capital has three co-authors on average. Finally, the percentage of isolates within
each discipline reveals for instance that, political scientist tend to work on their
own, whereas most of the management scholars collaborate.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the concept of social capital by ﬁrst analyzing vari-
ous deﬁnitions in the literature to identify common elements. Starting from the
very early use and deﬁnitions of the concept in diﬀerent disciplines seven common
elements were identiﬁed. Second, as a complementary resource we summarized
the main similarities and diﬀerences between physical, human and social capital.
The rationale behind following such a structure is the argument that more cross-
disciplinary collaboration is needed to circumvent the current confusion about
what social capital actually is. A simple social network analysis shows that col-
laboration between disciplines on social capital in terms of co-authorship is a rare
phenomenon. This chapter suggests that future cross-disciplinary work on social
capital will lead to better understanding.
To summarize the current understanding that incorporates both micro and
macro elements, social capital is a social resource arising from social networks or
(social organizations) that leads to beneﬁcial outcomes either by reducing costs or
by creating new forms of information exchange. The following chapters more or
less stick to this deﬁnition. As shown in chapters 3, 4 and 5 the extent of formal2.6 Conclusion 45
institutions in the past has a potential in forming current social capital. This does
not contradict with the deﬁnitions suggesting that social capital arises from infor-
mal institutions (e.g., voluntary associations). It is more of an extension: formal
institutions as well as informal institutions shape social capital. This argument
has important policy implications as suggested in chapters 4 and 6.
Building up on the ideas in this chapter, the next two chapters (Chapter 3 and
4) show how social capital aﬀects innovation and how innovation is identiﬁed as a
mechanism that translates social capital to economic growth. The main arguments
are then exploited to explain the social capital crime link (Chapter 5). The reason
for this extension is simply that crime is an important social phenomenon with
social as well as economic costs.Chapter 3
Social capital, innovation
and growth: Evidence from
Europe
When there’s trust there’ll be treats
Karmacoma, Massive Attack
3.1 Introduction
Economists have long been interested in explaining economic growth. The ad-
vancements in the recent literature emphasize the role of technical change in un-
derstanding economic growth. Pioneered by the studies of Romer (1986, 1990)
endogenous growth theory considers technical change as an endogenous variable
that is aﬀected from the economic decisions of the actors. Likewise its prede-
cessor, so-called “new growth theory” models economic behaviour as disengaged
from social interactions. Nowadays, technical change and economic growth are
understood within a socio-economic framework and as Temple (1999) argues, the
borders of sociology and political science may facilitate interesting contributions
to the thinking on economic growth. In line with this argument, an important
development in social science in the last decade is “the rise of interest in social
capital as a mechanism for understanding socio-economic phenomena” (Durlauf,
2002:459).
In the economic literature social capital has been identiﬁed as an important
determinant in explaining diﬀerences in income. Knack and Keefer (1997) and
Zak and Knack (2001) have shown for a cross-section of countries that countries
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with higher levels of measured trust are richer. It is however not clear how social
capital improves economic outcomes.
This chapter argues ﬁrst that current levels of social capital are formed by
historical institutions and investments, such as early literacy, past political insti-
tutions and universities. This follows important recent empirical research by Hall
and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) and Tabellini (2005),
who basically apply the arguments developed in North (1981) that history matters
for current economic outcomes.
Second, the idea that social capital improves economic outcomes is appealing,
but it is necessary to identify a factor through which social capital improves out-
comes. This chapter suggests that innovation is an important channel by which
social capital improves income growth. The idea is that more advanced historical
institutions have established a higher stock of social capital. Social capital in turn
inﬂuences the innovation process because the ﬁnancing of risky innovative projects
requires that researchers and capital providers trust each other. When they do so,
more successful projects are carried out, which improves innovation outcomes by
means of more patents. Finally, as shown by e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991)
and Aghion and Howitt (1992), higher innovation output yields higher income per
capita.
In the theoretical background of this chapter social capital is integrated in a
simple model of production. In this set up the accumulation of capital generates
knowledge which beneﬁts society and increases income. Knowledge grows because
of research eﬀort and the rate by which new discoveries are made. This way
of modelling is consistent with the approach introduced by Romer (1986) and
further developed by many others (see Aghion and Howitt (1998) for a review).
The accumulation of knowledge is amended by introducing the stock of social
capital. The stock of social capital has a positive eﬀect on the accumulation of
knowledge, which in turn increases output. The idea is that social capital has
a positive eﬀect on the investment in innovation. When researchers live in areas
with a larger extent of social networks and have high norms, venture capitalists are
more likely to invest in risky projects. This argument is similar to the one used by
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), who argue that social capital yields higher
ﬁnancial development. In this chapter the argument is that it induces innovation.
The framework above is applied to the data collected for 102 regions in the EU-
14 (Luxembourg is excluded). The regions of the EU-14 are from a homogeneous
set of countries that have operated under similar judicial and ﬁnancial-economic
regulation for some time now. Hence, variability in current formal institutions
and capital markets is less likely to be of major importance when investigating
regional diﬀerences in economic performance. This is an important advantage of
this approach, since the results presented in Knack and Keefer (1997) are based
on a set of countries including next to OECD member states also less-developed
countries (such as India, South Africa, Nigeria and Turkey) and a number of
South-American countries that seem to be hard to compare in terms of economic3.1 Introduction 49
conditions and institutions. Indeed, as shown by Beugelsdijk, de Groot, and van
Schaik (2004), the presence of poor countries in cross-country samples aﬀects both
the signiﬁcance and size of the eﬀect of social capital on growth. So, showing
that social capital aﬀects welfare, even within a homogeneous group of countries,
improves the credibility of the estimates.
There are important diﬀerences between EU regions and even between regions
within a country in terms of social capital and innovation performance. Recent
work by Moesen, Van Puyenbroeck, and Cherchye (2000), Beugelsdijk and van
Schaik (2005a) and Iyer, Kitson, and Toh (2005) shows that nearly all dimensions
of social capital display relatively large diﬀerences between regions. For instance,
the ratio of the highest to lowest trust score is around 1.2 in Germany and the
United Kingdom and about 1.6 in Spain and Italy (with trust measured by ag-
gregating the information from individuals to the regional level on a scale from
1 to 10). In addition, there are also diﬀerences in innovation inputs and perfor-
mance and income across and within EU countries (e.g., Gambardella, Mariani,
and Torrisi, 2002; Bottazzi and Peri, 2003; Bilbao-Osorio and Rodriguez-Pose,
2004; European Commission, 2001). These diﬀerences are discussed in detail in
Section 3. Finally, regional policies are increasingly strengthened and EU countries
are delegating more responsibilities to regions for the design and implementation
of innovation policies (e.g., European Commission, 2003). This adds to the im-
portance of the regional dimension of this research.
The creation of social capital and its measurement over time is important for
the validity of the empirical analysis. Countries such as Italy, Spain, the United
Kingdom and Germany were once composed of self-governed small states. For
instance in the 18th and 19th century there were important social and economic
diﬀerences between Italian regions under Papal order and regions that were free,
or between Hamburg and the other German regions under Prussian order. We
collect data for past political institutions, the presence of universities, literacy,
and urbanization from 1600 onwards and show how historical developments aﬀect
the current stock of social capital. In other words these historical institutions have
contributed to the early development of social capital (e.g., Tabellini, 2005) and
in Appendix A.2 we present the approach dealing with these historical data.
Information from the European Social Surveys (ESS) and the European Values
Surveys (EVS) is used to obtain measures of the current stock of social capital.
Innovation indicators are taken from Eurostat’s regional database, which contains
information on the number of R&D workers and the number of patent applications.
Economic performance is measured as GDP per capita growth in the period 1990-
2002.
The empirical analysis consists of three steps. First a causal link is established
between social capital and income per capita. Running regressions using historical
institutions as instruments for current social capital results in robust and signif-
icant positive eﬀects of social capital on income per capita. These estimates are
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Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) for an overview). Next, the relationship between
innovation output and social capital is estimated, using the relative number of
patent applications as the dependent variable. Again social capital is instrumented
by using information about historical institutions. The estimates suggest that a
higher stock of social capital yields higher levels of innovation. Finally, a 3SLS
strategy is employed to estimate how historical institutions and investments inﬂu-
ence current social capital, which in turn has an impact on innovation, which is a
determinant of current income. Of course, social capital is also entered directly to
address a possible direct link between social capital and income. The 3SLS esti-
mates suggest a strong eﬀect of innovation on income through social capital, but
no direct eﬀect of social capital on income. The estimates reveal that social capital
is a determinant of innovation, which in turn explains on average approximately
15 percent of the change in income per capita in the 102 EU regions between 1990
and 2002.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the theoretical back-
ground of the linkages among social capital, innovation and income. The data
and descriptive statistics are presented and discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4
explains the empirical strategy. Section 3.5 contains the estimates and robustness
and stability analysis. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical background
Most of the existing literature focuses on the relationship between economic out-
comes and innovation (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1998) or on the role of social
capital for economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001).
This chapter investigates the link between these theories by introducing the role
of social capital in fostering innovation, which in turn plays vital role in explaining
economic outcomes. This approach introduces a number of causal links, which are
systematically analyzed in this section. Since the unit of analysis in the empirical
work is an EU region, the model is constructed in terms of individuals living in
regions with regions operating in autarky.
The model departs from one in which diﬀerences cannot be due to diﬀerences in
market incentives and appropriability of innovation outcomes only, since the focus
is the regions of the EU-14 operating in the same capital market. We conjec-
ture that diﬀerences in the way in which historical institutions have shaped social
capital are important in stimulating innovation. This approach is consistent with
the notions summarized in Aghion and Howitt (1998) in which innovation occurs
through incentives and is stimulated by creativity and market structure, which are
determined by institutions. The improvement is that next to these channels the
channel through which social capital inﬂuences innovative activity is important to
explain diﬀerences in income.
The theoretical framework that this chapter builds on can be summarized as
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tions, increases the incidence of innovation. The reason for this is that investments
in innovative activities are risky and capital providers want to receive commitment
from researchers that their money is well spent. This is easier in an environment
in which people trust each other. In turn, this increases income.
3.2.1 Framework
Production
Consider a simple model in which output in region J (Y J) is produced by using
the inputs labour (LJ) and capital (KJ):
Y = AKαL1−α, (3.1)
where the superscript J is suppressed for simplicity. In this set up, there are
constant returns to capital and labour. A is accumulated endogenously, which
implies that production is characterized by increasing returns.
Assume now that the accumulation of capital generates new knowledge, which
beneﬁts the whole region. Also assume that all individuals and ﬁrms take the
level of AJ as given and cannot inﬂuence this eﬀect when they invest in capital
because they are small relative to the economy. For simplicity, this process takes
the following form:
A = SK1−α, (3.2)
where S is the stock of knowledge or developed ideas, as modelled and explained by
Jones (2005). This set up implies that the accumulation of capital yields external
beneﬁcial eﬀects to the people living in the region as a whole even when capital is
paid its marginal product αY/K.
If these two expressions are combined we obtain
Y = SKL1−α. (3.3)
In this model the accumulation of knowledge is treated as a by-product of cap-
ital accumulation. When L is normalized to one, we obtain the simple standard
growth equation: Y = SK Romer (1986). Note that in this simple model we
abstract from the underlying economics of the model, but that the outcomes are
consistent with a more elaborate model of e.g., creative destruction with tempo-
rary monopoly rents in which three sectors (ﬁnal goods, intermediate products
and research) compose the economy. In such a model, inspired by Aghion and
Howitt (1992), a Cobb-Douglas production technology, a continuum of interme-
diate products and arbitrage in the research sector between investment in capital
and research, show that equation (3.1) is an adequate representation of production.
This level of sophistication is not necessary, however, for the analysis of income
diﬀerences between EU regions.
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in research (e.g., spending on R&D or the number of researchers working on the
development of new ideas) multiplied by the rate at which discoveries take place.
The innovation of our approach is that this rate is not a constant (as in Romer,
1986) or dependant on (part of) the existing stock of knowledge (as in Jones, 2002),
rather it also depends on the stock of social capital in a region (V ): ˙ S = χEβSλV φ.
For simplicity, we abstract from the eﬀects of total research inputs and the existing
stock of knowledge on the growth of the stock of knowledge and focus solely on
the eﬀects of social capital, which is equivalent to using the simplest version of the
Romer-model extended with social capital:
˙ S = ΛV φ, (3.4)
where Λ is a constant capturing the eﬀects of the knowledge stock and total re-
search inputs discussed above. In this equation φ > 0 means that the productivity
of research is increasing in the stock of social capital, which means that the ex-
isting stock of social capital contributes to the success of research. If φ < 0, the
stock of social capital is detrimental to research and if φ = 0, the productivity of
research is independent of the stock of social capital. It is assumed that φ < 1
eliminates permanent growth diﬀerentials between regions, since we are more in-
terested in changes in income levels and the fact that permanent growth eﬀects are
inconsistent with the data (Jones, 1995). The growth rate in this model along a
balanced growth path is determined by the parameters of the production function
for knowledge and the population growth rate (which is zero here).
The conjecture is that 0 < φ < 1, which means that the stock of social capital
increases the productivity and success of research, which increases output. This
argument now needs a microfoundation.
Innovation and social capital
Suppose that there is a constant stream of ideas and that researchers develop these
ideas on their own in small one-person ﬁrms. Deﬁne the utility of researcher i as
Ui = U(ei,NJ,ρi,ki), where ei ∈ {0,1} is the decision to put in eﬀort (1) or not
(0) in developing an idea into productive knowledge, NJ are the social ties or is
the extent of the social network in region J, ρi are the individual norms of the
researcher, which can be low ρL or high ρH (with ρH > ρL) and ki are the cost
of cheating. Following the approach developed in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2004), there exists a cost threshold ¯ ki below which the researcher is deciding
ei = 0. This decision is a function of his norms and the extent of the social
network in the region: ¯ ki = ¯ ki(ρi,NJ), where higher norms and a larger extent
of a region’s social network increase the threshold in the sense that it becomes
harder for the researcher not to exert eﬀort.
Venture capitalists are willing to invest in the idea of researcher i only if they
know that the researcher is exerting eﬀort. This eﬀort is not observable by the
venture capitalists, only the outcome of the innovation process is, where it is3.2 Theoretical background 53
assumed that if ei = 1 the innovation is successful. For simplicity it is assumed
that many capital providers are searching for returns in a one period set up, with
no opportunity to retaliate or learn. The probability that researcher i in region
J will exert eﬀort depends positively on the proportion of researchers with high
norms ρH in region J (deﬁned as ΓJ) and the social network in region J (NJ).
Together, the fraction of researchers of the high type and the extent of the social
network in region J determine the stock of social capital. The higher this stock is,
the higher the willingness of investors to provide venture capital. The individual
venture capitalist’s investment in region J will then be
Ei = f(ΓJ,NJ) = g(V J) (3.5)
with ∂Ei/∂ΓJ > 0, ∂Ei/∂NJ > 0, ∂Ei/∂V J > 0. Here Ei is the amount of money
the investor is willing to invest in innovation, which is either Ei or 0. We abstract
from deﬁning the investor’s exact preferences and modelling the investor’s utility
but assume that the expected output of i’s investment is E(Yi) = (1 − πJ)YH +
πJYL ≥ rEi, where YH (YL) is the output when ei = 1 (ei = 0) and πJ is a
function of ΓJ, with ∂πJ/∂ΓJ > 0. This is similar to the exposition developed in
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004). Equation (3.5) now implies that investments
in research are more productive in high social capital regions. Translating this
to equation (3.4) implies that the social capital stock is a determinant of the
translation of ideas into new knowledge.
Putting the arguments together
This relationship between social capital and innovation is novel and the inter-
pretation of the model needs discussion. There is an element of risk involved in
innovation projects that shows up in diﬀerent ways. The investor may be risk
averse, internal capital constraints may be too high in a competitive market, mon-
itoring costs may be high, or information asymmetries and moral hazard problems
may hinder the ﬁnancing of R&D (e.g, Leland and Pyle (1977), Bhattacharya
and Ritter (1983), Myers and Majluf (1984), Boocock and Woods (1997), and
Bougheas (2004) for the development of these arguments). For the model it does
not matter where the barriers are coming from, as long as social capital can lower
them. This is possible in at least three ways. First, social capital prevents egoistic
behaviour because of the enforcement of informal norms. In a signalling game re-
searchers with “bad” projects can successfully mimic ﬁrms with “good” projects,
leading to underinvestment in innovation. Social capital can alleviate this problem
because of the fear that cheating aﬀects reputation, which increases the thresh-
old ¯ ki below which the researcher is putting in eﬀort and uses the eﬀect of the
strength of NJ on investment. Second, investors may ﬁnance an idea after con-
sidering the reputation of the ﬁrm. If a researcher displays an honest character
by signalling the true quality of his ideas, his trustworthiness increases in the eyes
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regarding the researcher, which would increase the probability of ﬁnancing ideas
in the region. This has the eﬀect of increasing ΓJin a region. Finally, when the
relationship between investor and researcher is based on trust, monitoring costs
are low. Hence, an environment of trust would reduce monitoring costs and make
innovation a more eﬃcient investment. By the same token, social capital may
reduce the costs incurred by the venture capitalist to gather information about
the quality of ﬁrms and the projects. Note that this eﬀect of innovation through
social capital is included next to a direct eﬀect of innovation on output. This
direct eﬀect is embodied in the Λ-term in equation (3.4).
It is also assumed that the formation of the stock of social capital is a long-run
process. In this the recent work by Tabellini (2005) is followed. He shows for
European regions that current culture is shaped by historical institutions in the
period from 1600 to 1850. Research along similar lines by Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2005) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanez, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999)
reveals that early institutions are important determinants of current economic
outcomes, such as income. We follow this argument for the stock of social capital
which is discussed in the next section in more detail.
This simple set up does not present a detailed analysis of the relationship
between social capital and innovation, but is consistent with various channels that
social capital is able to increase innovation. Rather, this model, which can be
easily extended to a full-blown endogenous model with a separate research sector
in the spirit of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)
without changing the outcomes, puts the proposed causal relationship between
social capital, innovation and income together at the regional level. Regions with
higher levels of social capital are more successful at innovating and are therefore
richer.
3.2.2 Empirical implications
Turning now to measurement, the empirical approach ideally would contain mea-
sures of social networks and the norms of researchers on the one hand and measures
of investment behaviour of venture capitalists on the other hand. These are not
observed in big databases, so we turn to output measures applied in previous so-
cial capital studies starting from Knack and Keefer (1997) and to patent data as
measures of successful innovation outcomes. An important prerequisite for empir-
ical analysis is that one has to make sure that the social-capital output measures
are picking up the direct eﬀect of social capital on innovation outcomes and are
unaﬀected by other environmental variables. To make sure that the estimates are
reliable, an instrumental variables approach is used with historical social capital
outcomes aﬀecting the current stock of social capital but not current innovation
and income changes. The empirical strategy is speciﬁed in Section 4 in more detail.3.3 Data and descriptives 55
3.3 Data and descriptives
The data span 14 EU countries divided into 102 regions deﬁned according to the
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). Canarias (ES7), Ciudad
Autonoma de Ceuta (ES63), Ciudad Autonoma de Melilla (ES64), Aland (FI2),
Departments D’outre-mer (FR9), Provincia Autonoma Bolzano (ITD1), Provin-
cia Autonoma Trento (ITD2), Luxembourg (LU), Regiao Autonoma dos A¸ cores
(PT2) and Regiao Autonoma da Madeira (PT3) is excluded due to limited data
availability. For Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the NUTS1 deﬁnition is used and for
Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Sweden NUTS2 is applied.
We employ as many disaggregated regions as the available data permit. The
basic reason for this is to capture the existing diﬀerences even within relatively
larger regions. For instance Navarra (ES22) and La Rioja (ES23) belong to the
same NUTS 1 region Noreste (ES2), however for Navarra the trust score is 35
percent and patent applications are 4 times larger than La Rioja. There were
quite a number of universities in Navarra in 19th century but no universities in La
Rioja. Similarly in Italy Liguria (ITC3) and Piemonte (ITC1) belong to the same
NUTS 1 region but in Piemonte the executives had unlimited authority between
1600 and 1750 compared to Liguria where there were substantial limitations on
executive authority during the same period. Even in a relatively homogeneous
country such as Sweden, Stockholm has much higher trust and innovation numbers
when compared to regions such as Sydsverige and Norra Mellansverige.1
3.3.1 Social capital
Measures of social capital are not without controversy. The fundamental premise
behind the value-added contributions of social capital is that it complements tra-
ditional resources (physical capital, human capital, etc.) with other resources
(social networks, trust, norms and values, etc.) to produce better outcomes (e.g.,
Coleman, 1988). Indeed, from an economist’s point of view, the beneﬁcial eﬀects
arise only in cases where social capital aﬀects expectations. Granovetter (1985)
stresses the networks of (social) relations in establishing expectations to gener-
ate trust to create and enforce norms. In a similar vein, Durlauf and Fafchamps
(2005) argue that social capital yields positive externalities, which are achieved
through shared values, norms and trust that aﬀect expectations and behaviour.
However, it is not easy to come up with a social capital indicator capturing the
above aspects. For instance, Fukuyama (1995) provides various instances of why
trust aﬀects economic well-being. The empirical social capital literature focuses
on explaining diﬀerences in economic growth and has beneﬁted from “generalized
trust” as a proxy for social capital, which measures the degree of opportunistic
1 Similar investigation are done for 87 NUTS 1 regions and for 82 regions beneﬁting from the
EU structural funds (e.g., Ak¸ comak and ter Weel, 2008a). The results display a similar character




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.3.3 Data and descriptives 57
Figure 3.1: Generalized trust scores, EVS vs. ESS
behavior (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). Knack and Keefer
(1997, p.1258) argue that trust “reﬂects the percentage of people in a society who
expect that most others will act cooperatively in a prisoner’s dilemma context”.2
With this in mind, the main social capital indicator (trust) comes from the ﬁrst
round of European Social Surveys (ESS) conducted in 2002, a database designed
to measure changes in and the persistence of people’s social and demographic
characteristics, attitudes and values. The original data are adjusted by popula-
tion weights to reduce the possibility of complications that might arise due to
over-sampling.3 The trust-indicator is constructed from the answer to the follow-
ing statement: “Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful”. The
answer category ranges from (0) “you can’t be too careful”to (10) “most people
2 One reason why we exclusively relied on this measure is the existence of studies for the
United States and Germany that complement surveys with trust experiments. It is found that
general trust questions are correlated with the actual behaviour from the experiments (e.g.,
Fehr, Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner, 2003; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman,
and Soutter, 2000). Other questions that are employed in the literature to measure social capital
are also incorporated. For instance, questions on whether individuals take part in social activities
(social), whether individuals are politically active (polactiv) or whether they are active members
of voluntary organizations (putnam and olson groups). Some of them are found to be signiﬁcant.
See Section 5.3 for the details of this exercise.
3 Countries participating in ESS have very diﬀerent populations, but the sample presents
information from 1,200 to 3,000 individuals for each country. For instance, the German sample
is composed of 2,919 and Dutch sample is composed of 2,364 individuals. However, Germany is
almost ﬁve times larger than the Netherlands. Especially in studies that compare countries or
regions it is advised to correct the data with the population weight provided by the ESS. This
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can be trusted”, with nine levels in between. The individual scores are weighted
and aggregated to the regional level and range from 1.67 [Cantabria, ES13] to 7.05
[Denmark, DK0] with a mean (std. dev.) of 4.88 (0.78) for all 102 regions. Previ-
ous studies also found large diﬀerences in social capital measures within countries
(e.g., Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2005a) for European regions and Iyer, Kitson,
and Toh (2005) for US regions). Aggregating regions to countries reveals that
trust is highest in Denmark and lowest in Greece as can be seen from column (7)
in Table 3.1.
Previous studies mostly employed a trust indicator from the ﬁrst round of
European Values Study (EVS) conducted in 1990, in which the respondents were
asked, “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”(trust0).4 The interviewees
were given two choices: (i) most people can be trusted or (ii) you can’t be too
careful. The ESS measure is preferred over this one because respondents can
choose a level on a 0-10 Likert Scale.5 The two trust scores from EVS and ESS
are highly correlated as can be seen in Figure 3.1 (the correlation coeﬃcient (0.65)
is signiﬁcant at the one percent level). Even though trust0 is not available for
all the EU-14 countries it is apparent that both trust indicators, trust and trust0,
reveal that the northern European countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden and
Denmark are characterized by higher generalized trust scores when compared to
the southern European countries (Table 3.1, column (7) and (8)). The next section
reports estimates for both trust indicators.
3.3.2 Innovation, performance and education
The innovation, education and economic performance measures are taken from
Eurostat’s regional database. Two main indicators of innovation are used: patent
data to measure innovation output and R&D intensity to capture inputs.
As a proxy, the innovation output is deﬁned as the “total number of patent
applications to the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) by year of ﬁling excluding patent
applications to the National Patent Oﬃces in Europe” per million inhabitants.
These ﬁgures might not reﬂect the true regional innovative potential, but do reﬂect
“commercially signiﬁcant innovations at the world’s technological frontier” (e.g.,
Furman, Porter, and Stern, 2002). Patents are an imperfect proxy for regional
4 The European Values Survey (EVS) is designed to measure fundamental values and norms
in ordinary life such as social-economic life, politics, family, marriage, religion etc. Unfortunately,
the ﬁrst round of EVS in 1990 covers only 13 European countries (not covering regions of Austria,
Greece, Finland, Luxembourg and former East Germany).
5 EVS incorporates two other trust questions, (i) trust in co-citizens, and (ii) trust in family.
They are both measured on a 1-5 scale, (1) representing ‘trust them completely’ and (5) repre-
senting ‘do not trust them at all’. When these scales are reversed so that higher scores would
reﬂect higher trust, the mean (std. dev.) of trust in family, 4.73 (0.16), is much higher than trust
in country citizens, 3.59 (0.30) for 72 EU regions. However, the latter also measures generalized
trust similar to the trust measure employed by previous studies (trust0). This reveals that the
respondents’ perceptions are clearly diﬀerent in each question, which can be seen as evidence
that the trust question measures “generalized trust”.3.3 Data and descriptives 59
innovativeness (e.g., Pavitt, 1982, 1988), but are the only well-established source
reﬂecting innovative activity (Trajtenberg, 1990). To avoid yearly ﬂuctuations a
three-year average around each point in time is used, so that pat91 is the average
of patent applications per million population in 1990, 1991 and 1992; and similarly
pat00 is the average of patent applications per million population in 1999, 2000
and 2001. Columns (4) and (5) in Table 3.1 present the country averages of these
indicators.
The patent indicator reveals the following. First, the indicator displays con-
siderable diﬀerences between regions supporting previous ﬁndings (e.g., Bottazzi
and Peri, 2003), which also holds at the country level. The patent applications
per million inhabitants in 1991 range from 0.6 [Centro, PT16] to 281.1 [Baden-
Wurttemberg, DE1], with a mean (std. dev.) of 58.3 (61.6). In 2000, the indicator
ranges from 1.8 [Kentriki Ellada, GR2] to 570.4 [Stockholm, SE01] with a mean
(std. dev.) of 116.1 (124.4), which indicates that the diﬀerential is persistent in
the 10-year period. Another observation is that patent applications of an average
northern EU country such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden are almost ten times
higher than an average southern EU country such as Greece, Portugal and Spain.
Also, there seems to be convergence in patent applications in the 1990s, illustrated
by a negative unconditional correlation of -0.589 (signiﬁcant at 1 percent level) be-
tween the growth rate of patents between 1991-2000 and log of patents in 1991.
This relationship is presented in Figure 3.2a. The horizontal axis measures the
log of the number of patent applications per million inhabitants in 1991 and the
vertical axis measures the growth of applications between 1991-2000.
R&D intensity is used as a proxy for innovation input. R&D intensity is de-
ﬁned as the percentage of R&D personnel employment in total employment in the
business enterprise sector in 1995.6 This measure ranges from 0.06 [Valle D’Aosta,
ITC2] to 3.53 [Stockholm, SE01], with a mean (std. dev.) of 1.16 (0.68). Compar-
ison of the numbers in column (6) to the ones in column (4) and (5) in Table 3.1
shows that higher R&D intensity is generally associated with more patent appli-
cations. The correlation between the R&D measure and patent measures equals
0.748 in 1991 and 0.766 in 2000, both signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Economic performance is measured by the growth rate of Gross Domestic Prod-
uct (GDP) per capita between 1990 and 2002. Column (1) in Table 3.1 presents
this rate and column (2) shows GDP per capita in 1990. The data suggest conver-
gence in economic performance over the 1990s because the correlation between the
growth rate of per capita GDP and initial GDP is -0.701, which suggests regions
which were lagging in 1990 are catching-up in the last decade. This relationship
is presented in Figure 3.2b.
6 Information on other measures, such as R&D expenditures, is not available for the full
sample (more than 15 regions are missing). Earlier years could not be used because of the
same problem. However, this measure is a satisfactory input measure considering the correlation
between R&D intensity and other R&D measures. The correlations are 0.756 and 0.759 with
total and business R&D expenditures for 89 regions. Both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1
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Finally, human capital is proxied as the share of the students in tertiary level ed-
ucation (levels 5, 6 and 7) to all students in 1993, according to the International
Standard Classiﬁcation of Education 1976 (ISCED76) deﬁnitions. The reason for
not following the literature (e.g., Barro, 2001) which uses diﬀerences in primary
and secondary education level is that there is hardly any heterogeneity in these
levels of education within the sample of developed EU-countries. There are signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences between European regions and countries. Column (3) in Table 3.1
shows that Finland and Belgium have the highest proportion of tertiary students,
while Ireland and the United Kingdom are among the lowest in our sample.
3.3.3 Institutions, literacy and universities
A set of instruments is needed to estimate causal links between social capital,
innovation and per capita income growth. To ﬁnd instruments we use historical
information from institutions.
Historical data on literacy
Education is an important determinant of economic growth (e.g., Barro, 2001).
Sandberg (1982) shows for 21 European countries that there is a relation between
the literacy rates in 1850 and per capita income in 1970, but not between literacy
and income in 1850, suggesting that literacy aﬀects economic well-being in the
very long-run. This ﬁnding is further supported by Nunez (1990) for 49 Span-
ish provinces. Unfortunately, in most of these studies it is unclear how literacy
translates into better economic outcomes.
A not so emphasized aspect of education is that it facilitates an environment
in which “good” cultural character can form. For instance, Cipolla (1969) argues
that literacy in the 17th and 18th century served as a basic intellectual and cultural
humus for the development of both mechanical and organizational innovations in
the industrial revolution.7 So, regions lacking solid educational institutions several
centuries ago are likely to have a poorer cultural character when compared to
regions with well-established educational institutions (Tabellini, 2005) and these
“good” cultural traits may have an impact on current income levels. For instance,
Lazear (1999) argues that having a common culture and language facilitates trade
between individuals. It is true that trade still exists in the case of multiculturalism
but only with intermediaries and in a world of second best where transactions are
costly. In the presence of higher social capital these transaction costs are falling.
In other words, besides a direct eﬀect of education on income, an indirect eﬀect
that operates through social capital exists as well.
Literacy rates in the 1870s and 1880s are used as a proxy for education. Al-
though the information diﬀers slightly for diﬀerent regions, in most cases the col-
7 In his words “...widespread literacy meant not only an elastic supply of literate workers but
also a more rational and more receptive approach to life on the part of the population”(Cipolla,
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lected information refers to the percentage of the population that is able to read
and write −including the people who only can read− in 1870s and 1880s. Ex-
cept for Austria, Greece, France, Portugal and Sweden the data is available at
the regional level. The data reveals that literacy rates in northern countries were
on average about three times higher than the southern countries in the 19th cen-
tury. Moreover more-developed countries such as the UK, Germany and France
are characterized by relatively homogeneous literacy rates across regions compared
to countries such as Spain and Italy where diﬀerences are considerably higher. In
Italy, Piemonte had a literacy rate of 68 almost ﬁve times higher than Calabria
that only had 14.6. The data is collected from several diﬀerent sources, which are
discussed in Appendix A.2.1. Column (9) in Table 3.1 presents country averages,
with low past literacy rates in Southern European countries and high ones in the
Nordic countries.
Historical data on universities
Universities are institutions that blend educational, social and cultural elements.
Readings (1996) argues that the evolution of culture can be understood in a frame-
work of struggle between the state and the university. Especially until the end of
19th century universities have been the primary institution of national culture
and identity and played a central role in national liberation movements. For in-
stance, in the early 19th century after the battle of Jena, it was not surprising that
one of the ﬁrst actions of Napoleon was to suppress Halle University (in Saxony,
Germany) (e.g., Rudy, 1984).
Universities not only create graduates with a common world view educated in
the same cultural tradition but also indirectly shape the future of a region or a
state by integrating their graduates in the existing social structure. If universities
are successful in transferring this vision to the public, then this dynamic structure
can serve to raise “good citizens” who behave well and act collectively to reach a
certain state of solidarity. In this respect, universities provide an important public
good that cannot be provided in other ways (e.g., Cowan, 2006).
Two diﬀerent variables are employed regarding the history of European univer-
sities. First, univF is deﬁned as “2000 minus the foundation date of the university”
to measure the period of existence of universities in a particular region. The latter
part refers to the date of foundation of the ﬁrst university established in a region.
By construction, higher values reﬂect the existence of universities in a region for
longer periods. The second variable, univN captures the density of universities.
It is deﬁned as the number of universities per 100,000 inhabitants around 1850. A
detailed inspection of the data shows that countries that are relatively richer such
as Germany, the UK and Belgium had a more uniform distribution of universities
per population. In countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, univer-
sities were clustered in particular regions. In northern countries such as Sweden
and the Netherlands universities were generally clustered in regions close to the3.3 Data and descriptives 63
sea.8 The main argument behind the hypothesized eﬀects of these variables is that
universities establish a basis where regional culture or identity nurture. This basis
would eventually transform informal institutions and aﬀect the formation of social
capital.
Along the same line of argument two other historical measures were developed.
First one is the average of the standardized values of univF and univN and the
second is the ﬁrst principal component of the standardized values of the two vari-
ables. The major sources for these variables are Ridder-Symoens (1996) and Jilek
(1984). Further information can be found in Appendix A.2.4. Country means of
these variables are displayed in Table 3.1.
Historical data on institutions
Tabellini (2005) argues that the current state of informal institutions is shaped
by the history of its formal institutions, such as political, legal and economic
institutions. This assertion becomes even stronger when we consider that EU
regions belonging to the same country now, were governed by diﬀerent political
power and institutions especially before the 19th century. In other words, political
liberalism has a positive impact by nurturing “good” cultural character, whereas
“bad” cultural character might be a reﬂection of rigid autocratic political power
in the past.
Several authors have argued that a political system inclined towards insti-
tutional liberalism, in which supreme authority is constrained, is beneﬁcial for
economic well-being. For instance, North and Weingast (1970) argue that Eng-
land’s unique political institutions play a major role in economic development at a
later stage. In a study on European cities, De Long and Shleifer (1993) show that
absolutist monarchs discouraged growth of commerce and industry in Western Eu-
ropean cities in the period 1000-1880. In a similar vein, Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2005) argue that, during the period 1500-1850, substantial economic
gains occurred only in nations where the existing political institutions were able
to place signiﬁcant checks and balances on political power. Most important to this
research is the eﬀect of past political liberalism on the evolution of cultural traits.
In a seminal study that compares the Maghribi and Genoese traders in the late
medieval period Greif (1994) argues that divergent political and social histories
and cultural heritages between the Maghribis and Genoeses gave rise to diﬀerent
cultural beliefs that later aﬀected the evolution of the societal organizations. He
shows that collectivist cultural beliefs, characterized by the Maghribis, led to a
societal organization in which the economic, social and moral sanctions against
aberrant behavior were applied (and controlled) by certain group(s); whereas in-
dividualist cultural beliefs, characterized by the Genoeses, resulted in an organi-
zational structure in which each group’s ability to use economic, social and moral
8 For a brief discussion of the state of the European Universities from 1500 to 1800 see
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sanctions against individual members was limited. In this respect, “the medieval
Latin individualist society may have cultivated the seeds of the Rise of the West”
(Greif, 1994, p. 943).
As a proxy for past political institutions, we employ data on “constraints on
the executive” deﬁned in the POLITY IV project, Political Regime Characteristics
and Transitions, 1800-2002.9 It is coded on a scale of 1 to 7, (1) representing
“unlimited authority” and (7) “accountable executive constrained by checks and
balances”. More information on the coding can be found in Appendix A.2.3. This
variable presumably captures “institutionalized constraints on the decision making
powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities” and hence higher
values are associated with a tendency towards democratic institutions and political
liberalism.
Most of the observations in our data come from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son (2005) and Tabellini (2005). In some cases the website of the POLITY IV
project is consulted. Over 70 regions in the data set are coded using the above
sources. We coded the variable “constraints on the executive” in the same way
as POLITY IV for the remaining regions (or countries). If the region had no (or
little) political autonomy then all regions are assigned the same value. In doing
so, we consider the political institutions in a 40-year window around each date
(for instance for 1850, the period of focus is 1830-1870). Information is available
for ﬁve dates: 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850. By the second half of the 19th
century most countries in the sample had completed their uniﬁcation process, so
after 1850 the regional diﬀerences are expected to be less important. Detailed
information on how the variables are coded is presented in Appendix A.2.3.
The data on institutions display some interesting features. More democratic
institutions are associated with higher current social capital. Up to 1750 there were
no considerable changes in constraints on the executive. Then, within a hundred
years, European regions display a gradual movement towards limiting the power
of the chief executives and move towards democracy. Countries such as Ireland,
Belgium, Denmark and the UK rapidly moved towards a more democratic setting
after 1700. Around the second half of the 19th century in the Netherlands, Ireland
and the UK the chief executives were almost completely controlled either by the
parliament or the governing body. On the other hand in countries such as Austria,
Greece, Italy and Portugal change was relatively slow and even in the 19th century
democracy in these countries were far below the level of the Netherlands and the
UK. Lastly, in Germany, Greece and Italy there were important diﬀerences between
regions as opposed to other countries that display more homogeneous distribution.
Following Tabellini (2005) two variables are deﬁned. First, instAVR is the
arithmetic average of ﬁve variables, inst1600, inst1700, inst1750, inst1800 and
inst1850. The variables instXXXX are deﬁned as the political institutions in year
XXXX. Second, instPC is deﬁned, as the ﬁrst principal component of the ﬁve
9 For more information see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ and Eckstein and Gurr
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
growth 0.50 0.21 0.08 1.18
gdppc90 13872.62 5412.90 4389.00 30263.90
educ 13.08 4.77 1.88 24.95
pat91 58.29 61.64 0.60 281.17
pat00 116.10 124.42 1.82 570.44
R&Dintns 0.25 0.22 0.00 1.00
trust 4.88 0.78 1.66 7.05
trust0 0.39 0.13 0.05 0.77
literacy 62.98 29.90 14.60 99.00
instAVR 2.49 1.48 1.00 5.60
instPC 0.03 1.98 -1.90 4.10
univF 377.38 264.70 0.00 800.00
univN 0.15 0.20 0.00 1.43
univAVR 0.02 0.60 -0.86 1.71
univPC 0.03 0.84 -1.22 2.42
urban 12.71 20.35 0.00 100.00
variables.10 The ﬁnal columns in Table 3.1 present country averages for these
variables.
Appendix A.1 provides the deﬁnitions of all variables used in the empirical
analysis. Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for the core variables applied in
this chapter. Due to space limitations the data in Table 3.1 are published at the
country level.
3.4 Empirical strategy
To show that social capital improves economic outcomes, the literature has used
two strategies. The conventional method is estimating a growth equation using
OLS, in which per capita GDP growth is regressed on standard determinants
(such as the initial per capita GDP, investment, education) and a set of social
capital indicators (for instance trust, membership to voluntary organizations etc.).
However, the problem of reverse causation is fundamental in estimating these
relations because current levels of social capital are likely to be inﬂuenced by
past and current economic conditions. Hence, OLS correlates of the relationship
between social capital and economic outcomes could be biased and cannot be
interpreted as reﬂecting causal eﬀects of social capital on per capita income growth.
To estimate causal relationships Knack and Keefer (1997) use the number of law
faculty graduates as an instrument for social capital and Tabellini (2005) employs
10 The eigenvalue for the ﬁrst component is 3.72 and describes 75 percent of the total variation
in the ﬁve variables. The ﬁrst eigenvector ranges between 0.39 and 0.50, suggesting a roughly
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information on the history of political institutions between the 17th to 19th century
and literacy rates at the end of 19th century as instruments for culture.
The empirical implementation in this study diﬀers in three ways from the exist-
ing literature. First, social capital is positively correlated with levels of education.
Higher levels of education would generally result in denser networks in which social
capital forms and higher social capital would also lead to better education oppor-
tunities. This dynamic relation has not been incorporated in previous research
analyzing the eﬀect of social capital on growth. In terms of the methodology,
this suggests considering interaction terms between social capital and education.
The coeﬃcient of the interaction term is expected to be positive. In terms of the
model this might show up as higher NJ or in a more elaborate version of the model
relatively more skilled workers feeding back into higher NJ.
Second, it is known that economic performance is positively correlated with
innovative activities. It is also known that societies in which people enjoy each
other’s conﬁdence experience a higher level of economic performance. This implies
that societies with a higher level of trust are better able to manage the process of
innovation and that creative eﬀort will be rewarded in relatively trusting societies.
To illustrate this trust is plotted against patent applications in 1991 and 2000 and
the results suggest a strong relation between the two indicators (see Figure 3.2c
and 3.2d). The correlation coeﬃcients equal 0.433 and 0.453, respectively. This
relation is incorporated in the framework by employing a patent regression, in
which patent applications are explained by R&D intensity, education and trust.
Third, combining these causal relations (i.e., from trust to growth; from trust
to innovation; from innovation to growth) into one structure is diﬃcult. In addi-
tion to simultaneity problems, both the growth and innovation equation contain
trust, which is endogenous to the system either because of omitted variables or
measurement error. For instance, regions with higher levels of social capital may
facilitate a structure in which it is easier and more eﬀective to implement policies
to further foster economic development and boost innovation (Ak¸ comak and ter
Weel, 2008a). Nevertheless, it is hard to measure policy success. Assuming that
such indicators on policy success are measurable and relevant, they are omitted
from both equations (3.6) and (3.7). So, it is reasonable to assume that trust may
be correlated with the error term. This suggests an estimation method in which
trust is instrumented.
A solution to this problem is to add a third equation to the system, i.e. a linear
projection of the endogenous variable on all exogenous variables in the simulta-
neous system. In addition to the exogenous variables, including instruments that
are correlated with trust would alleviate weak instrument problems. Trust is in-
strumented with the historical information collected on literacy rates, universities
and political institutions. Estimating this system with 3SLS produces consistent
estimates (Wooldridge, 2002, chap. 9).
The following system is then estimated:3.5 Estimation results 67
growth = β0 + β1gdppc90 + β2pat91 + β3trust +
β4educ + β5urban +  (3.6)
pat91 = α0 + α1R&Dintns + α2trust + α3educ + υ (3.7)
trust = δ0 + δ1literacy + δ2instPC + δ3univPC +
δ4X + η, (3.8)
where the subscript J for regions has been suppressed for notational convenience,
and the error terms comply with the assumptions described above. Growth is the
per capita GDP growth in the period 1990-2002 and pat91 is the log of patent ap-
plications per million inhabitants in 1991. Log of initial GDP per capita, gdppc90,
is included as a measure of convergence. R&Dintns represents the measure of
R&D intensity. The trust measure from the ESS is used. The education variable
educ captures the current eﬀect of education on growth next to the eﬀect through
the historical data. Urban is a proxy for the economic development around 1850s.
The reason for including this covariate is that Tabellini (2005) shows that the
historical instruments inﬂuence current economic growth through social capital
rather than a long-run process of per capita income growth. The last column in
Table 3.1 shows country averages for this variable. In equation (3.8), X denotes
the vector of variables exogenous to the system consisting of gdppc90, R&Dintns,
educ and urban. The instruments are the following: literacy is the literacy rate in
1880; univPC is the ﬁrst principal component of two indicators measuring the in-
tensity and the period of existence of universities in the 19th century; and instPC
represents the ﬁrst principal component of ﬁve indicators measuring the state of
political institutions between 1600 and 1850. All the equations include country
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 3.3 presents the correlations between trust and the instruments. Literacy
and trust are strongly and positively correlated as are trust and institutions. The
correlations between trust and the measures for universities (the presence and the
density of universities) are positive but less strong.
3.5 Estimation results
3.5.1 The eﬀect of social capital on growth
Table 3.4 ﬁrst presents estimates of the eﬀect of social capital on per capita income
growth for 102 regions by estimating
growth = β0 + β1gdppc90 + β2educ + β3urban + β4trust + , (3.9)68 Social capital, innovation and growth: Evidence from...
Table 3.3: Pairwise correlations between the instruments and trust
trust instPC instAVR univPC univAVR literacy
trust 1
instPC 0.37*** 1
instAVR 0.36*** 0.99*** 1
univPC 0.02 -0.17* -0.16 1
univAVR 0.02 -0.17* -0.16 1 1
literacy 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.31*** -0.05 -0.05 1
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Note: The PCA puts exactly the same weight for univF and univN and explains 62 percent of total
variation. Therefore univAVR and univPC are perfectly correlated. The principal component analysis
for the institutional variables also put similar weights on each variable. The ﬁrst principal component
explains 75 percent of the variation and it is calculated as: pca1 = 0.40(inst1600) +
0.49(inst1700) + 0.50(inst1750) + 0.44(inst1800)+ 0.39(inst1850) after standardizing all ﬁve variables.
using OLS. The estimates suggest that higher levels of trust yield higher GDP
growth in the period 1990-2002. The estimate suggests that a one standard devi-
ation (0.78) increase in social capital increases regional per capita income growth
by 14 percent.11 This result is consistent with the estimates presented in Knack
and Keefer (1997) for a cross-section of countries over the period 1980-1992. In
column (2) an interaction term is included to capture the possible complementar-
ity between social capital and education. The results do not change. Using trust0
− the trust indicator from EVS90 − yields similar estimates.
Social capital is endogenous and column (3) in Table 3.4 reports the ﬁrst stage
of the instrumental variables strategy. The ﬁrst-stage estimates suggest that all
instruments are positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with trust. This correlation
is not surprising given the individual correlations between the instruments and
trust from Table 3.3 above. F-tests for the joint signiﬁcance of the instruments
always exceed the critical value of 10, suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).
Finally, the 2SLS estimates reported in column (4) of Table 3.4 imply that there
is a strong and signiﬁcant impact of social capital on per capita income growth
in the period 1990-2002. Hausman, Sargan and F-tests reported at the bottom of
Table 3.4 suggest that these estimates are robust.
Table 3.5 reports ﬁrst-stage and second-stage estimates using the instruments
individually in three sets of regressions. The estimates suggest that the coeﬃcient
of social capital is somewhat sensitive to the use of diﬀerent instruments, but
the eﬀects remain qualitatively similar compared to the estimates in Table 3.4.
A number of alternative equations are estimated using instruments of groups of
two or three and they always produced a trust coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the ﬁve
11 Most right hand side variables have diﬀerent measurement units. Therefore these variables
are standardized. This makes it hard to interpret the coeﬃcients For this reason the analysis is
based on marginal eﬀects of trust by mentioning changes in terms of standard deviations. The
standardized coeﬃcients are presented in Table 3.103.5 Estimation results 69
percent level. There is not a case of weak instruments in the ﬁrst stage because
all instruments returned an F-test of joint signiﬁcance greater than 10. Also the
null-hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are valid is never rejected.12
3.5.2 The eﬀect of social capital on innovation
Table 3.6 ﬁrst reports the results from estimating
pat91 = β0 + β1R&Dintns + β2educ + β3trust + , (3.10)
pat00 = β0 + β1R&Dintns + β2educ + β3trust + , (3.11)
using OLS. The estimates suggest that a region’s innovative output is higher when
its level of social capital is higher. These estimates are consistent with the ones
presented by Fritsch (2004). He ﬁnds that cooperation increases the eﬃciency of
R&D activities, which most likely yields higher numbers of successful innovations
and patents. To address the endogeneity of social capital the same three indicators
are employed as instruments for the analysis reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Both
the ﬁrst-stage (column (3)) and second-stage estimates (column (4) and (5)) are
consistent with higher levels of social capital yielding higher levels of innovative
output in terms of patents both in 1991 and 2000.
Table 3.7 reports a number of alternative speciﬁcations that include the three
instruments separately.13 In addition, the behaviour of the instruments is ana-
lyzed, individually and as a group in 2SLS estimations in a similar fashion to the
explained above, which resulted in estimating 17 2SLS regressions. All regressions
produced a trust coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at the 5% percent level. The regressions do
not suﬀer from weak instrument problems and the null-hypothesis that the over-
identifying restrictions are valid is never rejected. Only univPC fails to produce a
signiﬁcant trust coeﬃcient in the second stage for the patent regression (column
(8) and (9)).
3.5.3 Stability
Despite its popularity, the empirical literature on economic growth is criticized
regarding the robustness of the results achieved. Levine and Renelt (1992) assessed
the robustness of the conclusions of cross-country growth regressions and found
12 A detailed analysis is also conducted in which four university indicators are considered,
univPC, univAVR, univF and univN. This analysis consists of estimating 29 regressions. In this
case it is found that only the indicator univF has a relatively poor performance as an instrument
for trust with signiﬁcance only at the ten percent level.
13 In some cases where trust is instrumented by a single indicator the F-tests are lower which
might point out to weak instruments. However, Tables 3.5 and 3.7 are only for robustness reasons
and reveal that it is not only the combination of three instruments that turns out signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst and second stages. These instruments are credible on their own but are
not strong statistically which is the primary reason to employ three instruments. Together, the
three instruments explain more than one-third of the variance in trust.70 Social capital, innovation and growth: Evidence from...
Table 3.4: Social capital and per capita income growth
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS
growth growth trust growth
gdppc90 -0.189 -0.184 0.326 -0.241
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.144)** (0.033)***
[0.045]*** [0.045]*** [0.110]** [0.046]***
educ 0.017 0.019 -0.101 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.109) (0.020)
[0.008]** [0.009]* [0.077] [0.011]
urban 0.024 0.024 -0.119 0.040
(0.012)** (0.012)** (0.079) (0.017)**
[0.012]* [0.012]* [0.070] [0.013]***















constant 0.357 0.506 0.066 0.308
(0.101)*** (0.063)*** (0.473) (0.174)*







N 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.68 0.68
Adj R sqr 0.79 0.80 0.61 0.62
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered standard errors in brackets. Clustered standard
errors are clustered at the country level to allow arbitrary correlations within a country.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. All the regressions include
country dummies. Hausman is a test of endogeneity. Null hypothesis is that trust is exogenous.
F-test is a test of joint signiﬁcance of the instruments. Sargan is a test of identiﬁcation.
Null hypothesis: Over-identifying restrictions are valid.3.5 Estimation results 71
Table 3.5: Alternative speciﬁcations for per capita income growth
(1) OLS (2) 2SLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) OLS (6) 2SLS










trust 0.160 0.123 0.199
(0.069)** (0.072)* (0.085)**
[0.133] [0.081] [0.091]**
gdppc90 0.289 -0.241 0.491 -0.226 0.312 -0.257
(0.144)** (0.039)*** (0.144)*** (0.038)*** (0.143)** (0.047)***
[0.165] [0.067]*** [0.246]* [0.051]*** [0.150]* [0.030]***
educ 0.019 0.016 -0.109 0.016 0.005 0.015
(0.102) (0.020) (0.115) (0.018) (0.103) (0.023)
[0.052] [0.011] [0.049]** [0.010] [0.066] [0.012]
urban -0.158 0.040 -0.090 0.036 -0.127 0.045
(0.081)* (0.018)** (0.083) (0.017)** (0.081) (0.021)**
[0.067]** [0.012]*** [0.094] [0.017]** [0.075] [0.020]**
constant 0.150 0.304 2.301 0.567 -0.230 0.211
(0.554) (0.212) (0.682)*** (0.098)*** (0.487) (0.255)
[0.259] [0.310] [0.240]*** [0.066]*** [0.377] [0.229]
Hausman 7.83 2.58 11.72
(0.006)*** (0.110) (0.000)***
F-test 5.53 12.91 4.69
(0.035)** (0.003)*** (0.049)**
N 102 102 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.75 0.64 0.58
Adj R sqr 0.57 0.61 0.56 0.70 0.57 0.49
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered standard errors in brackets. Clustered standard errors are
clustered at the country level to allow arbitrary correlations within a country. * signiﬁcant at 10%;
** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. All the regressions include country dummies. Hausman is a
test of endogeneity. Null hypothesis is that trust is exogenous. F-test is a test of joint
signiﬁcance of the instruments.72 Social capital, innovation and growth: Evidence from...
Table 3.6: Social capital and innovation
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 2SLS (5) 2SLS
pat91 pat00 trust pat91 pat00
R&Dintns 0.292 0.292 0.035 0.239 0.243
(0.061)*** (0.053)*** (0.099) (0.078)*** (0.069)***
[0.094]*** [0.061]*** [0.047] [0.099]** [0.060]***
educ 0.219 0.188 -0.028 0.182 0.154
(0.050)*** (0.044)*** (0.084) (0.063)*** (0.056)***
[0.052]*** [0.049]*** [0.096] [0.045]*** [0.050]***
trust 0.226 0.164 0.637 0.545
(0.062)*** (0.054)*** (0.174)*** (0.155)***










constant -0.303 0.164 -0.287 -0.238 -0.718
(0.435) (0.378) (0.461) (0.369) (0.328)**







N 102 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.85 0.88 0.66 0.78 0.82
Adj R sqr 0.83 0.86 0.58 0.74 0.78
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered standard errors in brackets. Clustered standard
errors are clustered at the country level to allow arbitrary correlations within a country.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. All the regressions include
country dummies. Hausman is a test of endogeneity. Null hypothesis is that trust is
exogenous. F-test is a test of joint signiﬁcance of the instruments. Sargan is a test of over
identiﬁcation. Null hypothesis: Over-identifying restrictions are valid.3.5 Estimation results 73
that almost all results are fragile. To assess the robustness of our ﬁndings an
investigation was conducted regarding how responsive the estimates of trust are
to the inclusion of other relevant variables that might have an impact on GDP
growth or patent growth.
The methodology simply involves assessing the fragility of an independent vari-
able to a change in the information set. The analysis starts by estimating equations
of the form
Y = Fαj + βijXi + γjSj + j (3.12)
where Y is a vector of GDP per capita growth rates or patent applications, F is
a matrix of independent variables that are always included in the regressions, X is
the social capital measure, Sj is a set of switch variables that are hypothesized to
have a relation with the dependent variable and j is the error term. The subscript
i indexes trust and j indexes the diﬀerent combinations of switch variables. The
analysis assesses the sensitivity of βij when diﬀerent sets of switch variables are
added to the regression.14
Robustness analysis is conducted for both per capita GDP growth and patent
models (equations (3.6) and (3.7), respectively). In the former model the depen-
dent variable is the growth of per capita GDP 1990-2002 and the ﬁxed variables
are log of initial GDP, education, trust and urbanization rates in 1850 (Table 3.4,
column (1)). For the latter the dependent variable is the patent applications to
EPO 1991 and the ﬁxed variables are R&D intensity, education and trust (Ta-
ble 3.6, column (1)). The regressions also include a constant term and country
dummies.
Following Beugelsdijk, de Groot, and van Schaik (2004) switch variables were
selected from a pool of independent variables from the ESS and Eurostat databases
that are exogenous to trust. Two criteria were considered in selecting these vari-
ables: (i) The correlation between a switch variable and trust should be less than
0.50 in absolute value and (ii) The correlation within switch variables is less then
0.50 in absolute value. 29 switch variables were identiﬁed, which are presented
in Appendix A.1, Table A.2.15 These switch variables are introduced to the pri-
mary regression in all combinations of 1 to 3 variables at a time. First column
14 A program designed speciﬁcally to assess robustness issues developed by Heijungs, de Groot,
and Florax (2001), MetaGrowth, is used to pursue such a methodology. For an application of the
program on the ﬁndings of Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) see Beugelsdijk,
de Groot, and van Schaik (2004).
15 Some of these indicators are highly correlated with trust and some of them are not. For
instance, the correlation coeﬃcient of some switch variables and trust is less than 0.10 and
only in half of the cases the correlations between trust and the switch variables are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent. There are at least 10 indicators that are completely not correlated
to trust. This logic of selection creates a balanced pool and enables us to analyse the impact of
adding an indicator that is loosely correlated with trust as well as the impact that results from
including an indicator that is highly correlated with trust.74 Social capital, innovation and growth: Evidence from...
of Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present how many times a variable appeared in a regression
for the growth and patent regressions, respectively. For example, in assessing the
robustness of trust, 4,090 regressions are estimated implying that trust appeared
in all of these regressions and the statistics provided are calculated by taking all
of these regressions into account. The robustness of the results were assessed by
employing six diﬀerent tests.
i) Strong sign test: All coeﬃcients for trust have the same sign.
ii) Weak sign test: 90% of the coeﬃcients for trust have the same sign.
iii) Strong extreme bounds test: This analysis was introduced by Leamer and
Leonard (1983).16 The relationship between the dependent variable and trust is
robust if all estimated coeﬃcients for trust have the same sign and are statistically
signiﬁcant at the same time.
iv) Weak extreme bounds test: Sala-i-Martin (1997) relaxes the above criterion
arguing that the relationship between the dependent and the independent variable
is robust if 90% of the estimated coeﬃcients for the independent variable have the
same sign and are signiﬁcant at the same time.
v) Weighted extreme bounds test: This test refers to the weighted weak extreme
bounds test. The weights are deﬁned as the value of the likelihood of the regression.
It is robust if 90% of the estimated coeﬃcients for trust have the same sign and
are signiﬁcant at the same time.
vi) Value of the cumulative density function: This test is based on the fraction
that lies at the right side of zero of the cumulative density function. A variable
passes the test (at a 10% signiﬁcance level) if the test score is smaller than 0.10
or larger than 0.90.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 and a number
of points should be highlighted. First, the relationship between trust and per
capita GDP growth is robust to inclusion of other variables. Trust passes 4 of
the 6 tests and about 80 percent of the time the resulting coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant
(Table 3.8). Furthermore, in the patent regressions (Table 3.9), trust passes all
of the tests and for all of the estimated regressions the estimated coeﬃcient is
signiﬁcant.17
16 See also Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992) for an application to growth literature.
17 The analysis was also replicated allowing arbitrary correlations within countries (i.e., with
clustered standard errors at the country level). Employing normal or clustered standard errors
does not display signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Appendix A.4 presents the summary results for the
stability of trust in diﬀerent speciﬁcations when normal and clustered standard errors are inter-
changeably used. To maintain the similarity with the original paper of Beugelsdijk, de Groot,
and van Schaik (2004) only detailed results with normal standard errors are presented in Tables
3.8 and 3.9.3.5 Estimation results 75
Second, for the growth regressions two indicators from ESS, help and opinion,
display robust results and both have a positive impact on growth. The former can
be viewed as a social capital indicator since it is derived from a question asking
“How often do you help others not counting work or voluntary work”. The latter
can be viewed as an indicator of culture. The respondents were asked to rate
“To be a good citizen. How important is to form independent opinion?” on a
scale from 0 “extremely unimportant” to 10 “extremely important”. In addition,
shares of agricultural and industrial employment seem to have robust impacts on
growth. Finally, the indicators discussed above also display a robust character in
the patent regression. But additionally, the indicator skill displays robust results.
This can be viewed as a measure of openness and it is constructed from a question
asking whether “all countries beneﬁt if people can move where their skills are most
needed”.18
Appendix A.3 presents a more detailed discussion of the impact of the presence
of certain switch variables on the probability of obtaining a signiﬁcant trust coeﬃ-
cient. Most regressions in which the trust coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant were found to
be including other statistically signiﬁcant measures of social capital such as, help,
polactiv and opinion.
3.5.4 Social capital, innovation and growth
Incorporating trust and innovation in a growth regression is possible by estimating
a simple OLS regression in which growth is the dependent variable (see Table 3.10,
column (1)). The results suggest that innovation and social capital have a positive
but insigniﬁcant correlation with growth. However, trust and pat91 are highly
correlated and considering both of them as independent variables may result in
misleading ﬁndings because of possible multicollinearity problems. The ﬁnal step
in the estimation of the model is to estimate the full model by using the 3SLS
strategy. Table 3.10 reports the results from estimating this model. The core
message from these estimates is that more advanced historical institutions, such
as universities, stable political environments and early literacy, yield higher levels
of present social capital (column (8)). Social capital is a strong determinant of
innovation outcomes along with traditional inputs such as education and R&D
investments (column (7)). Finally, innovation determines growth, but there is not
a strong direct impact of social capital on growth (column (2) and (6)). The
results of the full model are represented in columns (6) to (8) and the ﬁrst stage in
columns (3) to (5) in Table 3.10. The 3SLS estimation result only for growth when
trust equation does not include country dummies are presented in column (2). The
magnitude of the direct eﬀect of trust on growth is rather similar, however not
signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation (0.77) change in trust is associated with a
18 For the indicator help, the answer categories ranges from (1) “everyday” to (6) “less often
than” and for skill, the answer categories ranges from (1) “agree strongly” to (5) “disagree
strongly”. These scales were reversed so that higher values are expected to associate with better
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Table 3.11: Stability of trust in 3SLS estimations
stability of mean std. fract. sign.
equation variable value dev. (+) values
growth trust 0.036 0.024 0.01
growth pat91 0.156 0.058 1.00
patents trust 0.655 0.076 1.00
Total number of 3SLS estimations is 1559.
change in patent applications of 0.94 of a standard deviation, much higher than
the impact of R&Dintns and educ. The eﬀect of social capital on growth seems
to work through innovation. Together, our ﬁndings imply that social capital is
a signiﬁcant determinant of innovation, which in turn explains approximately 15
percent of per capita income growth in the EU regions between 1990 and 2002.
For the 3SLS estimates, a restricted version of the stability analysis of trust
was conducted. Beneﬁting from the results in Section 5.3, 10 switch variables that
never turned out to be signiﬁcant either in the patent or in the growth stability
analysis were omitted and the remaining indicators were included in the regression
individually and in groups of two to estimate 1,559 3SLS regressions in total. The
results for trust and pat91 are summarized in Table 3.11. Trust returns a positive
but insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient for more than 99 percent of the cases in the growth
equation. In all the estimations performed, pat91 in the growth equation and
trust in the patent equation are always found to be positive and signiﬁcant. Skill,
agremp and indemp were also found to be signiﬁcant in some cases in the patent
equation. Only the importance of obeying the law (implaw) and in some cases
the heterogeneity in the population minority returns signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the
growth equation.19
These results have important implications for the literature on relating a re-
gion’s (or country’s) social capital to economic performance. Mostly these studies
have been concerned with the causal relationship between social capital and eco-
nomic outcomes, neglecting explicit deﬁnitions of why social capital should have
a direct impact or indirect impact through a third factor on economic growth.
The estimates suggest that innovation is an important third factor explaining how
social capital increases economic outcomes, largely neglected by this literature.
19 The results of the robustness analysis for 3SLS should be interpreted with some caution
because each switch variable added in equation (3.6) or (3.7) automatically appears in the trust
equation hence in some models trust is explained by another social capital indicator besides other
variables. This may have produced complications in the analysis.3.6 Conclusion 81
3.6 Conclusion
In cross-country comparisons measures of social capital have a direct eﬀect on
economic outcomes, such as growth and investments (e.g., Knack and Keefer,
1997). It is however not clear how social capital improves outcomes. This chapter
identiﬁes innovation as an important channel by which social capital inﬂuences
per capita economic growth.
The framework provided in this chapter shows how social capital helps in the
process of stimulating innovation. The model focuses on diﬀerences in social cap-
ital across regions and shows that a higher stock of social capital yields more
innovation. The main reason for this is that innovation is a risky activity, so
the venture capitalist and researcher are both helped if they can trust one an-
other. This is easier in an environment in which people trust each other more.
This positive relationship between social capital and innovation feeds back into
the production process and increases per capita income.
The empirical contribution of this chapter is to show for 102 regions of the
EU-14 that early institutions shape current social capital, which in turn inﬂuences
innovation in regional comparisons. Innovation has an impact on per capita income
growth, but the direct eﬀect of social capital on per capita income growth vanishes.
These results are obtained using 3SLS estimates in which it is assumed that past
institutions and literacy rates are valid instruments for social capital. The methods
and the estimates are found to be valid and robust.
An implication of this result is that historical diﬀerences between regions of
an otherwise relatively homogeneous set of countries seem to have a lasting eﬀect
on social capital. The contribution of social capital to creating an environment
in which capitalists and entrepreneurs are able to strike the best deals improves
innovation outcomes, which are diﬀerent between regions, holding constant any
unobserved national variable and contemporaneous education and urbanization
rates. Of course, social capital and innovation are not treated at the microeconomic
level, so the exact transformation of social capital into innovation remains unclear.
But, the estimates suggest that research in this direction is promising.
The idea that the eﬀect of social capital on per capita income growth works
through innovation has policy implications for Europe. The ﬁndings suggest that
backward regions cannot improve fast in terms of innovation and per capita income
growth, because the shaping of social capital is crucial and takes long to develop.
It also suggests that public investments in R&D might not be beneﬁcial because in
all likelihood the private sector has trouble investing money eﬃciently. These re-
gions would beneﬁt probably more from investments in education, because human
capital and social capital are likely to be complementary.Chapter 4
How do social capital and
government support aﬀect
innovation and growth?
Evidence from the EU
regional support
programmes
Far beyond the shrinking skies
Where money talks and leaves us hypnotised
It don’t pave the way
Half day closing, Portishead
4.1 Introduction
Do social capital and government support programmes, such as the European
Union’s (EU) Objectives 1, 2 and 5b regional support programmes, have a positive
impact on regional economic outcomes? The previous chapter has considered
social capital as an important determinant of innovation and economic growth.
In this chapter, we investigate the role of social capital together with government
intervention by analysing EU structural funds in the period 1989-1999 in explaining
diﬀerences in innovation output and economic growth in the regions of the EU-12
in the period 1990-2002. The empirical results presented in this study suggest
that European Union funding does not provide a signiﬁcant contribution to the
welfare of EU regions unless it is integrated with social capital. Why is this?
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The research indicates that there is a positive interrelationship between levels
of education, measures of social capital and eﬀectiveness of government support
programmes. As such, for any given level of economic development, regions with
on average higher levels of education and greater social capital are more likely to
be characterized by stronger networks where communication, norms and values,
bonds and ultimately production are more eﬀectively integrated and conducted.
This improved structure facilitates a simpler and more eﬀective implementation
of policy which fosters economic development and boosts innovation.
More speciﬁcally, the estimates suggest that several forms of social capital con-
tribute positively to economic growth and innovation. The results indicate that
EU funding has no direct eﬀect on economic outcomes, supporting previous stud-
ies which emphasized the failure of EU funding to foster development in relatively
backward regions. The main contribution of the empirical analysis is that a com-
plementary relationship between government spending and social capital exists
and by itself contributes to economic development. Estimates suggest that the
interaction between social capital and EU funding contributes positively and sig-
niﬁcantly to economic growth and innovation, which in turn implies that, given a
current level of development, regions with relatively higher levels of social capital
beneﬁt more from EU support programmes. One major problem that comes to the
surface when studying the causal link between economic outcome and social cap-
ital is related to the diﬃculties experienced when trying to infer causation from
correlations in the data. For example, a correlation between social capital and
funding might arise if the funding promoted social capital, if groups with more
social capital were able to attract more funding, or if an outside factor inﬂuenced
both funding and social capital. Similar to the empirical approach used in chap-
ter 3, an IV approach was used to estimate the causal eﬀects of social capital on
economic growth and innovation, the results of which support robust estimates.
From a theoretical point of view, the results described in this chapter support
that institutions are important for both growth and innovation and that this re-
mains true when explaining diﬀerentials between relatively homogeneous regions
of the EU-12 countries. While these regions are bounded by the same institutional
rules and laws and, thus, are expected to perform similarly ceteris paribus, the
research indicates that informal institutions such as trust are able to make in-
stitutions work more eﬀectively in some regions than others. For example, social
capital is able to reduce information frictions in investment decisions, which makes
the ﬁnancing of risky projects more transparent. Italy is a case in point, where
diﬀerences associated with the social structure vary from one region to another
and thus perform very diﬀerently in terms of economic growth and innovation.
The estimates are also interesting when referring to policy analysis. The corre-
lation between social capital and education suggests that increasing investments in
human capital not only exerts a direct impact on economic growth and innovation
inputs, but also an indirect eﬀect which increases levels of trust within societies. It
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inability to boost economic growth in relatively backward regions. For instance,
Boldrin and Canova (2001) argue that the positive impact of structural funds
on growth is due to re-distributional dynamics. In a similar manner, Ederveen,
Gorter, de Mooij, and Nahuis (2002) argue that due to crowding out of private
and other national regional aid, rent seeking and moral hazard problems structural
funds are not spent eﬃciently. Their estimates show that backward regions could
have grown half a percentage faster, had structural funds been spent eﬃciently.
The estimates in this chapter suggest that the programmes administered as such
are indeed not causal to economic growth, but when integrated with social capital
and education, act as a highly eﬀective means to boost performance. The ﬁndings
support previous research by Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis (2006) who suggest
that structural funds are conducive to growth in countries with the ‘right’ institu-
tions. A strategy for future funding of relatively backward EU regions might be
one that integrates education into the funding programme to increase programme
eﬀectiveness. Finally, it is noted that innovation output is higher in regions where
more social capital exists. In these cases, EU funding helps stimulate innovative
activities when combined with social capital and education. There are two ways in
which innovation can be established: one way is to increase the level of education,
which is likely to yield multiple eﬀects on economic outcomes; the other way is
to design and establish sound economic institutions to stimulate innovation. For
example, provision for venture capital, tax credits for innovation and other beneﬁt
types for investors who work in relatively uncertain projects might be promoted
and protected by formal institutions. The advantages associated with these types
of institutions are manifold stimulating education, innovation, the creation of so-
cial capital and ultimately stimulating economic performance and prosperity.
This chapter is organised as follows. First, the theoretical background of the
study is presented along with a discussion of previous studies on social capital and
economic development and the eﬀectiveness of EU funding. Then basic informa-
tion on the datasets employed is presented and insight into the most salient details
is provided by using a number of descriptive statistics. Third, the main ﬁndings
associated with the estimation of several empirical models will be presented. Fi-
nally, policy implications associated with the estimates are discussed. In addition,
Italy is used as a case study to illustrate the way in which social capital, educa-
tion and government support, develop and act as a reinforcing mechanism that
stimulates economic development and innovation.
4.2 Social capital and implementing policies
4.2.1 Theoretical background
As discussed in detail in chapter 2, two important conditions must exist for social
capital to inﬂuence economic outcomes: the ﬁrst condition states that the decen-
tralized equilibrium is not ﬁrst best and the second states that only a number of86 How do social capital and government support aﬀect...
cases exist where social capital is able to achieve better outcomes. The ﬁrst con-
dition implies that a role exists for government institutions to establish property
rights, courts and law and to promote altruistic behaviour, stronger social bonds
and trust so that opportunism is reduced and market transparency is increased.
The second condition indicates that social capital is not a term or concept that
can be used to explain all of the diﬀerences experienced between economic perfor-
mances of diﬀerent groups.1 In this chapter, social capital is deﬁned and analysed
at the regional level with an understanding that it originates at an individual level
due to the diﬀerent forms of social interaction between people.
The role of social capital to implement government policy can be both posi-
tive and negative. Social capital is positively correlated with levels of education
(e.g., Goldin and Katz, 1999) as it supports access to publicly provided education
and to credit for the poor. This positive correlation is important because higher
levels of education generally induce denser networks where social capital forms.
In this situation, social capital generates positive externalities which are in turn
generated by social interactions. These externalities increase knowledge associated
with the behaviour of people, which in turn reduces the potential for opportunistic
behaviour to take hold. In addition, and most importantly, these externalities are
able to withstand the free-rider problem that occurs when information is limited
resulting in coordination problems and failures. The free-rider problem can be
reduced by providing public goods and other government initiatives that foster
development and reduce friction; by creating banking and insurance institutions;
and by creating mechanisms to penalize disobedient ‘group members’. In general,
regions with higher levels of education on average do better in terms of economic
performance and thus receive less government support. This is certainly true in
the case of EU structural funds. That said, it is important to note that, given a
certain level of development, regions with higher levels of social capital are more
likely to eﬀectively implement support programmes because they are able to inter-
nalize the externalities generated by social interactions and networks. This implies
that a positive correlation between the average level of education, the measure of
social capital and the government support programme will exist, which is the pre-
dicted outcome of the empirical analysis. This analysis also predicts that regions
with higher levels of education will be more likely to devote resources to innovative
activities. So, the determinants of innovation are likely to be positively correlated
to the interaction between social capital, education and government support.
Research also indicates that social capital has the potential to worsen eco-
nomic outcomes if policy interventions undermine social capital instead of change
incentive structures (e.g., Tirole, 1996). This is further exempliﬁed in cases where
external organizations, such as the Italian Maﬁa, become sources of civil social
capital. In these cases, competition within and between groups destroys other
1 Durlauf and Fafchamps (2005) review the literature and argue that social capital may help
to resolve coordination problems, alter individual incentives or it may aﬀect the technology of
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forms of social capital, primarily due to the violence used to maintain the (in-
formation) monopoly (e.g., Gambetta, 1996). The presence of kin groups might
also be detrimental to economic outcomes. Traditionally these groups have been
a valuable resource for enforcing bonds but in modern market economies these
‘dynasties’ may be considered an economic threat as they might foster corruption
(Collier and Garg, 1999). In most European regions these forms of detrimental
social capital will not occur at a large enough scale and therefore are unlikely to
inﬂuence the implementation and eﬀectiveness of EU programmes. Reference to
the Italian case is discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter.
4.2.2 Previous empirical research on social capital and eco-
nomic outcomes
Although a thorough review of the literature on social capital is provided in chap-
ter 2, the cornerstones of this literature are summarized below. Coleman (1990)
and Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) initiated empirical research on so-
cial capital. Coleman presented the basic theory of how social capital and social
interactions inﬂuence behaviour.2 Putnam presented an analysis which empha-
sized the importance of noting the diﬀerences in social capital when explaining
the diﬀerences of economic outcomes between the northern and southern regions
of Italy. One of the ﬁrst and most inﬂuential empirical studies in this area was
conducted by Knack and Keefer (1997). Knack and Keefer estimated how the
contribution of measures of social capital explained the diﬀerences in economic
performance between countries. The estimates derived for 29 countries suggest a
positive relationship between diﬀerent measures of social capital, levels of educa-
tion and economic performance. They ﬁnd that more trusting societies not only
have a stronger incentive to innovate and accumulate physical capital, but also
experience higher returns to human capital investments.3
Others have applied this study to European economies including Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2004), Tabellini (2005), Moesen, Van Puyenbroeck, and Cherchye
(2000), Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2005a,b) and Ak¸ comak and ter Weel (2006).
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) use data associated with blood donations
and participation in local elections to measure social capital and demonstrate that
there is a positive correlation between these measures and the ﬁnancial devel-
opment for a set of Italian municipalities. Tabellini (2005) examines the eﬀects
culture and institutions have on economic development in EU regions. He ﬁnds
that culture, deﬁned as norms and values created in the past, has a strong impact
on current institutions and on the current economic performance of EU regions.
2 Becker and Murphy (2000), Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) and Durlauf and Fafchamps
(2005) provide overview studies of both the theoretical and empirical work in this area.
3 Beugelsdijk, de Groot, and van Schaik (2004) address the robustness of the results of Knack
and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) and present some alternative explanations. Gen-
erally, the Zak and Knack’s estimates survive the robustness analysis, but Knack and Keefer’s
estimates are only limitedly robust.88 How do social capital and government support aﬀect...
The next three papers investigate the extent to which diﬀerences in social capital
contribute to diﬀerences in regional economic growth within regions of the EU.
They ﬁnd that regions with higher levels of ‘trust’ positively correlate to the level
of economic growth for the period 1960-2000. Ak¸ comak and ter Weel (2006) stress
the importance of studying social capital to better understand and explain diﬀer-
ences in innovation and regional development. A recent study by Fritsch (2004)
adds the importance of cooperation in research and development (R&D) processes
to make the uncertain process of pursuing innovation activities more transparent
to investors and capital providers.
Bilbao-Osorio and Rodriguez-Pose (2004) take a more traditional approach to
their study and analyse whether policies that are designed to foster R&D are
in fact paying oﬀ. Results from their analysis did not support a strong correla-
tion between innovation performance and economic growth. In addition to these
ﬁndings, Gambardella, Mariani, and Torrisi (2002) observed that patents, em-
ployment density and openness aﬀected labour productivity in European regions.
However, these studies did not take into account the socio-economic variation in
terms of social capital, which aﬀects capacity to conduct R&D. Verspagen (1999)
and Rodriguez-Pose (1999) investigate the degree to which regional clubs exist
and cultivate innovation. Both authors ﬁnd that clubs perform better overall and
that there are economic spillovers to less advanced regions. While clubs and social
networks share many similarities, they diﬀer in that networks form spontaneously
as free associations of economic agents, whereas clubs are organized and have a
relatively deﬁned membership structure. That said, clubs have the advantage of
making group decisions, a possibility social networks of agents do not have.
4.2.3 EU regional support programmes
In 1957, the European Social Fund (ESF) was set up by the Treaty of Rome to im-
prove job opportunities, by promoting employment and increasing the geographical
and occupational mobility of workers. In 1962, the European Agricultural Guid-
ance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) was created to promote the development
of agricultural and rural structures. In 1975, the European Regional Develop-
ment Fund (ERDF) was established to help alleviate regional disparities in the
EU member states. Finally, in 1994, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guid-
ance (FIFG) was set up to generate productivity and employment growth in the
ﬁsheries industry. These four funds are generally referred to as the ‘Structural
Funds’, and are the funds of interest for this chapter.4 It is important to note that
the main objective of an EU support programme is to act to decrease regional
disparities in terms of economic cohesion and development.
4 Other EU funds are the Cohesion Fund created in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty in
1993 and the European Investment Fund (established in 1994). The aim of the Cohesion Fund
is help relatively poor countries to preserve ﬁscal targets. The European Investment Fund aims
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The eﬀectiveness of EU policy to foster economic development has been ad-
dressed in a number of diﬀerent studies resulting in evidence that is generally
mixed. Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, and Verspagen (2003) present estimates
which suggest that regional support has had a positive impact on economic growth
in the 1990s. Estimates for periods before 1990 appear to be less conclusive. Dif-
fering eﬀects of regional policy on economic outcomes over a period of time are
often attributed to the major reform of 1988 which was ampliﬁed during the en-
largement of the EU by three relatively poor countries (i.e. Spain, Portugal and
Greece).5 The objective of the reform was to make the funds more eﬀective in re-
ducing income inequalities between regions and, as such, more ﬁnancial resources
were made available to do so. Beugelsdijk and Eijﬃnger (2005) present estimates
of the eﬀect structural funds had on regional economic performance for the period
1995-2001 and ﬁnd that poorer countries have caught up with richer countries.
These results contrast with the estimates of Boldrin and Canova (2001) which
provide the basis for their argument that structural funds serve re-distributional
purposes and have little relationship to fostering economic growth. These diﬀer-
ences in interpretation are most likely related to the splitting of data sets into
diﬀerent regions and the shortage of information for a number of countries (see
e.g., Boldrin and Canova, 2001, pp. 241-42). Ederveen, Gorter, de Mooij, and
Nahuis (2002) show that the backward regions could have developed much faster,
had the funds been spent in a more eﬃcient way. Moreover, they show that the
estimates are not robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and provide mixed evidence
on the eﬀectiveness of structural funds. In addition, Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi
(2004) found that the eﬀects of structural funds on economic growth are positive
but temporary and investments in education and human capital appear to be the
only factors that have lasting eﬀects in terms of regional convergence.
These studies have not linked the eﬀectiveness of EU structural funds on eco-
nomic development where diﬀerences in regional levels of social capital exist. The
role of social capital is critical when considering eﬀectiveness of policy implemen-
tation because regions with higher levels of trust in government programmes are
more receptive to implementation of new policy. Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg,
and Verspagen (2003) note that a relationship between accompanying factors, such
as a receptive environment, is likely to exist and aﬀect the success of regional
policies. Indeed, cross-country research conducted by Ederveen, de Groot, and
Nahuis (2006) show that eﬀectiveness of the structural funds depends on institu-
tional settings (e.g., openness, corruption and trust). The remainder of this study
emphasizes the importance of social capital when explaining the eﬀectiveness of
regional policy to foster innovation and economic growth.
5 See e.g., Begg and Mayes (1993) for a detailed discussion of the reform and Begg (1997) for
a discussion of the policy perspective of the structural funds after 1999. Nahuis and de Mooij
(2001) argue that there is a new case for reform after the recent EU enlargement with former
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Table 4.1: The measurement of social capital
Variable Description Mean (s.d.) Min Max
SC Index of social capital constructed by using 0.53 (0.10) 0.13 0.76
the ﬁve variables below.
TRUST Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too 4.78 (0.69) 1.66 7.05
careful. Coded as 0 to 10 in ESS. Higher
number representing higher trust.
PPLHLP Most of the time people are helpful or mostly 4.59 (0.74) 1.52 6.14
looking out for themselves. Coded as 0 to 10
in ESS, 10: most people are helpful.
PPLFAIR Most people try to take advantage of you, or 5.37 (0.75) 2.20 7.36
try to be fair. Coded as 0 to 10 in ESS,
10: most people try to be fair.
IMPVO Important in life: voluntary organizations. 5.04 (1.18) 2.91 7.45
Coded as 0 to 10 in ESS. Higher numbers
representing higher importance.
VOLUN Index constructed from ESS measuring the 0.02 (0.01) 0.00 0.06
involvement of the respondents in active
voluntary work for diﬀerent organizations.
The number of regions equals to 83. Further information is provided in the main text.
4.3 Data description and strategy
4.3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
Regional and national data sets were available for the following 12 EU countries:
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK.6 The EU is divided into 83 regions based
on the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS). Regional divisions
for each country were deﬁned by NUTS 1 for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the UK, and by NUTS 2 for Spain, Italy and
Portugal. Ireland and Greece lacked suﬃcient regional information of structural
funds for regional assessment and were measured at the national level.
Social capital
Measures of social capital are not derived without controversy. The fundamental
premise behind the value-added contributions of social capital is that it provides
a forum where traditional resources (e.g. physical capital, human capital) can
integrate with other resources (e.g. social networks, trust, norms and values) to
produce better outcomes for individuals (e.g., Coleman, 1988). Indeed, from an
economist’s point of view, the beneﬁcial impact arises only in cases where social
6 The focus is on EU-12 countries due to data limitations. Therefore, Austria, Finland and
Sweden were not taken into account.4.3 Data description and strategy 91
capital aﬀects expectations. 7 With this in mind, the following two indicators are
used: (i) generalized trust (TRUST) and (ii) an index of social capital (SC). The
data used to construct the measures of social capital are taken from the European
Social Surveys (ESS), a database designed to measure change and persistence of
people’s social and demographic characteristics, attitudes and values. The number
of observations listed for each region in the ESS varies and is not always representa-
tive for the size and demographic structure of the region, therefore, in aggregating
the data weights are applied to reduce the possibility of over sampling.
Most studies that focus on the impacts of social capital on economic outcomes
use generalized trust to measure the degree of opportunistic behaviour (e.g., Knack
and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001). Knack and Keefer argue that trust
‘reﬂects the percentage of people in a society who expect that most others will
act cooperatively in prisoner’s dilemma context’ (p.1258 Knack and Keefer, 1997).
Similarly, TRUST is constructed as the answer to the following questionnaire
statement: ‘Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful’. The response
category has eleven levels ranging from (0) ‘you can’t be too careful’ to (10) ‘most
people can be trusted’. The mean (standard deviation) of this variable for the
EU-12 countries as a whole equals 4.945 (2.395), with n=25,268.
The second indicator is an index of social capital that reﬂects diﬀerent dimen-
sions of social structure such as trust, solidarity and organizational membership.
There are two main reasons for constructing such an index: First, many indicators
of social capital are highly correlated with each other, so analysing the eﬀects of
diﬀerent dimensions at the same time (by placing more than two of the indicators
in the same regression, for instance) generally does not produce sensible results
because of collinearity problems. Second, these variables are not only hypothesized
to have individual impact on economic outcomes but may also reinforce each other.
Five indicators have been integrated into one measure so that the several possible
dimensions of social capital can be captured. The subsequent social capital index







where Xij is the value of indicator i for region j and m is the number of indicators.
The mean (standard deviation) of this social capital indicator equals 0.53 (0.10)
for the whole sample. The correlation coeﬃcient between TRUST and SC is 0.81
(n=83).
Table 4.1 provides information and descriptive statistics concerning diﬀerent
social capital indicators. The ﬁrst row depicts the mean, standard deviation, min-
7 Granovetter (1985) put stress on the networks of (social) relations in establishing expec-
tations, in generating trust so to create and enforce norms. In a similar vein, Durlauf and
Fafchamps (2005) argue that social capital generates positive externalities, which are achieved
through shared values, norms and trust that aﬀect expectations and behaviour. Dasgupta (2003)
discusses the importance of this latter argument in greater detail.92 How do social capital and government support aﬀect...
imum and maximum value of TRUST. Of particular interest is the relatively large
dispersion in generalized trust between the EU-12 regions, with Spain having the
lowest level (1.66) and Denmark having the highest (7.05). The next row de-
picts the social capital index which includes the following ﬁve indicators: TRUST,
PPLHLP, PPLFAIR, IMPVO and VOLUN. These indicators incorporate diﬀerent
aspects of social capital referred to in the literature. PPLHLP is an indicator
which measures the extent to which people are helpful or altruistic vs. unhelpful
or egoistic. PPLFAIR measures a similar aspect with a slightly diﬀerent focus on
people being fair. Finally, IMPVO and VOLUN measure the attitude towards vol-
untary organizations and participation in voluntary organizations. Coupled with
TRUST, these indicators are aggregated into the SC indicator, which is applied
to the empirical analysis as a measure of social capital.
Structural funds
EU structural funds are designed to target six objectives, four of which have a clear
regional focus.8 The regional objectives are: economic adaptation of less devel-
oped regions (Objective 1); economic recovery of regions aﬀected by the industrial
crisis (Objective 2); speeding up adjustment of agricultural structures (Objective
5); and regions corresponding to or belonging to regions at NUTS 2 level with a
population density of eight inhabitants per squared kilometre or less (Objective
6). Objectives 1, 2 and 5b are taken into account when conducting the empirical
analysis. Objective 6 is left out because its coverage is limited to regions in the
northern parts of Finland and Sweden where funding is less than 1 per cent of the
total money available making empirical analysis for all of the EU regions impos-
sible. Objective 5a is also left out because it covers common agricultural policies
which are not aimed speciﬁcally at the regional level. Objective 5b is included in
the analysis, as it is aimed speciﬁcally at rural and agricultural regions where low
levels of socio-economic development, high shares of agricultural employment, and
relatively low population density and/or depopulation trends exist. As of March
1999 over 85 per cent of the overall EU structural fund budget is available for
Objectives 1, 2 and 5b.9
Regional information is available for the period 1994-1999. The indicator used
for the empirical analysis is the summation of structural funds for Objectives 1, 2
and 5b divided by regional GDP. Table 4.2 outlines a number of descriptive statis-
tics for each of the EU-12 countries. The numbers reveal a variety of interesting
trends regarding EU funds. EU structural funds as a percentage of GDP are in-
creasing for all countries with the exception of Ireland and Luxembourg, reaching
a level of 3 per cent of GDP in Portugal. In Greece and Portugal EU funds ap-
pear to be complemented by both private and public spending. This spending is
8 The other two objectives involve reducing long-term unemployment (funding covers about
10 percent of the total available money) and facilitating the adaptation of workers to industrial
changes and to changes in production systems and technologies (about 2 percent of total funding).
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deﬁned as matching funds, which are a prerequisite for obtaining EU funding. In
Greece especially, private funding increased almost ﬁvefold over the 1990s. This
tendency in Greece can also be seen in the other EU-12 countries in terms of pri-
vate expenditures. The share of EU funds is highly variable across the countries,
with Spain, Portugal and Greece, consuming more than half of the total structural
funds, mainly in the form of Objective 1 support. A more detailed analysis (not
presented here) shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between regions even
within countries with relatively poor regions receiving a lot of Objective 1 support.
For example in Germany, Baden-W¨ urttemberg received very little support (0.005
per cent of GDP) when compared to Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (1.3 per cent of
GDP). The level of EU funds is as high as 6 per cent of GDP in the case of the
A¸ cores in Portugal.
Economic performance
Economic performance is measured using several indicators. All indicators were
sourced from the Eurostat REGIO database. 10 GDP per capita dispersion from
1990 to 2002 is based on Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, and Verspagen (2003).11
In addition, information on Gross Value Added (GVA) is used.12 The resulting
computations display a moderate form of catching-up especially after 1995 (e.g.
the dispersion of GDP per capita drops from 0.160 in 1995 to 0.138 in 2002).
This tendency towards convergence decreases when Greece, Spain and Portugal
are excluded from the sample. The GVA ﬁgures for the three main sectors in the
economy depict a diﬀerent picture. They indicate an increased level of divergence
in the agricultural sector accompanied by relatively strong convergence in the
industrial sector. On the other hand, the service sector displays the strongest
level of convergence compared to the other two sectors over the same period. The
main indicator for empirical analysis is the growth of per capita GDP between
1990 and 2002.
Innovation
The innovation data was sourced from the Eurostat REGIO database and the Eu-
rostat web pages. Expenditures for business R&D and government R&D are used
as primary innovation indicators from the input side. R&D activity is measured
by using the data on R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP for government
and business sectors in 1995. Both R&D BUS and R&D GOV have a minimum
10 In addition, information available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat has been used as
well.
11 The per capita GDP dispersion ﬁgures are calculated by ﬁrst computing the logs of regional
GDP relative to EU averages for each year. The standard deviation of these numbers is used as
a measure of dispersion.
12 GVA is the net result of output valued at basic prices, minus intermediate consumption
valued at purchasers’ prices, of a resident producer unit in a region. More information is available
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Table 4.2: EU support as a percentage of GDP
1994-1999 1989-1993
Total SF Nat. Exp. Priv. Exp. Total SF Nat. Exp. Priv. Exp.
Belgium 0.29 0.38 0.25 0.09 0.13 0.06
Denmark 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08
Germany 0.18 0.17 0.35 0.09 0.14 0.12
Greece 2.76 1.25 1.44 2.40 1.35 0.29
Spain 1.37 0.70 0.46 0.67 0.55 0.25
France 0.18 0.24 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.08
Ireland 1.74 0.65 0.61 2.38 1.52 1.48
Italy 0.34 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.10
Luxembourg 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.25
Netherlands 0.11 0.21 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.04
Portugal 3.10 1.22 1.24 2.82 1.62 1.28
UK 0.18 0.17 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.05
EU avrg. 0.64 0.36 0.47 0.48 0.36 0.28
Note: ‘Total SF’ is the total structural funds as percentage of GDP received by a country.
‘Nat. Exp.’ and ‘Priv. Exp.’ stand for the national public and private sector expenditures,
respectively, that match structural funds.
value of 0 and a maximum of 3.13 (East England) and 1.05 (Berlin), respectively.
The mean (standard deviation) for R&D BUS is 0.67 (0.66) and 0.20 (0.20) for
R&D GOV, with n=83.
A composite innovation index, constructed by taking both the input and out-
put side indicators into account, was added to the study. The innovation index
(INNOV) is a version of the regional summary innovation index with diﬀerent vari-
ables.13 The values for each indicator are re-scaled, summed and then divided by
the number of indicators as explained above for the social capital index. INNOV
consists of an index of ten variables:14 (i) R&D personnel relative to the active
population (education, government and business sectors were applied separately
as unique indicators); (ii) R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP (education,
government and business sectors were applied separately as unique indicators);
(iii) human resources in science and technology (total, per population); (iv) Euro-
pean Patent Oﬃce (EPO) patent applications relative to the region’s labour force;
(v) employment in high-technology manufacturing (as a percentage of total em-
ployment); and (vi) employment in high-technology knowledge intensive services
(as a percentage of total employment). INNOV has a mean (standard deviation)
of 0.258 (0.130). The minimum value of INNOV is 0.046 (Valle d’Aosta, Italy)
13 For details see European Innovation Scoreboard 2003-Indicators methodological report,
available at http://trendchart.cordis.lu/tc download statistics.cfm.
14 The innovation data are for 1995 except for the patent data. The selection of 1995 is
due to data availability. Patent data are the average of 1990, 1991 and 1992 number of patent
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and the maximum is 0.647 (Baden W¨ urttemberg, Germany). Several indices using
diﬀerent variables were constructed to check the robustness of the innovation indi-
cator. The correlation between them ranges from 0.94 to 0.99, adding conﬁdence
to the validity of the innovation measure.15
Patent data is used to proxy innovation output to assess the determinants of
innovative output. More speciﬁcally, patent applications to the EPO by year of ﬁl-
ing per inhabitant (and per labour force) are used in the regression analysis below.
Patent data contained in the Eurostat database refers only to patent applications
made to the EPO and do not include data associated with patent applications
made to the National Patent Oﬃces in Europe. Therefore, the ﬁgures associated
with this data may not reﬂect the true regional potential of innovation. Following
Furman, Porter, and Stern (2002), this measure nevertheless reﬂects ‘commercially
signiﬁcant innovations at the world’s technological frontier’. Keeping in mind that
patent data may not be a perfect indicator for the innovative performance of a re-
gion (e.g., Pavitt, 1982, 1988), it remains the only well established source of data
that reﬂects inventive activity (Trajtenberg, 1990). Patent applications display
a trend of catching up revealed by a correlation coeﬃcient of -0.54 between the
growth of patents in the 1991-2000 period and the initial level of patent applica-
tions. A second innovation index, only including the innovation input indicators,
has been computed as well. INNOV input is based on four indicators; (i) R&D
personnel relative to the active population (total); (ii) business R&D expenditure
as a percentage of GDP; (iii) employment in high-technology manufacturing (as a
percentage of total employment); (iv) employment in high-technology knowledge
intensive services (as a percentage of total employment).
4.3.2 Empirical implementation
Two sets of equations were estimated to show that indicators of social capital
are causal to economic outcomes. One equation was used to determine the eﬀect
social capital on economic growth for the period 1990-2002 and the other was used
to determine the eﬀect social capital on patent growth for the period 1991-2000.
The diﬃculty associated with reverse causality is that an inherent fundamental
problem remains when estimating these relationships, primarily due to the fact
that current levels of social capital are likely to be inﬂuenced by past and current
economic conditions. Simple OLS estimates depicting the relationship between
social capital and economic outcomes might be biased; therefore they cannot be
interpreted as a causal eﬀect of social capital on economic growth and innovation.
Problems associated with this bias were solved by using a 2SLS strategy where
indicators of past political institutions between the 17th and 19th centuries were
15 Composite indices with diﬀerent indicators may render diﬀerent results; therefore several
innovation indices were constructed by omitting and including diﬀerent indicators. As mentioned
above the correlations between the indices are high. Moreover, all of the indices behave similarly
in the regression analysis (i.e. all the indices produce signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, at least at the 10
per cent signiﬁcance level, when included in the regression).96 How do social capital and government support aﬀect...
used as instruments for social capital. These instruments are similar to those used
by Tabellini (2005) in his study on the causal eﬀect of culture on income.
Tabellini (2005) argues that it is highly probable that the formal institutions
that belong to a region’s historical past shape its current cultural state. This be-
comes even more apparent when one considers that there were EU regions located
within the same country that were governed by diﬀerent political institutions and
powers, especially before the 19th century. His estimates show that political lib-
eralism has a positive impact as it shapes ‘good’ cultural character, whereas past
rigid autocratic political power may have had a negative impact resulting in ‘bad’
cultural character. In order to capture the impacts associated with past politi-
cal institutions, we refer to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) and, to a
greater degree, Tabellini (2005), by using ‘constraints on the executive’ as a proxy
to historical political institutions as deﬁned in the POLITY IV project.16 This
variable is meant to capture ‘institutionalized constraints on the decision making
powers of chief executives’. It is coded on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 repre-
sents ‘unlimited authority’ and 7 represents ‘accountable executive constrained by
checks and balances’. Information is available for the following ﬁve dates: 1600,
1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850. The main data source for this variable is Tabellini
(2005). In cases where data was missing, observations for some of the regions and
countries were sourced from the POLITY IV data set located on the POLITY IV
project webpage. Ak¸ comak and ter Weel (2006) show in detail how these variables
are constructed.
The following equations were estimated for a set of 83 EU regions, where the
subscript r for regions has been suppressed for notational convenience, and where
 and υ are error terms with the usual assumptions:
GDP1990−2002 = C + α1GDP1990 + α2SC + α3EUFUND + α4X
α5EDUC + α6INT1 + α7INT2 +  (4.2)
PAT1990−2002 = C + β1PAT1991 + β2SC + β3EUFUND + β4X
β5EDUC + β6INT1 + β7INT2 + υ (4.3)
GDP 1990-2002 is the average annual GDP per capita growth in the period 1990-
2002 and PAT 1991-2000 is the average annual change in patent applications per
inhabitant for the period 1991-2000. GDP1990 and PAT1991 are included as mea-
sures of convergence. SC either refers to trust or the social capital index as deﬁned
16 For more information about the variable and the POLITY IV data set see the POLITY
IV project webpage http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ and Eckstein and Gurr (1975).
Tabellini (2005) provides a thorough historical appendix about the political state of EU regions
between the 17th and 19th centuries. The appendix to chapter 3 (Appendix A) is an extension of
the above literature. A brief description of the POLITY IV project and the “constraints on the
executive” indicator could be found in Appendix A, together with the data on 102 EU regions.4.4 Results 97
above, and EUFUND is the total structural funds as a percentage of GDP. The
variables INT1 and INT2 denote interaction terms. INT1 is the interaction be-
tween education and social capital, which are expected to reinforce one another.
INT2 is the interaction between measures of education, social capital and EU fund-
ing. This interaction term captures complementary relationships that may exist
between social capital and EU funding. Depending on the equation estimated, X
denotes a vector of other variables. For the per capita GDP growth these are:
share of employment in industry and agriculture sectors in 1990; education, as
measured by the share of upper secondary students in total students as deﬁned
by ISCED97 for 1993; innovation indicators such as R&D expenditure as a per-
centage of GDP for business and public sectors; and the composite innovation
index. The patent growth model does not include employment variables, and the
share of students in tertiary education replaces the education variable since it is
more plausible to hypothesize higher education as a proxy to represent education
in a patent growth regression. INNOV input also substitutes the innovation index.
4.4 Results
This section discusses the results of estimating equations (4.2) and (4.3). Second
stage regression results of the 2SLS estimates are presented (ﬁrst stage results
are available upon request). As expected, ﬁrst stage estimates generally depict a
strong and positive relationship between the instruments and the measures of social
capital. The ﬁrst row of each table indicates whether the estimates are OLS or
2SLS. The standard errors reported in all tables have been adjusted for clustering.
In addition, F-tests for the joint signiﬁcance of the instruments always exceed the
critical value of 10, as suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). This adds conﬁdence
to the validity of the instruments by removing problems associated with weak
instruments. Finally, the null-hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions are
valid is never rejected.
4.4.1 Economic growth
Estimates of equation (4.2) using diﬀerent sets of independent variables are pre-
sented in Table 4.3. Average annual regional GDP per capita growth for the period
1990-2002 is explained in column (1) by GDP in 1990, shares of employment, busi-
ness R&D activities, the region’s share of students in upper secondary education,
trust and EU funding. In addition, an interaction term between education and
trust is included to show the complementary relationship between the two, as
outlined previously. The estimates reveal convergence among the EU-12 regions
reﬂected by a negative eﬀect of initial GDP per capita on economic growth in
the subsequent period. Furthermore, a higher share of agricultural employment is
associated with low economic growth. The indicators of innovation, social capital,98 How do social capital and government support aﬀect...
government support and education do not appear to have a signiﬁcant correlation
to growth during this period. It is interesting to note that the interaction between
education and trust is positive and signiﬁcant, pointing out the complementarities
between the two. The results presented in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4.3 show
the eﬀects that occur when the interaction between structural funds, education
and trust is added. This interaction term always signiﬁcantly contributes to eco-
nomic growth and it depicts the independent eﬀect of trust on economic outcomes
in the EU regions. Similar results are obtained for both social capital index (SC)
and TRUST. These OLS estimates are reported in column (4).
Since problems associated with reversed causality between measures of social
capital and economic growth are serious, a 2SLS strategy where the social capital
variables are instrumented by the historical information on institutions is applied
to present the same type of analysis. These results are listed in columns (5) to
(8) of Table 4.3. The estimates presented in column (5) and (6) are the 2SLS
equivalent of the OLS estimates presented in column (3) and (4) respectively.
What is most interesting to observe is that instrumenting social capital increases
the coeﬃcients on TRUST and SC considerably suggesting a strong link from social
capital to economic growth. The interaction eﬀects also become more powerful and
signiﬁcant.
In addition, the eﬀect that R&D has on economic growth is positive and sig-
niﬁcant, likely because the 2SLS approach removes measurement error from the
social capital variables. The results presented in columns (7) and (8) replace the
business R&D variable by an indicator of public R&D (R&D GOV). This is done
because there might be cases where regions with more social capital not only ben-
eﬁt from policy initiatives that foster development, such as the EU funds, but
also beneﬁt from their ability to gain from public spending on innovation. Indeed,
the estimates presented in columns (7) and (8) for TRUST and SC, respectively,
suggest that government R&D signiﬁcantly contributes to economic growth. The
eﬀects of social capital and EU funding on growth remain similar to the results
presented for business R&D investments.
To further investigate the importance of innovation, the variable INNOV re-
placed R&D indicators resulting in the estimates presented in the ﬁnal four columns
of Table 4.3. The advantage of INNOV is that it captures both input and output
characteristics of innovation. The results of this exercise suggest that innovation
contributes to growth in a signiﬁcant way and that when combined, social capital
and EU funding also contribute positively to development throughout the 1990s.
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to determine the robustness of the esti-
mates. This analysis was designed to examine the responsiveness of TRUST.17
17 The methodology used is carried out using the MetaGrowth computer programme employed
in Beugelsdijk, de Groot, and van Schaik (2004) and provided by Henri de Groot. The software
is designed speciﬁcally to assess the robustness of estimating models of cross-country/region
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The methodology basically involves assessing the ‘fragility’ of TRUST with respect
to additional independent variables that have the potential to reﬂect the cultural
characteristics of a region and, as such, explain GDP growth. The ﬁrst step is
to estimate a GDP growth model. This model includes initial GDP, the share of
agricultural and industrial employment, the composite innovation index, educa-
tion, trust, interaction terms and the set of 12 country dummies. The number
of switch variables were determined by selecting indicators that are exogenous to
TRUST and have low correlations with each other to avoid any problems associ-
ated with multi-collinearity. Fifteen switch variables were introduced to the base
model in groups of one to three variables at a time. This exercise resulted in 575
regression estimations. The results show that the relationship between TRUST
and per capita GDP growth is robust with respect to inclusion of other relevant
variables. TRUST has a mean coeﬃcient of 0.027 with a conﬁdence interval of
[0.025 to 0.029]. More than 85 per cent of the estimated coeﬃcients of TRUST are
signiﬁcant at least at the 10 per cent level. The only noteworthy eﬀect of switch
variables on growth were those related to religion (i.e., belonging to a certain
religion).
When combined, these results suggest that EU funding did not have a direct
eﬀect on economic performance during the 1990s. This ﬁnding corroborates ear-
lier evidence presented by Boldrin and Canova (2001) which suggest that monies
already spent do not make a positive contribution to the economic development
of relatively backward regions. That said, it is important to note that the main
ﬁnding of this analysis is that in order for EU policy to be eﬀective, social capital
must be present. Given a certain level of economic development, regions with
higher levels of social capital beneﬁt more from EU funding than regions with
lower levels of social capital.
4.4.2 Innovation
The estimation results of equation (4.3) are presented in Table 4.4. The table shows
only the second stage results of the 2SLS estimations. The dependent variable is
deﬁned as the growth of the number of patent applications per million inhabitants
between 1991-2000. Results using the number of patent applications relative to a
region’s labour force yield similar qualitative results.
The table is divided into two sets of results. The ﬁrst four columns list es-
timates including those related to business R&D, and the second set of columns
reports estimates that used INNOV input as an indicator for technology related
activities.18 The estimates suggest a positive role for TRUST and SC in explain-
ing changes in innovation output, which stresses the importance of these variables
for carrying out successful research projects. If the level of social capital is high,
then there will likely be a decrease in the number of information frictions that
18 Estimates for government R&D suggest similar outcomes. These results are available upon
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occur between the capitalists (i.e., those who ﬁnance the innovation project) and
the entrepreneurs (i.e., those who implement the project). Higher levels of trust
between these parties will work to increase penalties to those who continue to
cheat investors, so that any further damage to reputation can be avoided. It is
more likely that there will be less cheating and more (venture) capitalist project
investment in regions where higher levels of trust and social norms occur.
This exercise also suggests that there is a direct negative eﬀect of EU funding
on innovation output. This is partly due to the fact that many of the funded
regions are backward and as such, are not doing much in terms of innovation as
is reﬂected in the number of patents. In these cases it appears that an increase
in funding does not beneﬁt innovation. This direct estimate supports the doubts
many academics and policy-makers have had during their pursuit for eﬀective
regional policy that fosters development. That said, it appears that a comple-
mentary relationship between social capital and policy eﬀectiveness exists due to
the strength and signiﬁcance of the eﬀects associated with the interaction between
social capital and EU funding. Interpretation of these results supports the fact
that certain levels of trust must be present to carry out innovation. If trust is
high, then more funds will be devoted to innovation. As trust increases, problems
associated with information decrease and as such, prescribed funding is spent more
appropriately. This also holds true for EU funding which is spent more eﬀectively
when information problems are reduced, improving the potential for innovation
and growth.
Finally, the sensitivity analysis of TRUST in the patent growth regression
model suggests similar ﬁndings to those found in the case of GDP per capita
growth. The OLS version of model (6), Table 4.4, is used as the base model.
Twelve switch variables were selected to assess the robustness of the estimates
presented in Table 4.4. A total of 298 regression equations were estimated to
determine robustness. The ﬁndings suggest that a robust relationship between
TRUST and patent growth exists. The analysis produced a mean coeﬃcient of
0.117 ranging from 0.108 to 0.126. Over 80 per cent of the estimated coeﬃcients
of TRUST are signiﬁcant at least at the 10 per cent level. Two of the twelve
switch variables are worth mentioning when explaining patent growth: they in-
clude (i) indicators measuring diﬀerent aspects of the importance of obeying laws
and (ii) regulations. This would appear to make sense, since patent protection
and intellectual property rights are known to be important for innovation output
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4.5 Discussion and implications
This section discusses the implications of the results in three ways. First, policy
implications associated with the results are discussed with a focus on education
policy, EU support programme eﬀectiveness, institutional design and establish-
ment. Second, the case of Italy is presented as an illustration of how social capital
works within a country to make a diﬀerence in economic outcomes, further stress-
ing the importance to stimulate the creation of social capital. Finally, there is a
brief summary of the main ﬁndings followed by a discussion of the potential of the
estimates for wider applications.
4.5.1 Policy implications for innovation
Education
What does the future hold for education in Europe? The estimates in this chapter
have shown the positive eﬀects education has had on economic outcomes. It is
important to note that the educational variable was not split up into diﬀerent
educational categories. This was for two reasons: ﬁrst, data availability limited
the number of regions that had suﬃcient information for each of the speciﬁc ﬁelds
of education; second, from a theoretical and empirical point of view, speciﬁc ﬁelds
of education are not considered critical for the formation of social capital. Recall
that the eﬀects of education interact directly with social capital, and that previous
work indicated that the level of education is more important than the ﬁeld. The
policy perspective for education is simple: an increase in the levels of education
in backward regions will increase norms and values, bonds and connectivity in the
form of networks, which will in turn increase the level of social capital. Policy-
makers should make this their primary goal given the fact that a relatively large
dispersion in educational levels exists.
A second eﬀect associated with an increase in the levels of education is that
it serves as an input into the process of innovation. Perhaps in this case, a focus
on technical ability coupled with an increased inﬂow into technical studies would
help to increase innovation eﬀorts. On the other hand, past examples of speciﬁc
labour market policies which aim to make labour ﬂow towards innovation have
not been very eﬀective. This is primarily due to the fact that when labour ﬂows
from one sector to another the associated supply and demand must be adjusted
to yield diﬀerent prices. Goolsbee (1998) has shown that an increase in the wages
for scientists and engineers in innovative sectors results in a ﬂow of workers to-
wards these sectors and a labour shortage in the sectors where these workers were
originally employed. This increases the overall level of wages for these occupations
thereby rendering only a price eﬀect. A better approach would be to stimulate
education in speciﬁc ﬁelds of study.104 How do social capital and government support aﬀect...
EU programme eﬀectiveness
What does the future hold for programmes in Europe? The debate surrounding EU
funding eﬀectiveness is complicated because it has been going on for a long period
of time and because it is diﬃcult to assess empirically. From an econometric point
of view it is diﬃcult to distinguish cause and eﬀect and to address the eﬀectiveness
of exogenous variation which is required to estimate EU funding contributions
to economic development. From a more practical point of view the correlations
presented in this research suggest that the EU policies are ineﬀective in their
direct contribution to innovation and development, but eﬀective in combination
with social capital. The policy implication of this strong and signiﬁcant result is
that the Objectives 1, 2 and 5b EU programmes should come with an appropriate
amount of education and dissemination of information in the regions at stake.
While a provision of education from speciﬁc ﬁelds would be advantageous to a
region, an increase of the overall level of education within a region would likely
provide a better situation having both direct and indirect eﬀects on economic
outcomes. Increasing levels of social capital is only possible if problems associated
with information are solved. Policies targeted at solving such issues should take
into account the length of time it takes to establish trust and, perhaps more
importantly, should ensure that the right design of institution is established.
Institutions
What institutions should Europe develop in the future? While social capital is use-
ful when explaining potential economic outcomes, it is diﬃcult to transform social
capital into formal institutions. Traditional approaches that were implemented to
increase innovation and growth include the establishment of intellectual property
rights protection, courts of justice and law. While there is no question that these
institutions help increase the potential for innovation and growth, it remains un-
clear how they interact with social capital. Generally speaking, these institutions
work to increase the probability that start-up ﬁrms will be established and will
innovate and produce with great success. However, if a situation occurs where the
people of a region have little or no trust in the government, then the institutional
framework will be perceived as detrimental to innovation and growth. Currently,
Europe has a sound and homogenous institutional framework but a considerable
level of heterogeneity in terms of social capital throughout all of its regions. The
ﬁght against corruption and opportunism should be realized so that increased lev-
els of social capital coupled with strong institutional frameworks can serve as an
engine to growth and innovation.
Provision for venture capital is primarily based on trust between the innova-
tor and the capitalist. The provision of venture capital by the market is more
eﬀective if the capitalist is protected from corruption and if incentives are such
that the innovator is punished when he defaults. In addition, the expenditure
of government monies must be held accountable by providing detailed follow-up4.5 Discussion and implications 105
Table 4.5: Case of Italy
North Italy South Italy Italy
Trust 0.321 -1.000 -0.246
Composite social capital index (SC) 0.208 -0.947 -0.339
Share of students in upper secondary level, 1993 0.648 0.292 0.488
Share of students in tertiary level, 1993 0.838 -0.125 0.405
Composite innovation index (INNOV) -0.318 -0.591 -0.447
Total R&D as a percentage of GDP 1995 -0.383 -0.585 -0.479
Business R&D as a percentage of GDP 1995 -0.295 -0.725 -0.499
Government R&D as a percentage of GDP 1995 -0.365 -0.037 -0.210
Patent application per population, 1995 0.098 -0.686 -0.274
Gross value added, total, 1995 0.396 -0.746 -0.093
Gross value added, services, 1995 0.328 -0.534 -0.042
Gross value added, industry, 1995 0.471 -1.011 -0.164
Gross value added, agriculture, 1995 0.063 0.060 0.062
Total EU structural fund as a percentage of GDP -0.503 -0.007 -0.280
Objective 1 EU structural fund as a percentage of GDP -0.505 0.045 -0.258
Objective 2 EU structural fund as a percentage of GDP 0.174 -0.650 -0.197
Objective 5B EU structural fund as a percentage of GDP 0.146 -0.413 -0.106
Note: All values are standardized meaning that a value of 0 equals the mean of the sample n=87
North Italy: Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Trento, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia, Emila-Romagna, Toscana,
Umbria, Marche. South Italy: Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna
reports outlining the results and merits of the expenditure, to promote conﬁdence
in the EU governing bodies and eﬀectiveness of their associated policies. This
can only be accomplished by supporting a cooperative and transparent exchange
of information throughout the entire process. The current growth and extension
of the EU into other countries provides an excellent opportunity to improve the
exchange of information by revising the monitoring and information system in
Brussels. Decentralized funding from investors who are trusted by the public and
support for improved access to information at ‘the construction site’, are likely to
boost conﬁdence in both the EU and local government authorities.
4.5.2 Italy
Italy is one of the more prominent examples of a country where society is stratiﬁed
along the lines of income, development and crime: the rich and trustworthy north,
and the poor and corrupt south. Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) based his
study of social capital on Italy, and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) based
their study on the diﬀerences between regional patterns of economic development
and social cohesion in Italy, with an emphasis on the split between the northern
and southern regions. Table 4.5 lists a number of core variables associated with the
empirical analysis. Note that all numbers in the table are standardized means, so
that the average of the 83 regions in the sample is equal to zero for all indicators.
The ﬁrst two rows depict the discrepancy between the measures of social capital106 How do social capital and government support aﬀect...
found in the north and south. The next two rows similarly depict a huge diﬀerence
in the levels of education found in the North and South. Taken together, these
four indicators imply that development in the southern areas of Italy should be
far less than the economic development in the northern areas. An examination of
the GDP indicators and innovation measures determines that this is certainly the
case.19
What should Italy’s policy look like in the future? First and foremost, policy
should focus on increasing levels of education which in turn will increase the level
of social capital. The complementarity between these will boost innovation and
output in the long-run. Note that Italy had the greatest regional diﬀerence in levels
of education (i.e., between its northern and southern regions) for all EU countries
in the data. A secondary eﬀect associated with increasing levels of education is
that it provides a means for people to make a living on their own so that they
might escape involvement with illegal acts and crime. Final observations indicate
that social capital in southern Italy is almost non-existent. This implies that
the theoretically detrimental eﬀects of social capital on society should be absent.
Social capital and bonds can be high within the gang structure, but levels of trust
for society as a whole will be exceptionally low.
4.5.3 Conclusion
The estimates discussed in this chapter suggest that there is a positive correlation
between social capital and government support programmes designed to foster
economic development and economic outcomes. There appears to be a greater
capacity to implement government support programmes in speciﬁc regions where
higher levels of social capital exist. As such, the region beneﬁts in terms of higher
levels of economic growth and increased innovative activity. The empirical analysis
indicates that there is an interplay between social capital and government invest-
ments in the EU regions. This is an important ﬁnding as it suggests that norms
and values that have not been institutionalized by property rights or integrated
into other legal institutions, play a critical role in the eﬀective implementation of
support programmes. In summary, the EU Objectives 1, 2 and 5b programmes for
EU regional support do not appear to foster economic development on their own
but when combined with higher levels of social capital, they beneﬁt both economic
development and innovation.
One of the main advantages of this study is that it has used information from a
19 One could argue that the diﬀerences in economic development between the north and the
south of Italy are due to diﬀerences in institutional landscape in the past rather than social
capital. However the diﬀerences in social capital are more or less persistent through time. For
instance, Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) and de Blasio and Nuzzo (2006) argue that
the regions that were rich in social capital in the 19th century are also well-endowed nowadays.
Moreover, as shown in chapter 3 the historical variables aﬀect income growth through social
capital not by any other mechanism (in statistical terms). To explain diﬀerences in these variables
only with historical variables (institutions) is only a part of the story. Adding culture that governs
social, institutional and economic outcomes is a more complete and interesting argument.4.5 Discussion and implications 107
set of relatively homogeneous countries and/or regions, which decreases the inﬂu-
ence of other (unobserved) factors on the estimates. While it would be premature
to draw ﬁrm conclusions for other countries or regions based on these estimates,
it is likely that these estimates suggest that a certain level of social capital is nec-
essary for successful implementation of government support. Indeed, case study
evidence from Kenya suggests that if social capital cannot be created in the short
term then it can be in the long term by investing in education so that there is an
increase in the levels of participation in groups, social capital and trust (Gugerty
and Kremer, 2002). In addition, fostering investment in human capital appears
to be an eﬀective way in which levels of social capital might be increased. Aside
from the direct impact of human capital on economic performance and its role as
an input into the process of innovation, its indirect contribution to the promotion
of social cohesion and compliance with norms and values is an eﬀect that should
not be overlooked. Currently there is a diﬀerence of about 8.2 years in the aver-
age level of education between the most advanced regions of the EU (i.e., located
mostly in the northern parts of the EU) and the least advanced regions of the EU
(i.e., located mostly in the southern areas of the EU). It would appear the EU’s
capacity to support future development would be improved greatly if this educa-
tion gap was closed. This, of course, would require a commitment to invest in
resources to support education. Human capital must be viewed as an investment
good that requires eﬀective policy programmes to support skills acquisition from
an early age onward. Investment in schools and training, coupled with a campaign
to promote awareness of the importance of education within the family unit, will
foster technological progress and human capital as a whole.Chapter 5
Social capital and crime:
Evidence from the
Netherlands
The larger and more colorful a city is, the more places there are to hide
one’s guilt and sin; the more crowded it is, the more people there are to
hide behind. A city’s intellect ought to be measured not by its scholars,
libraries, miniaturists, calligraphers and schools, but by the number of
crimes insidiously committed on its dark streets...
Orhan Pamuk, My name is Red.
5.1 Introduction
One of the most puzzling elements of crime is its heterogeneity across space and not
its level or inter-temporal diﬀerences (e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman,
1996; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997).1 Even after controlling for eco-
nomic and social conditions and population characteristics, there remains a high
variance of crime across space. Homicide rates across comparable and more or less
equally developed nations in the European Union (EU-15) in the 1990s range from
on average 12 cases of homicide per million inhabitants in Sweden, to 28 homi-
cides per million in Finland. Within a sample of Dutch municipalities (>30,000
inhabitants) crime rates per capita vary between 1.60 in Hof Van Twente (Overi-
jssel) and 14.60 per capita in Amsterdam. Observable factors, such as population
density, the youth unemployment rate, the mean level of education and income
1 See Freeman (1999) for an overview of the crime literature in economics. Early contributions
in economics by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) explain the level of crime and the decision to
commit crime from an economic perspective.
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inequality can account for only a small fraction in explaining these diﬀerences. 2
Utrecht and Leiden are similar in most socio-economic indicators, but Utrecht has
a crime rate per capita of 14.3 compared to Leiden, which has a crime rate of only
6.3 per capita.
How can we explain these diﬀerences in crime rates across space? This chapter
argues that diﬀerences in social capital can account for a signiﬁcant part of the
observed diﬀerences in crime rates across cities. Criminal behaviour depends not
only on the incentives facing the individual but also on the behaviour of peers
or others surrounding the individual. Given the same opportunity and expected
returns from crime, an individual is less likely to commit crime if his peers and
the community he belongs to punish deviant behaviour. If one individual decides
not to commit crime, it is less likely that others will do so, which creates an
external eﬀect of one person’s behaviour on the others. Informal social control
by which citizens themselves achieve social order increases the level of well-being
in a community. This in turn raises the level of trust among citizens, altruistic
behaviour (e.g., involvement in charity and voluntary contributions or donations)
and participation in activities that serve the community at a more abstract level
(e.g., voting). Although informal social control is often a response to unusual
behaviour, it is not the same as formal regulation and thus should not be equated
with formal institutions that are designed to prevent and punish crime, such as
the police and courts. It rather refers to the ability of groups to realise collective
goals and, in this setting, to live in places free of crime.
The empirical part of this research focuses on municipalities (>30,000 inhabi-
tants) in the Netherlands. A variety of social capital measures is employed. Pre-
vious work in economics and sociology treats social capital as a positive sum.3
Instead of measuring social capital as a positive value, it might be easier to mea-
sure the absence of social capital through traditional measures of social dysfunction
such as, family break down, migration and erosion in intermediate social struc-
tures (Fukuyama, 1995). This approach hinges on the assumption that just as
involvement in civic life is associated with higher levels of social capital, social
deviance reﬂects lower levels of social capital. This study beneﬁts from diﬀerent
indicators such as voluntary contributions to charity, electoral turnout and blood
donations as well as traditional measures of social capital. 4
These indicators seem unrelated and plagued by measurement error if used
2 Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) argue that only about 30 percent of the variance
in crime rates across space in the United States can be explained by observable diﬀerences in
local area characteristics.
3 Higher social capital is associated with higher economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer,
1997); more investment in human capital (e.g., Coleman, 1988); higher levels of ﬁnancial de-
velopment (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004); more innovation (e.g., Ak¸ comak and ter
Weel, 2006) and lower homicide rates (e.g., Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001).
4 Various indicators have been employed to proxy social capital, e.g., generalized trust and
membership to associations, gathered from diﬀerent surveys like the World Values Survey (WVS)
and the European Social Survey (ESS). Although these indicators result in consistent and robust
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as individual indicators of social capital. However, they turn out to be highly
correlated and a common denominator of all these indicators combining several
multi-facet dimensions may serve as a useful and a robust measure of social capital
(e.g., Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). This problem is tackled ﬁrst by treating social
capital as a latent construct. Several social capital indices are constructed by
using principal component analysis (PCA). Second, this chapter shows that social
capital, both represented by individual indicators and by an index, is an important
determinant of crime after controlling for other covariates. We also show that the
historical state of a municipality in terms of population heterogeneity, religiosity
and education has an impact on the formation of current social capital. The
ﬁndings reveal that on average a one standard deviation increase in social capital
would reduce crime rates by 0.32 of a standard deviation and that social capital
explains about 9 percent of the total variation in crime rates.
The approach in this chapter contributes to the literature in several aspects.
First, social capital is treated as a latent construct. Both the presence (e.g., blood
donations, voluntary giving and trust) and the absence of social capital (e.g., family
breakdown and population heterogeneity) are measured, which diﬀerentiates this
study from the existing literature. Simple correlations between various survey
and non-survey indicators of social capital display quite high coeﬃcients. For
instance, the average of the correlation coeﬃcients between survey based trust and
non-survey based social capital indicators − charity, blood and vote − is roughly
0.40. Second, we try to provide an explanation for how social capital forms. This
aspect is largely ignored in the literature and only took attention recently. In line
with Tabellini (2005) and Ak¸ comak and ter Weel (2006) this chapter argues that
the history of a municipality a century ago has a signiﬁcant impact on current
levels of social capital. Third, though crime is a global phenomenon most of
the literature is based on the evidence from the United States (US), the United
Kingdom (UK) and Canada.5 The Netherlands has an interesting setting with
homogeneous economic conditions, high concentration of foreigners and a free
market for soft drugs. Finally, the units (municipalities) are much smaller in
scale and much more homogeneous when compared to other studies. Thus, the
results are less likely to be aﬀected from diﬀerences in government policies, laws
and regulations. Given the high level of homogeneity, the probability of ﬁnding a
signiﬁcant correlation between social capital and crime is low, making us conﬁdent
of the robustness of our estimates.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 presents the conceptual frame-
work and develops our arguments. We present information on the data in Section
5.3. The empirical strategy is presented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the
estimates and a number of robustness checks. Section 5.6 concludes.
5 For US see for instance, Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996), Freeman (1996),Grogger
(1998), Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002), Levitt (2004) and
Lochner and Moretti (2004). For UK see, Wolpin (1978) and Sampson and Groves (1989) and
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5.2 Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework in this chapter studying the link between social capital
and crime to explain the heterogeneity of crime across space is based on social
capital as a source of control and community organization. To explain this frame-
work, it is better to start ﬁrst by providing a concise deﬁnition of social capital.
After that the chapter proceeds by developing the conceptual framework and the
approach taken to explore the link between social capital and crime.
5.2.1 Deﬁning social capital
The deﬁnition of social capital is based on four diﬀerent measures from several
diﬀerent literatures.
First, social capital is an increasing function of participation in civic life. For
instance, higher voter turnout and more voluntary donations to charity contribute
to a community’s social capital. Voter turnout is hypothesized to capture civic in-
volvement and participation in community decision making. This indicator is also
used by Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993), Putnam (1995), Rosenfeld, Mess-
ner, and Baumer (2001) and Gatti, Tremblay, and Larocque (2003). Voluntary
contributions in money terms are supposed to capture the strength of intermedi-
ate social structures such as charities, clubs and churches and could be employed
as another indicator that measures the presence of social capital. In this study,
city’s voter turnout rate and its monetary contribution per household to charity
are used as indicators for social capital.
Second, social capital is higher when people care more for each other or are
more altruistic. To measure this dimension of social capital, Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2004) suggest to use voluntary blood donations as an indicator for
social capital. Although charity and blood seem to measure similar phenomena
there is one particular diﬀerence. Experimental research reports that voluntary
contributions may incorporate elements of warm glow (e.g., Andreoni, 1995) and
reciprocity at the same time. For instance, most charity organizations send or give
small gifts (pens, postcards, etc.) and it has been shown that the contributions
increase with the size of the gift (Falk, 2004). However monetary compensations for
donating blood may even crowd out blood donation as suggested by Titmuss (1970)
and recent studies have shown that this could well be the case (e.g., Mellstrom
and Johannesson, 2008). In the Netherlands there is no monetary compensation
of any kind for donating blood, so we suggest that blood donation captures a pure
warm glow eﬀect. In this sense, voluntary blood donations per capita is employed
as a measure of social capital.
Third, security and trust increase the stock of social capital. When there
is more conformist behaviour, more respect for each other and when norms are
institutionalized, the level of social capital is higher. Trust has been identiﬁed as
a source of social capital. Economists deﬁned the concept in a rather lax way,5.2 Conceptual framework 115
as an optimistic expectation regarding other agents behaviour (Fafchamps, 2004).
Both sociologists and economists have beneﬁted from the survey-based ‘generalized
trust’ indicator as a proxy to social capital and as an alternative indicator to social
relations in general, which measures the degree of opportunistic behaviour (e.g.,
Putnam, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Rosenfeld, Messner,
and Baumer, 2001; Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld, 2004). The trust indicator
is found to be highly correlated with other measures of social capital such as
memberships to associations, extent of friendship and neighbourhood networks
and voting (Putnam, 1995).6 To capture this dimension generalized trust index
and trust in the police is used as indicators for social capital.
Finally, informal controls and the extent of informal contacts and acquain-
tances increase social capital. So far our indicators assume to measure the pres-
ence of social capital. However, the absence of social capital can be measured
by using measures of population heterogeneity and family structure. First, the
literature on disadvantaged youth and juvenile crime suggests that most criminals
come from single-parent households (e.g., Case and Katz, 1991). Social capital
in single-parent households is supposed to be low because of the fact that they
lack a second parent and because they change residence frequently. It has been
shown that single-parenthood has a negative impact on various outcomes, such as
educational attainment, juvenile crime and teenage pregnancy, aﬀecting children’s
social development (e.g., McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994; Parcel and Menaghan,
1994). Second, population heterogeneity is an important factor that aﬀects social
capital and trust as it breaks closure. As indicators of (lack of) informal control
and population heterogeneity, this chapter beneﬁts from divorce rates and the
percentage of foreigners.
Empirically, social capital is viewed as a latent construct that consists of these
elements. In Section 5.3 the empirical methodology is described in great detail.
5.2.2 Social control and community organization
Studies of the social environmental characteristics of crime have shown that there
exists a lot of heterogeneity. Disadvantaged neighbourhoods and communities are
not equally plagued by high crime rates. Sampson and Groves (1988) have devel-
oped a theory of social organization in which communities are empowered through
their trust in each other to take action against crime and to cooperate with formal
control, such as the police.7 Consistent with this theory, Sampson, Raudenbush,
and Earls (1997) report signiﬁcantly lower crime levels and self-reports of vic-
timization in neighbourhoods characterized by social or collective eﬃcacy in their
study of informal social organization and violent crime in Chicago. Similarly,
Bursik and Grasmick (1993) argue that the eﬀectiveness of law enforcement and
6 Research has shown that the survey-based trust question may measure trustworthiness
(Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter, 2000) or well-functioning institutions (Beugelsdijk,
2006) rather than trust itself.
7 See also Kornhauser (1978), Sampson and Groves (1989) and Bursik and Grasmick (1993).116 Social capital and crime: Evidence from the Netherlands
public control is higher in communities with extensive civic engagement.8 Strong
attachment and involvement in community matters also lead to strong social bonds
by which conﬂicts are resolved in a more peaceful way compared to communities
with weak social bonds (e.g., Hirschi, 1969). Hence, the cost of conﬂict resolution
decreases and more conﬂicts will be solved.
Communities are stronger when there is lower population turnover and density,
because turnover and density negatively aﬀect the ability to know others and to
observe and intervene in trouble making activities. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999)
explain why there is more crime in larger cities by arguing that larger communities
have a more transient and anonymous character, which reduces social cohesion.
This makes it harder to enforce social sanctions, which reduces the cost of crime
and thus results in more crime. Similarly, Williams and Sickles (2002) ﬁnd that
by being caught an individual risks to loose the utility generating social capital
(loss of reputation and job, divorce etc.). This means that the more social capital
an individual possesses the higher the expected cost of committing crime, which
reduces the probability to engage in criminal activities. Consequently, given the
probability of being caught and formal control, higher levels of social capital seem
to reduce crime.
When people know each other better, they are also more likely to participate
in community organizational life. This is expressed in participation in voluntary
organizations and charity (e.g., Putnam, 1993) and support. The opposite is true
for disadvantaged families and disadvantaged neighbourhoods in which deprivation
of any kind feeds further deprivation through mechanisms of social interactions and
peer eﬀects such as learning eﬀects, imitation and taking the peers as a role model
(e.g., Case and Katz, 1991; Manski, 2000; Evans, Wallace, and Schwab, 1992).
Individuals who belong to these families are more likely to be unemployed, have
low incomes and education and have personal problems. In most cases divorce
rates are higher and families are single-parent families headed by women. They
are also more likely to live in dense areas with a heterogeneous population and
more likely to change residence. Hence, disadvantaged families and persons invest
and participate less in the social community they belong to.
5.2.3 Operating the concept
Most research on social capital struggles with causality. In this research, it could
be the case that higher crime rates result in out-migration and constrain positive
social interactions. It might also be the case that criminal activity erodes social
capital because it engages individuals in crime networks and keeps them away from
educational and occupational opportunities. This chapter argues that social capi-
tal is a positive sum and founded by historical institutions. Institutions promoting
8 See e.g., Taylor, Gottfredson, and Brower (1984), Sampson and Groves (1989), Land, Mc-
Call, and Cohen (1990), Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer (2001), Lederman, Loayza, and Menen-
dez (2002) and Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld (2004) for empirical evidence.5.2 Conceptual framework 117
the formation of social capital in the past are positively correlated with current
levels of social capital but not with current levels of crime. Finally, higher levels
of social capital now, result in lower crime rates.
This implies an instrumental variable strategy in which a city’s current social
capital is instrumented by its past level education, population heterogeneity and
religiosity. Recent studies have shown the validity of such an approach (Tabellini,
2005; Ak¸ comak and ter Weel, 2006). The argument here is that population het-
erogeneity, the contribution of religion to human and social capital investments,
and education in the past contribute to the formation of a city’s social capital,
hence shape current social capital.
If social capital is an asset paving the way to community governance (Bowles
and Gintis, 2002) or to achieve goals that could be not be achieved or could be
achieved only at an higher cost (Coleman, 1988), then any factor that leads to dis-
organization and dis-attachment in the community would eventually reduce social
capital. Population heterogeneity is such a factor that may trigger dis-attachment
as higher levels of heterogeneity would break closure, reduce acquaintance among
residents and may result in lower trust among members of the community (e.g.,
Rose and Clear, 1998; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001). The eﬀects of racial
and/or ethnic heterogeneity on socio-economic outcomes are well documented in
the literature. It is shown that heterogeneity has an eﬀect on corruption (Mauro,
1995), rent seeking and low educational attainment (Easterly and Levine, 1997),
and lower provision of public goods (Goldin and Katz, 1999). However, this chapter
argues that ethnic and religious heterogeneity may result in circumstances where
formal and/or informal institutions are not binding. Therefore, our argument is
more in line with the literature that links heterogeneity to social capital in the
wider sense. For instance, both Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir,
and Easterly (1999) argue that ethnic fragmentation may increase polarization in
a community and create diﬃculty in the provision of public goods such as public
education, libraries, and sewer systems. In a similar vein Alesina and La Ferrara
(2000) argue that racial composition aﬀects the degree in participation in social
activities. Zak and Knack (2001) and Rupasingha, Goetz, and Freshwater (2002)
also show that higher levels of ethnic diversity may result in less trusting societies.
Protestant belief may have a dual eﬀect on the formation of social capital,
which is beyond simply saying that being more religious is associated with higher
social capital. First, Beyerlein and Hipp (2005) diﬀerentiate between bonding
and bridging social capital and argue that groups characterized by bonding social
capital are not eﬀective in creating an environment of informal social control to
deal with the threat of crime, whereas groups with extensive bridging social capital
are more eﬀective in creating such foundations.9 The results show that crime
9 Bonding social capital are links mainly or exclusively among members of the same group,
whereas bridging social capital links members of diﬀerent groups among communities. Bonding
social capital increases community social capital within groups, but may also reduce overall
social capital by restricting links among groups. Beyerlein and Hipp (2005) use the percentage
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rates are lower in societies with higher levels of bridging social capital. Given
this ﬁnding that mainline Protestants are more likely to be involved in community
wide volunteering, which in turn refers to higher levels of social capital, we argue
that communities where more Protestants reside are characterized by a certain
environment and ‘ethic’ to paraphrase Max Weber, in which social capital may
nurture. This view stresses the institutional aspect of Protestantism. A second link
is the human capital aspect. Becker and Woessmann (2007) argue that Protestant
instructions to read the Bible in ones own language and the support for universal
schooling boosted the literacy levels early on and hence created human capital as
a side eﬀect. Previous research by Coleman (1988) and Goldin and Katz (1999)
help to explain diﬀerences in human capital by relating it to historical diﬀerences
in social capital. 10
The interaction between human and social capital is well documented in the lit-
erature (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Goldin and Katz, 1999). Here we base our argument
on the fact that human capital aﬀects social capital with a lag. For instance Goldin
and Katz (1999) show that high school movement in the 1930s in various states
in the U.S aﬀects current levels of social capital. Recent analyses by Tabellini
(2005) and Ak¸ comak and ter Weel (2006) support this ﬁnding. They show that
for diﬀerent samples of European regions literacy rates in 1880s do have an impact
on current levels of social capital and on a set of cultural indicators. The idea here
is that education builds human and social capital at the same time. As shown
by Gradstein and Justman (2000, 2002) education aﬀects social capital because
education is an important socializing instrument. It builds common norms and
facilitates interaction between community members who might be diﬀerent along
cultural, religious or ethnic lines.
5.3 Data and descriptives
The data span 142 municipalities with more than 30,000 inhabitants in the Nether-
lands. We employ the 2002 geographical deﬁnition of Dutch municipalities and
each municipality is matched to a NUTS regional deﬁnition.11 Most of the socio-
economic variables come from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The analysis is re-
stricted to municipalities with populations of more than 30,000. For smaller
municipalities and for earlier years some variables are not available. Table 5.2
volunteering, and the percentage of Evangelical Protestants as a proxy for bonding social capital
because Evangelical Protestants are more likely to involve in voluntary activities within their
group but not in a wider community.
10 A possible third mechanism may be the ‘guilt’ mechanism. As suggested by Fafchamps
(1996) and Platteau (1994a), contractual obligations could be enforced via several mechanisms
such as loss of reputation and guilt. Starting from Max Weber numerous studies emphasized
how religion might play a role in individual or ﬁrm decision making.
11 The 2002 geographical deﬁnition of Dutch municipalities is available at Statistics
Netherlands (CBS), http://www.cbs.nl. The NUTS deﬁnition is available at eurostat
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat. The Netherlands is divided into 4 NUTS 1, 12 NUTS 2 and 40
NUTS 3 regions. See Ak¸ comak and ter Weel (2008b) for details.5.3 Data and descriptives 119
presents summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis. The
most salient details of the most important variables are discussed below, and other
variable deﬁnitions, sources and details could be found in Appendix B.
5.3.1 Social capital
Several indicators is used to proxy social capital. Information on voluntary giving,
charity, is obtained from the national fundraising agency (Centraal Bureau Fond-
senwerving, CBF). The data is available in euro terms and deﬁned as voluntary
contributions per household averaged over the term 2000-2005.12 For the electoral
turnout we use the voter turnout for the elections of the Lower House (Tweede
Kamer) in 2003. Following Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) data on blood
donations is collected. Blood is deﬁned as the blood donations per 100 inhabitants
in 2005. Higher values of charity, vote and blood are associated with higher levels
of social capital.
To support the data and for robustness purposes data is gathered also from
the ESS − a database designed to measure persistence and change in people’s
social and demographic characteristics, attitudes and values. These survey-based
indicators are widely used in the social capital literature. To increase the sample
size ﬁrst and the second round of ESS conducted in 2002 and 2004 were merged.
The merged data include information on more than 4,000 individuals. The data
is adjusted by population weights to reduce the possibility of complications that
might arise due to over-sampling. An equal weight trust indicator is constructed
from the answers to the following three questions and labelled it as trust, (i) most
people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful ppltrust, (ii) most people try
to take advantage of you, or try to be fair (fair), (iii) most of the time people
are helpful or mostly looking out for themselves (help). For all three indicators
higher values represent higher levels of social capital. To capture the conﬁdence
in institutions we use “trust in police” (formed from the question “How much
you personally trust the police”) from the same source. Unfortunately all these
ﬁve indicators are only available for 40 NUTS 3 regions and it is not possible
to collect similar information at the municipality level. However, these measures
are included in the analysis by creating variables that have the same value for
municipalities in the same NUTS 3 regional deﬁnition.13
The absence of social capital is measured using traditional measures of het-
12 Voluntary givings per inhabitant is also calculated for each year and then averaged over time
to see whether there is any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between this measure and the indicator above.
As expected there is no eﬀect on the results. This calculation introduces some bias because the
municipality deﬁnitions change every year from 2000 to 2005 and for this reason correspondence
tables are used to match municipalities and in cases that there is missing population or household
information we interpolate the data. Due to these shortcomings the original version of the
indicator is used as available from the source.
13 For instance, Heerlen (917), Sittard (1883), Maastricht (935), Landgraaf (882) and Kerkrade
(928) are all in Zuid-Limburg, hence all ﬁve municipalities share the same value for the above
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erogeneity and family structure. Information on the percentage of foreigners in
each municipality is collected as a proxy to population heterogeneity.14 Related
to this measure a new indicator is formed (movers) to represent mobility in a
municipality. It is deﬁned as the sum of the absolute value of immigration and
emigration divided by the population. To reﬂect erosion in family induced social
capital divorce rates are used as an indicator.15
The correlations among all these indicators are displayed in Table 5.1 and
depicted in Figure 5.1. The simple correlations suggest that measures of social
capital are strongly correlated. Correlations between the individual indicators,
charity, blood, vote, trust, foreign and divorce, are in a range between 0.01 to
-0.74 with an average of 0.36.16 As shown in Ak¸ comak and ter Weel (2008b) these
observations are not restricted to a speciﬁc group of municipalities and hold for
diﬀerent subsamples (see section 5.5.3 on Robustness).
To get an idea of how regions and municipalities are distributed along these
social capital indicators a k-means cluster analysis is performed to see whether the
data diﬀerentiates between regions with high and low social capital. If the analysis
is restricted to two groups there is a clear distinction between the north and east
of the Netherlands, which are rich in terms of social capital and the south and the
west, which are relatively poor in terms of social capital. If the cluster groups are
increased to 4 this distinction still prevails although it is not that clear anymore.
Municipalities in the northern part of the Netherlands tend to have values that are
above the mean for charity, blood, vote and trust and values below mean for foreign
and divorce. In the southern part this pattern is the other way around. In the
west and the east there are mixed groups. This simple preliminary analysis gives
another hint that the social capital indicators tend to move together supporting
simple correlations.
The fundamental premise in this paper is that these variables capture diﬀerent
dimensions of social capital and even though they may not be very good proxies
for social capital individually, a common denominator of them may stand as a
good indicator of social capital. The ﬁnal goal is to treat social capital as a latent
construct and to form social capital indices by using principal component analysis
(PCA). First PCA analysis includes charity, blood, vote, trust, foreign and divorce.
The ﬁrst principal component is labeled as SC1 which explains about 55 percent
of the total variation. This is an overall index merging both presence and absence
of social capital in one measure. Then another index is formed in a similar way,
SC2, only capturing the presence of social capital hence including the ﬁrst four
indicators above. Due to reasons mentioned above about the availability of trust
14 To support this measure we also collected data on immigration, emigration and detailed data
on foreigners diﬀerentiating between males and females and between ﬁrst and second generation
immigrants. Introducing such diﬀerences does not yield diﬀerent results.
15 Using the percentage of single parent families/households also yields similar results.
16 The average calculated by taking the absolute value of each correlation. For NUTS 3 regions
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics for municipalities>30,000 inhabitants
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
density 1369.31 1231.36 95.00 5511.00
charity 6.38 3.18 0.73 19.06
blood 2.69 1.67 0.21 14.41
vote 80.49 4.59 67.70 91.20
divorce 5.31 1.68 0.55 9.96
trust 5.77 0.25 5.30 6.20
ppltrust 5.76 0.31 5.13 6.32
help 5.32 0.29 4.79 5.91
fair 6.22 0.27 5.75 6.76
trustplc 5.89 0.19 5.23 6.41
foreign 16.30 7.30 4.61 45.39
immig 0.72 0.38 0.17 2.59
emmig 0.37 0.21 0.12 1.31
movers 1.09 0.55 0.31 3.78
SC1 0.00 1.80 -5.27 3.92
SC2 0.00 1.40 -3.50 3.70
SC3 0.00 1.32 -2.98 3.43
protestant1859 54.95 33.19 0.02 99.77
foreign1859 2.07 2.16 0.00 12.94
#school1859 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.18
crime 4.99 2.49 1.60 14.53
homicide 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
assault 0.58 0.30 0.13 2.01
rape 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
robbery 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.55
theft 1.23 0.74 0.23 5.31
autotheft 1.47 1.03 0.20 7.64
burglary 0.55 0.24 0.13 1.29
domestic burglary 0.47 0.21 0.05 1.09
drug 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.18
young 18.81 3.23 9.96 32.47
inequality 0.90 0.45 0.23 2.56
unemp 1.60 2.66 0.00 16.84
education 51.72 7.55 34.76 71.34
cofshop 0.35 0.45 0.00 3.67
shop 21.61 7.69 7.34 49.53
recrat 27.08 8.72 13.45 66.53122 Social capital and crime: Evidence from the Netherlands
at the municipality level, a ﬁnal index is constructed, SC3, including only charity,
blood and vote for robustness reasons. The ﬁrst component explains more than
60 percent of the variation in these three variables. Further details on the social
capital indicators, the principal component loadings and the explained variance
for all included indicators are presented in Appendix B.1.2.
5.3.2 Crime
Information about crime is constructed from the 2002 crime monitor of the Alge-
meen Dagblad. The data yield information on 27 diﬀerent types of crime.
The crime indicator covers all recorded crimes and is deﬁned as overall crime
per 100 inhabitants (crime). In the literature there is a tendency to use data for
crime that have minimal reporting inconsistencies such as, motor vehicle theft,
robbery and burglary. This is indeed important because the crime numbers in-
clude a category for bicycle theft, but especially in the Netherlands bicycle theft
is so common that many people do not even report if they are victim of bicycle
theft. In a similar vein, crime numbers on handling soft drugs could also be biased
since there is a relative free market for soft drugs in the Netherlands. On the other
hand, citizens are more likely to report if their car is stolen. Therefore, as well
as analyzing overall crime rates nine categories of crime are speciﬁed according to
the 2006 European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice. These are homi-
cide, serious assaults, rape, robbery, theft, motor vehicle theft, burglary, domestic
burglary and drug related crimes. Appendix B.1.3 deﬁnes each of these categories
and presents descriptive statistics for a number of subsamples. The most com-
mon reported crimes are robbery, theft and drug related crimes, whereas the least
common are homicide and rape.
A more detailed investigation of the crime data produces two main insights.
First, most recorded crime falls into one or two subcategories. For example, overall
theft is roughly 55 percent of all recorded crime and roughly 11 percent consists
of assaults; whereas serious crime such as rape and homicide is only 1 percent of
overall crime rate. Second, in the Netherlands most criminal activities take place
in larger agglomerations. For instance, among all recorded homicides 51 percent
occurred in the 22 largest cities and about 85 percent were observed in municipal-
ities with more than 30,000 inhabitants. In extreme cases like robbery and drug
related crimes 3 out of 4 attempts are observed in the 22 largest Dutch cities. This
pattern more or less prevails for all categories and even for overall crime rates as
53 percent of all recorded crime is observed in the 22 largest agglomerations and
83 percent occurs in municipalities with more than 30,000 inhabitants. Appendix
B, Table B.4 provides the distribution of criminal activities for diﬀerent subsam-
ples. It seems appropriate to argue that criminal activity in the Netherlands is
an urban phenomenon, which supports the choice of the sample. The selection of
142 municipalities represents only about 35 percent of all the municipalities in the
Netherlands but covers about 90 percent of overall crime.5.4 Empirical strategy 123
5.3.3 Instrumental variables
In line with Tabellini (2005) and the ﬁndings in the previous chapters, this chapter
suggests that historical factors do have an impact on the formation of social capital.
Three indicators are used as instruments for social capital all of which are observed
at the municipality level in 1859: (i) population heterogeneity, (ii) percentage
of Protestants, (iii) number of schools. All three variables are taken from the
population archive (Volkstellingen), which provides historical data on household,
population, occupation etc. starting from 1795 onwards. 1859 is selected because
this is the earliest date for which data at the municipality level are available. More
information about the population archive and the three instruments can be found
in Appendix B.1.4. Table B.5 lists the data for the 142 municipalities with more
than 30,000 inhabitants.
The percentage of foreigners in 1859 is used as an instrument for current social
capital as it is a proxy for trust in 1859. Municipalities that were well endowed
in terms of social capital 150 years ago may still be rich in social capital, which
emphasizes the importance of initial presence. In this case, past social capital
directly aﬀects current social capital but has no direct impact on current crime
levels. Foreign1859 is deﬁned as the percentage of foreigners living in a munici-
pality in 1859. Protestant1859 is deﬁned in a similar manner as the percentage
of inhabitants belonging to any of the Protestant denominations in 1859. Finally
data on the number of schools in 1859 is collected as a direct proxy for human
capital investment diﬀerent from the eﬀect of Protestantism on human capital for-
mation as discussed in Section 5.2. Although it may not be a perfect indicator
for human capital the results reveal that it is still a credible instrument to cur-
rent social capital. #school1859 is deﬁned as the number of schools per 1,000
inhabitants.
5.4 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy in this chapter hinges on the assertion that social capital
is an important determinant of crime and that social capital is hard to measure
thus should be best treated as a latent construct. Social capital is diﬀerent from
other forms of capital in the sense that it is not directly observable. Therefore,
ﬁrst strategy is to measure social capital as a single index composed of diﬀerent
indicators that could act as an individual proxy for diﬀerent dimensions of social
capital. For this purpose, a principal component analysis (PCA) is used that
estimates
Yi = βisocial capital + i, (5.1)
where i corresponds to diﬀerent indicators of social capital, Y is the latent con-
struct composed of a number of social capital indicators. Estimating this equation124 Social capital and crime: Evidence from the Netherlands
yields a number of principal component factors and a number of principal com-
ponent loadings, βi, which could be viewed as weights. Since the indicators are
highly correlated with each other we only use the ﬁrst principal component as a
measure of social capital and label it SCx, where x ranges from 1 to 3 and de-
notes the inclusiveness of the index. As discussed above we construct three indices
where SC1 is the most inclusive consisting of six indicators and SC3 is the least
inclusive consisting of three indicators. Table B.2 lists the principal component
loadings and the explained variance for each index and for each sample. The ﬁrst
principal component explains 50 to 65 percent of the variation induced by the
indicators.17
Having constructed the indices of social capital the analysis starts by estimating
the following base model with OLS using usual explanatory variables of crime:
crime = β0 + β1density + β2education + β3unemp
+ β4young + β5SC + , (5.2)
where subscript m for municipalities has been suppressed for notational conve-
nience, and the error term complies with the usual assumptions. Crime represents
crime rates depending on the type or group of criminal activity. Density refers to
population density. To normalize the data we took the natural log of population
density. Higher crime rates are expected in densely populated areas. Education is
the percentage of people with medium and high levels of education. As criminal
activity is concentrated within relatively younger age groups, the percentage of
people between 15-24 years old is also included as a regressor. Unemp represents
the unemployed under age 30. Education is expected to be negatively correlated
with crime and the percentage of population 15-24 years old and youth unemploy-
ment are expected to be positively associated with crime. SC represents not only
the three indices but also the six individual indicators to construct the indices.
The next step is to replicate the analysis above for an extended model:
crime = β0 + β1density + β2education + β3unemp
+ β4young + β5SC + β6X + υ, (5.3)
where X consists of a set of control variables which are; (i) income inequality, (i)
controls for the percentage of area devoted to shopping and recreation activities,
and (iii) number of coﬀeeshops per 10,000 inhabitants. We expect these variables
to be positively correlated with crime rates.
Endogeneity and the possibility of reverse causality could bias the estimates
of the above models when using OLS. Putnam (2000) has argued that low social
capital may result in higher crime, which in turn may result in even lower levels
17 Recently, a similar strategy was used by Fryer, Heaton, Levitt, and Murphy (2005) to
measure the impact of crack cocaine on crime in U.S. cities.5.5 Results 125
of social capital. For example, a third unobserved variable could aﬀect both crime
and social capital. Certain policies implemented by the local government could
reduce crime but at the same time have an impact on social capital. Or, it could
be the case that crime reporting rates are correlated with social capital levels,
so inhabitants living in high social capital areas may be more likely to report
crime (e.g., Soares, 2004). To deal with such problems a 2SLS strategy is followed
in which social capital is instrumented with the historical proxies discussed in
Section 5.3. We use the percentage of foreigners and Protestants, and the number
of schools in 1859 as instruments for social capital. This yields the following model:
crime = β0 + β1density + β2education + β3unemp
+ β4young + β5SC + β6X + ν,
SC = δ0 + δ1foreign1859 + δ2protestant1859
+ δ3#school1859 + δ4Z + η, (5.4)
where foreign1859 stands for the percentage of foreigners and protestant1859 de-
notes the percentage of Protestants in a municipality in 1859. #school1859 is the
number of schools per 100 inhabitants in 1859. The matrix Z includes all other
exogenous variables. We expect foreign1859 to be negatively, and protestant1859
and #school1859 to be positively correlated with social capital. Since almost all
the variables have diﬀerent measurement levels all the indicators are standard-
ized so that the mean and variance equals 0 and 1, respectively. Therefore the
estimated coeﬃcients are also standardized coeﬃcients measuring how the depen-




The empirical investigation starts by estimating the base model (equation 5.2)
using OLS. Table 5.3 presents the estimates. The dependent variable is deﬁned as
the overall crime rates. The mean of this crime measure has been standardized to
zero. The results from the base model reveal that individual indicators of social
capital have signiﬁcant impact on overall crime rates. Charity, blood, vote, trust
and trustplc are negatively associated with crime, whereas foreign, divorce and
movers are positively correlated with crime rates. With the exception of trust all
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.18 The ﬁndings are in line with
the previous research that reports negative eﬀects for trust, civicness and electoral
18 As mentioned before trust scores are available at the NUTS 3 level and are merged with
the data at the municipality level. This adjustment likely partly explains why the coeﬃcient is
statistically insigniﬁcant. Similar analysis at the NUTS 3 level (with n = 40) returns a signiﬁcant
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turnout (e.g., Sampson and Groves, 1989; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer, 2001;
Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez, 2002; Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld, 2004);
a positive link between crime and population heterogeneity (e.g., Jobes, 1999) and
single parenthood and crime (e.g., Sampson, Morenoﬀ, and Earls, 1999). Moreover,
all three social capital indices have signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on crime as can be
observed from the last three columns in Table 5.3. These indices imply that a one
standard deviation increase in the social capital index reduces crime by between
0.29 and 0.35 of a standard deviation. This eﬀect is economically meaningful, since
it means that a one standard deviation increase in social capital would reduce crime
rates by about 2 percent on average.
The ﬁndings on ordinary determinants of crime also support prior evidence.
Population density generally has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on crime sug-
gesting that densely populated areas are more likely to be vulnerable to crime
than relatively rural areas (e.g., Wolpin, 1978; Macmillan, 1995). This results
because heterogeneity and residential instability reduce the eﬀectiveness of com-
munity sanctions. In addition, urban areas attract criminal activity as there are
more opportunities for such activities in cities where they can act rather anony-
mously (e.g., Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). The estimations turn out a negative
coeﬃcient for education suggesting that the higher the level of education the lower
the crime rate, which is also consistent with the literature (Lochner and Moretti,
2004; Wolpin, 1978). This is ﬁrst because higher education is associated with
better labor-market outcomes hence increasing the opportunity cost of crime and
possibly because school attendance keeps young people away from the street con-
ditional on the fact that young people commit more crimes (Lochner and Moretti,
2004). However, only in a few speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁ-
cant.
The results also show that crime rates are increasing with the percentage of
young people, which is consistent with earlier work (Wolpin, 1978; Freeman, 1996;
Grogger, 1998). The only contradicting result of the estimates is the negative co-
eﬃcient for the youth unemployment rate, although the coeﬃcient is statistically
insigniﬁcant. ¨ Oster and Agell (2007) and Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002)
show for a panel of Swedish municipalities and American cities that a fall in un-
employment led to a drastic decrease in drug possession, auto theft and burglary.
However, these results also reveal that changes in youth unemployment have no
particular eﬀect on crime.
After the inclusion of a number of additional control variables the results are
qualitatively similar as Table 5.4 shows. All social capital indicators have a statis-
tically signiﬁcant impact on crime rates. In the extended model, income inequality
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on crime and the sign alternates depending on the speci-
ﬁcation. Previous research on the eﬀect of income inequality on crime also shows
contradicting results (e.g., Soares, 2004). However, recent research shows that







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.128 Social capital and crime: Evidence from the Netherlands
itself aﬀect property crime (Bourguignon, Nu˜ nez, and Sanchez, 2003; Chiu and
Madden, 1998). Another point is that the cross-section analysis throughout this
chapter may not be such a suitable approach to assess the importance of inequality
and unemployment on crime rates. Unfortunately, in this setting it is not possible
to pursue panel analysis. This is because there is no adequate data to do so and
more importantly because social capital is a stock that does not change from year
to year, whereas inequality and unemployment do.
As expected the percentage of recreational and shopping area has a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on crime (e.g., Jobes, 1999). This is because there are more
opportunities for criminals in such areas and the returns are higher (e.g., Glaeser
and Sacerdote, 1999). The results also display quite a strong eﬀect for the per-
centage of coﬀeeshops in a municipality. This could be due to several reasons.
First, the probability of committing crime may increase under the inﬂuence of
soft drugs. Second, coﬀeeshops attract disadvantaged persons, gang activity and
drug dealers which sets up an environment that supports criminal activity. Fi-
nally, to buy drugs, addicted people often have to commit crime. Inclusion of
the four control variables increases the explanatory power by one third suggest-
ing that about 65 percent of the variation in crime is explained by the extended
model. The added-variable plots are presented in Figure 5.2, which reveal the
strong conditional correlations except for trust.
Table 5.5 is a summary table presenting the coeﬃcients of all social capital
indicators we consider for diﬀerent subsamples. It is apparent that all six (charity,
blood, vote, foreign, divorce and movers) non-survey social capital indicators
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on crime. The survey indicators, trust, ppltrust, help,
fair and trustplc, do not return a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient all the time. Another
potentially interesting result is the impact of emigration as well as immigration on
crime rates. Immigration has a negative eﬀect because it reduces 0.1cm closure in a
community (e.g., Jobes, 1999). Considering the fact that social capital originates
from social interactions within a network, any factor breaking links between actors
is harmful for social capital. In this respect emigration may also increase crime
rates. It could also be the case that individuals who are less integrated in a society
are more likely to commit crime, which is why both immigration and emigration
are positively associated with crime rates. Our indicator movers (capturing both
eﬀects) reﬂects residential instability in a community and it is positively related
to crime suggesting that the higher instability the higher crime rates, which is
consistent with earlier work (e.g., Rose and Clear, 1998). The social capital indices
are always signiﬁcant at the one percent level regardless of the speciﬁcation and
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5.5.2 2SLS estimates
The OLS estimates above could be biased because of causality problems. There-
fore it is better to explore a 2SLS strategy instrumenting social capital with the
percentage of foreigners, percentage of Protestants and the number of schools in
1859. Table 5.6 presents the 2SLS estimates. Columns (1), (3) and (5) present the
ﬁrst stages of the 2SLS estimations for the three social capital indices, respectively.
The instruments in the ﬁrst stage have the expected eﬀect on social capital. The
quality of the instruments is important as they should be correlated with social
capital but not with the error term in a way that the instruments should be on
the ‘knife’s edge’. If the correlations of the instruments and social capital are
not strong enough in the ﬁrst stage we run into weak instrument problems. On
the other hand, if they are too strong we cannot safely assume that they are not
correlated with the error term. The joint F-tests in the ﬁrst stage show that our
instruments are valid as they pass the F-test threshold of 10 suggested by Staiger
and Stock (1997). Moreover the over-identiﬁcation tests show that the eﬀect of
the instruments on crime are operationalized only through their eﬀect on social
capital, not by any other mechanism.
The second stage results reveal that the coeﬃcients of the social capital indices
are somewhat larger than their OLS counterparts and signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level. These estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in social
capital reduces crime by between 0.30 and 0.34 of a standard deviation. This
eﬀect is economically meaningful and not far from the estimates from the OLS
exercise above (Table 5.4). The estimates suggest that the causality runs from
social capital to crime and the historical state of a community shape current social
capital.
Complementary to the OLS results above Table 5.7 presents summary infor-
mation on how individual indicators of social capital behave in 2SLS speciﬁcation.
Table 5.7 is comparable to Table 5.5 and for each subsample the ﬁrst column
shows the 2SLS coeﬃcient derived from the estimation of the base and the ex-
tended models. The second column shows the associated joint signiﬁcance test
of the instruments in the ﬁrst stage. In all speciﬁcations the estimations return
a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in the second stage. However, the F-tests illustrate an
interesting pattern. As can be seen from Table 5.7 F-tests for foreign, divorce,
vote and charity are larger than (or within the proximity of) 10. Given this, one
can argue that these indicators can be labeled as good indicators of social capital,
since they display consistent and quite robust estimates in their relationship with
crime. Blood donations do not perform as good as the ones above.
The methodology employed in this chapter allows us to discuss which indicators
of social capital perform best. This is potentially interesting for future research as
we can identify social capital indicators and also their relation to crime. This and
the previous sections have summarized the results for 14 potential social capital5.5 Results 133
Table 5.6: 2SLS results for crime and social capital
(1) 1st stage (2) 2SLS (3) 1st stage (4) 2SLS (5) 1st stage (6) 2SLS
SC1 crime SC2 crime SC3 crime
density -0.841 0.089 -0.511 0.167 -0.524 0.162
(0.133)*** (0.086) (0.111)*** (0.072)** (0.098)*** (0.074)**
education 0.294 -0.013 0.314 0.003 0.230 -0.025
(0.091)*** (0.048) (0.077)*** (0.057) (0.073)*** (0.053)
unemp -0.085 -0.048 -0.129 -0.065 -0.059 -0.039
(0.060) (0.035) (0.063)** (0.036)* (0.048) (0.035)
young 0.134 0.128 0.279 0.182 0.167 0.149
(0.127) (0.089) (0.099)*** (0.091)** (0.093)* (0.086)*
inequality 0.318 0.063 0.314 0.069 0.301 0.062
(0.104)*** (0.061) (0.099)*** (0.063) (0.080)*** (0.062)
shop 0.024 0.148 0.121 0.180 0.030 0.146
(0.095) (0.051)*** (0.097) (0.056)*** (0.076) (0.053)***
recrat -0.026 0.129 -0.001 0.135 0.045 0.149
(0.111) (0.056)** (0.081) (0.063)** (0.072) (0.061)**
cofshop -0.330 0.179 -0.130 0.235 -0.188 0.217
(0.097)*** (0.062)*** (0.077)* (0.062)*** (0.064)*** (0.064)***
foreign1859 -0.366 -0.309 -0.237
(0.090)*** (0.085)*** (0.066)***
protestant1859 0.315 0.321 0.396
(0.086)*** (0.087)*** (0.067)***








Constant 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.014
(0.088) (0.046) (0.080) (0.048) (0.069) (0.047)
N 142 142 142 142 142 142
Adj R sqr 0.66 0.68 0.53 0.64 0.61 0.66
R-squared 0.69 0.57 0.64
F-test instrm. 16.18*** 17.43*** 25.16***
overid 4.14 (0.11) 3.28 (0.19) 2.11 (0.34)
Dependent variable is overall crime rate. All variables are standardized. Columns 1, 3 and 5 are the ﬁrst stage results.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
F-test is a test of joint signiﬁcance of the instruments.
overid is a test of over identiﬁcation. Null hypothesis: Over-identifying restrictions are valid.134 Social capital and crime: Evidence from the Netherlands
indicators and three indices constructed from these indicators. Indicators related
to social support, solidarity and civicness perform quite well as indicators of social
capital. However, electoral turnout and donations to charity stand out from the
rest. Although their relation to crime is mostly signiﬁcant, blood donations and
trust are found to be rather inferior when compared to charity and vote. This
can be seen from Table B.2 in Appendix B. When constructing the indices, the
principal component analysis yields more or less the same weight for charity and
vote, but blood and trust receive only about one third of the weight attached to
charity and vote. This discrepancy becomes visible and signiﬁcant as the sample
moves from NUTS3 regions to smaller municipalities. The results also show that
indicators of social control (divorce rates) and population heterogeneity (percent-
age of foreigners, immigration, emigration and movers) can be labeled as good
social capital indicators. When the principal component loadings of the most in-
clusive index (SC1) is inspected carefully one can easily see that charity, vote,
foreign and divorce receive similar weights in magnitude. In almost all speciﬁca-
tions charity, vote and most of the measures of social control and heterogeneity
are important determinants of crime. Blood donations and trust indicators from
the ESS database are found to be not as important as the others.
5.5.3 Robustness
Subsamples
Several robustness checks are performed to validate the results. First, the analy-
sis is replicated using diﬀerent subsamples: 95 municipalities over 40,000 inhabi-
tants; 63 municipalities over 50,000 inhabitants; 40 NUTS 3 regions and ﬁnally 22
largest agglomerations in the Netherlands. This exercise do not change the previ-
ous ﬁndings and reveals that the ﬁndings are not bound to a speciﬁc subsample.
The results are summarized in Table 5.5 and the detailed results are presented in
Ak¸ comak and ter Weel (2008b).
Diﬀerent Types of Crime
Besides analysis on the overall crime rates the extended model (equation 3) is
also estimated for 9 diﬀerent crime categories. The rationale behind this is the
argument that overall crime rates are biased due to under reporting of certain
crime types. Therefore, one has to show that these results also hold for crime
that is supposed to have minimum reporting inconsistencies such as auto theft,
robbery, serious assaults and homicide. Table 5.8 presents the expected sign and
the signiﬁcance levels of the impact of diﬀerent social capital indicators on crime
subcategories and Figure 5.3 depicts the added-variable plots. The results high-
light several interesting points. With the exception of the social capital indices,
only in the case of homicide the individual social capital indicators seem to have
weak eﬀect. The only subcategory of crime that is found to be aﬀected by all5.5 Results 135
social capital indicators is serious assaults. The diﬀerence in the eﬀect of social
capital on property and violent crimes is also not that important. The only excep-
tion to this is that trust and divorce seem to have more eﬀect on violent crimes
when compared to property crimes. Another interesting result is that charity,
vote and foreign have a signiﬁcant impact on almost all of the crime categories.
The other indicators are sometimes loosely related to crime rates. This point could
also be taken as a point for caution for researchers who employ a single (or few)
social capital indicator, as the results would highly depend on the selection of that
particular indicator.
Social Capital Indicators
One of the main arguments in this chapter is that the indicators seemingly un-
related are in fact correlated with each other and represent diﬀerent dimensions
of social capital. Previous research argues that blood donations and electoral
turnout can safely be considered to be exogenous (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zin-
gales, 2004). By the same token, one could argue that divorce rates are exogenous
too. However, it could be the case that because of higher crime municipalities
become more transient and heterogeneous as opportunities attract outsiders or it
could be the case that because of high crime residents are afraid to leave their
homes which aﬀects their civic participation and reduces interpersonal trust (e.g.,
Liska and Warner, 1991). As a further robustness check Figure 5.4 shows what
happens if one employs indicators of social capital as instruments for each other.
The upper and the lower panel represent the 2SLS coeﬃcients and the t-ratios
respectively. To make this point clear one can explain the methodology as fol-
lowing. Each social capital indicator is instrumented by the remaining ﬁve social
capital indicators to estimate 2SLS models. For instance, for the ﬁrst box-plot
in the upper panel, all possible combinations of blood, vote, trust, foreign and
divorce − is used individually, and in groups of 2, 3, 4 and 5 − as instruments for
charity and the 2SLS estimation is replicated over and over again until all possible
combinations are consumed. This produces a set of 2SLS coeﬃcients and t-ratios
for charity and the distribution of these coeﬃcients and t-ratios are depicted as
the ﬁrst box-plot in the upper and lower panel respectively. This is done for all six
indicators and for each case there are 31 observations (i.e., 31 2SLS coeﬃcients and
t-ratios for each social capital indicator). The (*) indicates the coeﬃcients and
the t-ratios of the social capital indicators from the OLS estimation of equation 3
(see Table 5.4). The three vertical lines in the lower panel indicate the signiﬁcance
levels at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
From Figure 5.4, the following observations stand out. First, as can be seen
from the lower panel, all the 2SLS coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at least at the 5
percent level. This supports the argument that all these indicators are related to
each other and could be used as instruments for each other. Including them in the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































k140 Social capital and crime: Evidence from the Netherlands
It was speciﬁcally for this reason that social capital indices were constructed.
Second, the 2SLS coeﬃcients and t-ratios are somewhat higher than their OLS
counterparts. Third, the 2SLS coeﬃcient of trust varies to a large extent but this
is expected as trust ﬁgures are adjusted for the use at the municipality level as
explained before in Section 5.3.1. As a further robustness check the 2SLS model
is estimated by instrumenting social capital with the three instruments including
them individually rather than as a group to see their individual eﬀect on social
capital in the ﬁrst stage. The summary results are provided in Table 5.9. One
can easily see that the percentage of Protestants in 1859 is a powerful instrument
for social capital. Population heterogeneity and number of schools in 1859 do not
perform as well as religiosity when used as instruments individually.
Table 5.9: Diﬀerent 2SLS speciﬁcations for crime and social capital
SC1 SC2 SC3
(1) 1st stage (2) 2SLS (3) 1st stage (4) 2SLS (5) 1st stage (6) 2SLS
SC crime SC crime SC crime
foreign1859 -0.472 -0.145 -0.418 -0.164 -0.378 -0.182
(0.098)*** (0.102) (0.088)*** (0.115) (0.075)*** (0.128)
F-test instrm. 23.01*** 22.59*** 25.26***
protestant1859 0.450 -0.407 0.436 -0.419 0.481 -0.380
(0.084)*** (0.102)*** (0.081)*** (0.112)*** (0.062)*** (0.093)***
F-test instrm. 28.63*** 28.74*** 60.40***
#school1859 0.216 -0.467 0.207 -0.486 0.156 -0.646
(0.099)** (0.262)* (0.089)** (0.283)* (0.086)* (0.420)
F-test instrm. 4.76** 5.37** 3.30*
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
All coeﬃcients are obtained from the 2SLS model (equation 4) when it is estimated by including instruments individually.
rather than as a group of three. F-test is a test of signiﬁcance of the instrument in the ﬁrst stage.
Detailed results are available from the authors on request.
Diﬀerences in Income
Fourth robustness exercise involves including income measures to the extended
model. It might be the case that income levels rather than income inequality
explain variation in crime. Five diﬀerent indicators of income are included sep-
arately in the regression to assess the responsiveness of the coeﬃcients of three
social capital indices. These are, (i) income p: income per person (no distinction
between full time and part-time employment), (ii) income t: income per person
(of those who work 52 weeks a year), (iii) income w: income per person of western
origin (of those who work 52 weeks a year), (iv) income nw: income per person
of non-western origin (of those who work 52 weeks a year), and (v) income gap:
income w / income nw. Figure 5.5 displays summary results of this exercise.
Original standardized coeﬃcients are compared to coeﬃcients resulting from ﬁve
diﬀerent estimations for three SC indices. The inclusion of income indicators does
not change the previous ﬁndings. Including income per person of full-time em-5.5 Results 141



























Next, crime rates could display variance across ethnic communities. For instance,
keeping all other factors constant assume that there are two communities with
similar level of foreigners residence but one has higher crime. The mix of foreigners
might explain this diﬀerence. There might be less crime in municipalities where
the majority of foreigners are from European countries. To test this, the extended
model is re-estimated by diﬀerentiating between foreigners of western and non-
western origin. When comparing diﬀerent groups standardized coeﬃcients could
be misleading, so the actual impact on crime is calculated instead. Presence of
one percent of non-western foreigners is associated with 0.18 percent higher crime,
whereas this is only 0.13 for western foreigners. The results are meaningful as
on average the foreign population is about 15 percent of total population. So for
instance, presence of 10 percent non-western foreigners in a municipality accounts
for 1.8 percent crime on average.19 One possibly expects this trend to persist for
19 On average the overall crime rate is about 5 percent, so 10 percent of non-western foreign
population accounts for about 30 percent of overall crime142 Social capital and crime: Evidence from the Netherlands











Figure 5.6: Origin of foreigners and diﬀerences in crime rates
diﬀerent crime categories. Figure 5.6 depicts the eﬀect of the presence of non-
western and western foreigners, with the original eﬀect for diﬀerent crime types.20
As can be seen from the graph this is not exactly true. Only in the case of theft
and robbery presence of non-western foreigners is associated with higher crime.
There are negligible diﬀerences between non-western and western foreigners for
other categories of crime.
The empirical strategy in this chapter incorporates heterogeneity and divorce
rates in a social capital index, so in a way the argument is that these indicators
aﬀect outcomes through social capital. However, most empirical crime models
assess the eﬀect of these variables individually. For this reason, the extended
model is re-estimated by OLS and 2SLS by including divorce, foreign and SC3
index in the same equation. The results are summarized in Table 5.10, rows (3)
and (4). The ﬁrst two rows present the coeﬃcients from the original estimations.
The presence of social capital still seems to be an important indicator even after
including divorce and foreign as independent variables. The eﬀect of SC3 reduces
considerably but this does not change our conclusions.
20 Murder and rape are omitted from the graph as the eﬀects are very small and the diﬀerences








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.144 Social capital and crime: Evidence from the Netherlands
Another assumption that the empirical strategy rests on is that the exogenous
variation in social capital depends on historical instruments. The 2SLS estimations
only take this exogenous variation into account, which in a way assumes that
historical instruments are the only indicators that matter. This is of course not
true. One way to deal with this problem is to run OLS estimations controlling
for historical instruments (e.g., Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2007). Rows (5)
to (7) display summary results for the estimations when three instruments are
included as independent variables. Comparing rows (5) to (7) with the ﬁrst two
rows it can be observed that the results change slightly. Moreover, the ﬁndings
also reinforce the quality of the instruments as it is clear that the instruments do
not have impact on current crime levels.
Finally, as a further robustness check, the most inﬂuential observations are
omitted using two criteria: Cook’s D and Df Betas. For each criterion ﬁrst the
most inﬂuential observation and then the ﬁrst ﬁve most inﬂuential observations
are taken out and the extended model is re-estimated. Table 5.10, rows (8) to (15)
summarize the results of these exercise. The coeﬃcients of the three social capital
indices remain signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
5.6 Conclusion
From a community governance perspective, communities play an important role in
crime prevention by providing informal social control, support and networks. As
Dilulio (1996) puts it, the presence of social capital provides community-oriented
solutions to the crime problem and these solutions are more important than in-
creasing expenditure on police or incarceration.
The estimates in this chapter suggest that communities/cities with higher lev-
els of social capital have lower crime rates. These estimates are robust and the
causality of this relationship has been addressed carefully. Generally, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in social capital reduces crime by roughly around 0.30 of a
standard deviation. These estimates contribute to ﬁnding an explanation for why
crime is heterogeneous across space.
Institutional development in the past is employed as a proxy for current social
capital. Hence, social capital is treated as a long-term phenomenon, which stock
has been build during a long period of time. From a policy perspective, this
makes this study diﬃcult to apply because the measures of social capital cannot be
changed rapidly but need long-term investment. On the positive side, for instance,
the results reveal that crime is higher in municipalities where more youth is present.
Informal education in the early stages of the life cycle provided by the family and
community control and support could act as an important mechanism to reduce
youth crime and later on to build networks.Chapter 6
Investing in institutions:
The case of Turkey and the
EU membership
Daddy watch your little black sheep run.
Sweet Dreams, Tori Amos.
6.1 Introduction
Chapters 3 and 5 have shown the interplay between formal and informal institu-
tions by arguing that formal institutions shape informal institutions in the long
run. In chapter 4, to utilize these ﬁndings, we have devoted attention on the pol-
icy aspects of informal and formal institutions and seek answers regarding what
kind of institutions are necessary to maintain and improve the current state of
EU countries in terms of innovation and economic development. One implication
is that, especially in developed countries formal institutions (e.g., education) and
informal institutions (e.g., social capital) are of complementary nature. However,
given the fact that research along this line is still premature it is not easy to draw
policy conclusions. This chapter is an attempt to unveil further policy implica-
tions arising from this study. The main argument is that investing in institutions
assists countries to achieve dual objective. On the one hand, creating and sup-
porting “right” formal institutions has short and medium run implications, such
as improvement in labour and ﬁnancial markets. On the other hand, formal in-
stitutions also have an impact on how society functions thus indirectly aﬀecting
values, norms and informal institutions. To materialize these arguments, the issue
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of Turkey’s membership to the EU is taken as a case not only because of the timely
debate on this issue but also that investing in institutions is a credible and sustain-
able suggestion to resolve the ongoing discussion for the past 50 years regarding
Turkey’s membership.
We wish to advance the argument that getting passed the near-stalemate in
negotiations over Turkey’s membership to the EU needs to be more explicitly
based on recognition of the key role played by formal and informal institutions
in structuring the modes of governance in Turkey and between Turkey and the
EU member states. This recognition does not imply acceptance or rejection of
certain core values that for long have governed and given identity to each and ev-
ery one of these states. Such recognition is the ﬁrst step toward seeking solutions
that work through and build on, rather than dismiss, the institutions through
which governance is exercised. Working through institutions entails embracing
some institutions in both camps as legitimate while recognizing that others need
to be counter-balanced in the medium term through economic and other incentives
and neutralized in the long term through development programmes and macroe-
conomic policy with a potential to pave the way for the formation of desirable
institutions in a (still) emerging market economy such as Turkey. The premise
is that strengthening institutional ties between Turkey and the EU will not only
increase the probability of Turkey becoming an EU member but also will boost
Turkey’s capacity to strengthen its position in social and economic aspects. Co-
operation along these lines also oﬀers an important opportunity to start a process
of understanding and healing to thwart a potentially serious cultural divide (along
religious lines) with quite signiﬁcant global implications.
This chapter focuses on the relations between Turkey and the European Union.
It begins with an historical overview of the Turkey-EU relations to highlight some
of the pertinent facts that underlie the analysis. To illustrate the latest mood
in the debate, the arguments for and against Turkey’s membership to the EU
are examined. By using data from the European Values Study (EVS), section
6.2.2 shows that many of Turkey’s supposed cultural diﬀerences with the rest of
Europe are based more on (mis)perception rather than evidence and contrary to
the general belief (e.g., Jose Manuel Barosso’s recent speech referring to Europe’s
common values). European values relating to religion and democracy are not as
common as they are believed to be. The diﬀerences between Turkey and the EU
are more of political and economic nature and, as such, could only be addressed
through increased integration of Turkey into Europe by strengthening institutional
ties which in turn would lead to a formal and equitable membership, rather than
pressures that could lead to Turkey’s isolation. Put diﬀerently, further work to
bring Turkey into the EU’s fold can only be done through institutional capacity
building with deliberate EU support in Turkey and within the EU based on full
recognition of diversity and multi-culturalism.6.2 Historical context, past and present 147
6.2 Historical context, past and present
Post-Soviet political change in Europe in the 1990s, the rise of Islamic fundamen-
talism in the Middle East and other regions culminating in the attack on the World
Trade Centre Towers on September 11, 2001, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, and increased anxiety about the large number of Muslims in Western
Europe are some of the key factors that have redeﬁned the parameters of the
discourse on Turkey’s EU membership. Other issues include the banning of the
Islamic head-cover for women in French schools, the politically motivated murder
of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam by a Muslim extremist, and the anti-Danish and
anti-European demonstrations in Islamic countries following the printing of cari-
catures of the prophet Mohammad in Denmark and other European countries. In
addition, there has been a general “hardening” of the position on the Armenian
question by some governments.1 There are those, like Nicolas Sarkozy of France
and Angela Merkel of Germany who have openly opposed Turkey’s membership
or called for a special status arrangement - the so-called “privileged partnership”
between the EU and Turkey. The opposition is based in part on the premise that
the Muslim immigrants have not integrated well into the European way of life
and thus are a threat to social cohesion in smaller countries like Denmark and the
Netherlands.2 Another major issue is the prospect of a signiﬁcant increase in the
number of Muslims in formal European institutions if Turkey, with a population
of 72 million, becomes a member of the EU. A related concern is the projected
ﬁnancial burden imposed on the EU by the much poorer Turkey. However, in the
EU’s oﬃcial assessment these projections “have been based on current EU policies
and the present performance of the Turkish economy, ...[and] are ... highly spec-
ulative” (Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey , RICT, pp. 25-26).
Another parameter is the mismatch between civilizations. It has been argued
that “a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-faith Europe could send a power-
ful message to the rest of the world that the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ is not the
ineluctable destiny of mankind...Europe could play an inestimable role in future
relations between the ‘West’ and the Islamic world” (Report of the Independent
Commission on Turkey , RICT, p. 16). On the other hand, excluding Turkey from
Europe may aggravate the already uneasy relations with Islamic nation states. Ac-
cording to Wallerstein (2004), barring Turkey from European Union membership
increases the likelihood that the moderately Islamic and pro-Europe government
of Turkey might give way to a less moderate regime and something that would
rebound on Europe signiﬁcantly. Indeed, despite the reservations expressed by
some of the EU members, the oﬃcial view of the EU is consistent with this line
1 The French and Canadian governments, for example, have been insisting with increasing
intensity that the Turkish state must own up to its historical role in the injustices suﬀered by
the Armenians during the World War I.
2 However, that many second and third generation immigrants still see themselves and are
generally treated as “the other” is testament to the inadequacies in policies and programmes to
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of reasoning. The oﬃcial EU position cautions against disappointing Turkey’s
hopes for membership. Failure to accommodate Turkey is likely to provide fuel
for the advance of ultranationalist as well as Islamist currents, leading to further
destabilization of an already volatile region (RICT, p.22).3
Table 6.1: Arguments for and against Turkey’s membership
Arguments for: Arguments against:
Turkey is considered to be a large and dynamic
emerging market with a liberalized market-
based economy.
Increasingly, anti-EU membership proponents
in Turkey argue that the EU is not sincere
about accepting Turkey as a member.
Turkey enjoys a high degree of economic inte-
gration with the EU (as indicated by its mem-
bership of the Customs Union, for example).
Turkey’s large and poor population would cre-
ate direct (e.g., EU budget, structural funds)
and indirect (e.g., ﬂow of Turkish workers) ﬁ-
nancial burden to the other members.
Turkey’s membership would validate the claim
that the EU is an open and inclusive com-
munity of nations capable of drawing strength
from cultural and religious diversity.
Cultural and religious diﬀerences as well as po-
litical volatility and weak democracy represent
insurmountable barriers to Turkey’s member-
ship of the EU. (This sentiment is shared by
both EU members and diﬀerent anti-EU mem-
bership groupings in Turkey).
Turkey’s parliamentary system is compatible
with the western European political systems.
Turkey’s large population would create a bias
in favour of Turkey in EU decision making:
Turkey would be the second most powerful
state in terms of the number of votes.
Turkey is a geopolitical bridge between the
west and the east bordering the major oil
ﬁelds.
The arguments against Turkey’s membership fall under two headings: (i) eco-
nomic and political reasons, and (ii) the belief that Turkey is culturally diﬀerent
and that Turkey can not be associated with European values. Given this brief
historical summary, we wish to summarize the arguments for and against Turkey’s
membership of the EU (Table 6.1) and contextualise them in a framework to carry
out a preliminary institutional analysis.
6.2.1 Economic and political issues governing membership
Turkey’s application for full-membership in 1987 was rejected on the grounds that
Turkey was not as yet a suﬃciently developed economy. The EU recommended
that Turkey should put eﬀorts into increased economic integration with Europe,
suggesting that Turkey enters a Customs Union agreement with the EU as a pre-
requisite for being considered for membership. Turkey signed a Customs Union
3 The Turkish government has taken a series of measures to counter the arguments against its
membership. One such measure is the publication in 2000 of the results from a survey conducted
by TESEV, Turkey’s leading think-tank. A key ﬁnding of the survey is that the secular system of
government in Turkey has the overwhelming support of the Turkish people. While the majority of
those surveyed considered themselves as devout Muslims, they also believed that religion should
not interfere with political life (RICT, p.28). This conclusion is consistent with the ﬁndings,
based on the analysis of the EVS, reported later.6.2 Historical context, past and present 149
agreement with the EU in 1995 and became the only non-member state of the
European Customs Union.
Nowadays, Turkey has come to be considered one of the world’s ten most
promising emerging markets (Rouleau, 2000). The economic structure is market-
based and liberalized, in line with the current trends in majority of the industrial-
ized countries and recently has been described as a “functioning market economy”
for the ﬁrst time by the European Commission (European Commission, 2005, p.
54). With the signing of the Customs Union, Turkey’s economy became progres-
sively integrated into the European economy (e.g., Togan, 2000, 2004) as depicted
in Figure 6.1. For example, around 50% of all imports into Turkey in the past
ten years have come from the EU countries. Approximately 55% of Turkey’s ex-
ports are destined for EU countries.4 There are numerous joint ventures with




































4 For a detailed analysis of Turkey-EU economic relations with a special attention on customs
union, see Togan (2000, 2004). All the ﬁgures are calculated from original data available from
Turkish Statistical Institute and Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade.150 Investing in institutions: The case of Turkey and the...
at roughly 60% of the total FDI received while Turkish FDI is clearly directed
towards the EU and other European countries: 53% of total Turkish FDI in the
last 25 years has been invested in the EU countries. In monetary terms the share
of FDI in Turkey by the EU countries has doubled from 1986 to 2002, reaching
65% of all FDI Turkey received in the period 1986-2002.5
However, by the time of the 1997 Luxembourg meeting the priorities of the
EU had changed, resulting in the decision to turn down Turkey’s membership
application because Turkey did not meet the Copenhagen Criteria, laid down by
the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. There were now political as well as
economic conditions to be met by Turkey prior to being considered for membership.
Currently, opposition to Turkey’s membership is expressed in terms of Turkey
having a weak and volatile democracy, a much larger population and much lower
standards of living. The question of democracy in Turkey notwithstanding, Turkey’s
membership will impose a ﬁnancial burden on the EU while the country assumes a
strong voice in the decision making process due to its large population. In assess-
ing the impact of Turkey’s membership on the EU voting Baldwin and Widgren
(2005) argue that under the Constitutional Treaty scheduled to come into eﬀect on
November 1, 2009 Turkey would be the second most powerful member state after
Germany superseding other member states such as France, the United Kingdom,
and Italy. There is also a general concern that on membership, Turkish workers
would “ﬂood” western European labour markets. It is worth pointing out that
similar concerns were raised about Polish workers moving to Western Europe in
search for better employment prospects after Poland became a member of the
EU. While there was some movement in the short-term from Poland to Western
European countries, this did not persist. For instance, since the last enlargement
in 2004 a monthly average of 14,000 people have been immigrating to the United
Kingdom from the eastern EU countries. However, the British economy seems to
have had the capacity to absorb them and there has been little sign of disruptions
in the labour market as a result of these developments.6
Another key argument against Turkey’s membership, although sounds ridicu-
lous, is its geographical location. It is argued that only 5% of Turkey’s total area
lies in Europe and therefore Turkey cannot be considered as European. How-
ever, the condition of being in Europe geographically is not applied to Cyprus,
which is geographically located rather to the east of Turkey, or Malta, which is
closer to Africa than to Europe. Cyprus is considered as “European” because
of its historical (economic and political) links with Europe not because of geog-
raphy. The same argument can be applied in support of Turkey’s membership.
5 Unfortunately, this integration has drawbacks. Under the Customs Union agreement Turkey
is expected to act in accordance with the common trade policy of the EU. But, as Manisali (2004)
points out, because Turkey does not have membership privileges, complying with the agreement
restricts Turkey’s policy space. Moreover, Turkey has not received most of the 2.5 billions of
euros promised by the EU as a compensation for the adverse eﬀects of Customs Union on the
Turkish economy.
6 Internet source. Accessed 13.03.2006
http://www.ukimmigration.com/news/2006 03 01/uk/slowdown in jobseekers.htm.6.2 Historical context, past and present 151
The geographic argument is particularly redundant when one views Europe as a
“dynamic social construct” or “an imagined community that can change accord-
ing to circumstance and political leadership” (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het
Regeringsbeleid , WRR, p. 25). There are numerous political, economic, and
social reasons for the construct to include Turkey.
Many of the opponents of Turkey’s membership point to the weaknesses of the
Turkish legal system, which remains ineﬀective. As well, almost everyone agrees
that corruption is rife in the country and there is a sizable informal economy
(see Table 6.3). The Turkish government’s eﬀorts in recent years to reform its
judicial system and set up functioning state institutions to eﬀectively structure
and regulate the economy have been lauded by the European Commission but
deemed insuﬃcient to warrant grounds for membership talks. But there is a limit
to how much of the institution building can be “engineered” and imposed by the
Turkish state in a top-down and isolated fashion. At any rate, there are numerous
historical examples that suggest that top-down institution building runs the risk
of never becoming fully embedded and is prone to reversal or implosion, as was
the case with many state-enforced formal institutions in the former Soviet Union
and the Eastern Bloc. In section 6.3 we argue that embedding new institutional
forms, such as the legal system to align Turkey with the rest of the EU, will require
support from the ground up and external impetus which, in the case of Turkey,
can come from the European Union.
The strength of the ‘against’ camp in Turkey
A recent phenomena that has aﬀected the EU-Turkey relations is the rise of the
“against” camp within Turkey. In the past numerous appearances against Turkey’s
membership have occurred in Turkey. Lately the arguments of this anti-EU camp
have reached a level of maturity, are more reasonable and more pronounced in
the Turkish public and media. As an evidence, the recent Eurobarometer survey
shows that only %48 of the Turkish citizens think that EU memberhsip is good as
opposed to about %75 when Turkey received candiditate country status in 2004.
Fail to address these allegations might create serious problems leading to a slow
down in the negotiations.
Cultural diﬀerences are played up by both Europeans and Turks opposed to
Turkey’s membership. Religious fundamentalists in Turkey promote the view that
Turkish Islamic culture would decline under pressure from the non-Muslim Eu-
rope. The ultra-Nationalists in Turkey play on the insecurity of Turks about their
national identity and threats to its stability. Dissolution of a Turkish state is feared
as a possible consequence of complying with the EU vision and rules about minor-
ity rights and the need for a more inclusive mode of governance that gives stronger
voice to national ethnic and religious minorities. Recently the Nationalist Move-
ment Party (MHP) changed its policy towards the EU and Turkey’s membership
by arguing that neither Turkey nor the EU would beneﬁt from Turkey’s member-152 Investing in institutions: The case of Turkey and the...
ship, labelling the negotiations as a “tactical distraction” that would undermine
Turkey’s current position.7 The ultra-left and the Communist Party of Turkey
argue that the EU is nothing more than an instrument that rapidly integrates
Turkey into world capitalism and the global market.8
Khan (2005) argues that anti-Islamic sentiments in Europe strengthen anti-
EU sentiments in Turkey which might play a signiﬁcant role in undermining the
accession talks:
“The more Turkey’s culture is criticized by voices in Europe, the tighter
Turks may pull the blanket of national and cultural identity around them-
selves. Ultimately, the real danger to Turkey’s bid for EU membership may
not lie in the diﬃcult negotiations ahead in Luxembourg, but among those
Turks who believe they will never really be accepted in the EU club - and
who say good riddance.” (Khan, 2005, p. 41)
There is a strong sentiment among many Turkish intellectuals (and a large
proportion of the public) that the EU-Turkey relations are not based on reciprocity
and shared interests. The EU is said to be beneﬁting more than Turkey from
this relation with no demonstrated willingness to help Turkey with some of its
many worries about national security and economic stability. Emre Kongar, a
well-known Turkish intellectual, states that the EU would stand to beneﬁt the
most from the accession talks since the talks are largely focused on what Turkey
should do in terms of reforms to meet the EU’s approval without the EU making
any commitments to help Turkey in seeing to its domestic priorities including
potential ethnic strife, Cyprus, and the diplomatic chasms with Greece.9 Ismail
Cem, the former Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs of Turkey, has complained that the EU
has formed a seemingly deliberate habit of bringing speciﬁc issues such as Cyprus,
relations with Greece, and the treatment of Kurds and Armenians in Turkey into
the discussions over and again, even if a consensus has been reached on these issues
in previous negotiations (Cem, 2005). Although the EU stresses that membership
decision is objective, i.e., tied to economic and political criteria, it is a fact that
the EU has given priority to some countries over others in their eﬀorts to fulﬁll
these criteria (e.g., Sjursen, 2002). Unfortunately, Turkey has never been in such
a privileged status.
On the contrary, Turkey has been given a long list of unwritten criteria. These
include the demand by some member states that accession talks be “open-ended”
and not necessarily result in full membership, that there should be “permanent”
limitations on (Turkish) labour-mobility, insistence on the recognition of Cyprus,
7 Internet source. Accessed 16.12.2005.
http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/agustos/09/p05.html.
8 Internet source. Accessed 16.12.2005.
http://www.tkp.org.tr/index.php?kat=585&yazi=725.
9 Internet source. Accessed 16.12.2005.
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Table 6.2: Turkey-EU relations from Ottoman era to Republic of Turkey
Ottoman Empire vs Europe, 19th
cent.
Turkey vs European Union, 20th cent.
Economic
demands
Starts with extending capitula-
tions in the 18th century and ends
with Baltalimani trade agreement
with the United Kingdom in 1838,
(and later with other European
countries) which grants certain
privileges to UK traders. Conse-
quently, local traders and produc-
ers were unable to compete with
foreigners that later caused eco-
nomic bankruptcy of the empire at
the end of the 19th century.
Starts with the agreement of Ankara
(1963). The attempts to liberalize the
capital markets were ﬁnalized by full
capital mobility in 1989. This acceler-
ated economic integration and eventu-
ally led to customs union with the EU
in 1995. As a result, Turkey is entitled
to act in accordance with the common
trade policy of the EU, but is not able
to shape the policy since Turkey is not
a member state. This means that the




Most of the political demands
by the Europeans regarding the
rights of Christian minorities and
foreigners (living in Ottoman ter-
ritory especially foreign traders)
were granted with the moderniza-
tions attempts ‘Tanzimat’ (1839)
and ‘Islahat’ (1856).
Most of the political demands (human
rights, the issue of Cyprus etc.) were
granted by amendments in constitu-
tion, civil law and variety of other ad-
justments within a period of 10 years
(the process is still pending). This






Ottoman Empire was recognized
as a part of the ‘European Con-
cert’. Paris Peace Agreement
(1856).
Turkey was recognized as a candidate
country (The period from December
1999 to 17 December 2004).
Note: For a thorough discussion see Kazgan (1999).
admissionbyTurkeytoresponsibilityforthekilling, displacement, andpersecution
of Armenians in the aftermath of the ﬁrst world war, and a willingness to address
the unresolved Kurdish question. Given this long list of complex issues, it is
perhaps little wonder that many of the EU member states have no intention of
embracing Turkey as a member. The key question here is not whether or not these
issues should be used against Turkey’s membership but how the membership of
the EU will accelerate and strengthen Turkey’s attempts to address these issues.
A public opinion survey conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies
foundation in 2002 reveals that although around 65% of the respondents support
EU membership, the question on sincerity of the EU regarding Turkey’s mem-
bership rated as 3.7 on a scale of 1 to 10 (Kirisci, 2002). 10 It is perhaps not
10 This disappointment is noted by Ahtisaari and Rohan of the Independent Commission on
Turkey: “The same is true of the reported intention of some Governments to have the so called
’Privileged Partnership’ concept explicitly included in the negotiating framework as alternative
to full membership. This proposal has also been discussed at last December’s [2001] European
Council meeting and was rejected, resulting in a reference to ‘open-ended negotiations’ in the
Council’s conclusions. Such wording, which has never been used in previous enlargement rounds,
may have somewhat ruﬄed Turkey’s feathers, but was ﬁnally accepted as constructive ambiguity154 Investing in institutions: The case of Turkey and the...
very surprising that the public opinion in Turkey is increasingly turning against
Europe, harking back to the historical distrust in relations between Turkey and
its European neighbours.11 Many of the Turkish opponents of membership draw
parallels between the Turkey-Europe relations in the second half of the twentieth
century and the relations between the Ottoman Empire and European powers in
the 19th century, arguing that joining Europe now could well result in the demise
of the Turkish Republic just like closeness to Europe undermined the Empire in
the nineteenth century (Table 6.2).
6.2.2 How common are European values and how diﬀerent
is Turkey?
Approach
Twenty-ﬁve years ago Geert Hofstede in his inﬂuential study, ‘Culture’s Conse-
quences: International diﬀerence in work related values’, investigated the work re-
lated values of people in over 50 countries, who worked in local subsidiaries of IBM.
He identiﬁed four-dimensions of national culture. In all four dimensions Turkey
was grouped with other European countries such as Belgium, France, Greece, Por-
tugal and Spain. This section shows that many of Turkey’s supposed cultural
diﬀerences with the rest of Europe are in fact unsubstantiated by analyzing the
data from the European Values Study, 1999 (EVS). There is extensive support
for the argument that the social and cultural diﬀerences between Turkey and the
EU are largely exaggerated, based more on (mis)perception and unsupported by
empirical evidence. Moreover, European common values are not as common as
they are believed to be and Turkey ﬁts reasonably well within this range of het-
erogeneity. The analysis focus on fundamental values such as individual’s views on
religion and democracy, since these values seem to feature strongly in statements
against Turkey’s EU membership.
EVS was designed to measure change and persistence in people’s social and de-
mographic characteristics, fundamental value orientations and norms in ordinary
life. The study provides detailed data on social structure, family, religious aﬃlia-
tion etc. One common problem in such datasets is that the sample size for each
country may not reﬂect the true population of the country. Since our intention
is to compare countries we adjusted the original data using population weight as
a remedy to complications that may arise from over-sampling. This adjustment
ensures that each country is represented in proportion to its population size. We
formed seven country groups for comparison:12
so often used in international diplomacy”.
11 In a recent study Ulagay (2005) argues that there has been an increase in anti-EU sentiments
in Turkey and anti-integration sentiments in EU countries. He also points out that there is general
disappointment with what the EU has delivered to date, which was manifested in the rejection
of the European Constitution in the referenda in France and the Netherlands
12 EVS does not provide data on Cyprus.6.2 Historical context, past and present 155
• EU15: 15 EU member countries prior to the latest enlargement.
• EU27: All current EU member states excluding Cyprus.
• EU12: All member states joined EU since 2004, excluding Cyprus.
• EUNORTH: Four northern European member states in the EU15: Denmark,
Finland, Netherlands and Sweden.
• EUSOUTH: Four southern European member states in the EU15: Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain.
• LATE COMERS: Two new member states Bulgaria and Romania, and Croatia.
• FORMERSOV: Three former Soviet countries: Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.
Appendix C, Tables C1 and C2 present the detailed average scores, standard
errors and the measurement scale of each variable for Turkey and the 7 groups
deﬁned above. To highlight the heterogeneity within the EU27, we make use
of the range and present in brackets the code for the country corresponding to
the maximum and minimum scores. The detailed results in the appendix are
summarized in Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. To compare all variables on a similar
measurement scale the indicators were standardized so that the mean of each
indicator is zero. The ﬁgures present the distribution of each indicator for 26 EU
countries plus Turkey. The ﬁgures represent the median, 25th and 75th percentile
as indicated by the upper and lower hinges of the box and the smallest and the
largest value (excluding the outliers) as indicated by the spikes. The average of
each variable is zero and the position of Turkey is shown by the symbol “o”.
Empirical ﬁndings
This section questions the validity of the arguments against Turkey’s membership
based on cultural diﬀerences. The perceived belief in European public is that
(i) Turkey is overwhelmingly religious and religion is supported by the family,
the education system and the government, (ii) mix of weak democracy, political
system and importance of religion renders individual value orientations that are
incompatible with the EU member states. The discussion below shows that these
beliefs are in fact unsubstantiated.
A key ﬁnding is that for almost all the variables relating to religion, Turkey
falls within the range of values representing the importance of religion among the
EU27. However, for a better understanding we need to compare the variables
(v6, v101 and v115) which relate to questions on believing in god and on whether
the respondents belong to a religious denomination. As expected the proportion
of respondents who believe in god or who at least belong to a religion is higher
in Turkey when compared to the average of the EU15 or the EU27 (Appendix C,
Table C.1 and Figures 6.2 and 6.3). This early observation is supported by two sets156 Investing in institutions: The case of Turkey and the...
of detailed questions on individuals’ view on the importance of the church/mosque
in individual, family and social life, and on the importance of religious services.
For most of the indicators, Turkey’s scores are still somewhat larger than the EU
average but are in moderate levels oscillating between the minimum and maximum
score of the EU27.
A striking ﬁnding is that Turkey’s scores are close to the EU average when
respondents are asked how religious they are or how often they attend religious
services (v110 and v105). This indicates that Turkey’s population is not as reli-
gious as commonly perceived or, to put it in another way is only as religious as
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averages for seven countries for which the data is available are as follows: Italy
(3.78), Austria (3.64), Turkey (3.54), Bulgaria (3.06), Lithuania (3.05), Germany
(2.94) and Czech Republic (2.62). The ﬁndings show that the respondents from
Italy and Austria support this argument more strongly than the respondents in
Turkey. With respect to parental views on religion in education, we ﬁnd that
Turkey is also not that diﬀerent from the rest of the EU.
Turkish respondents’ position regarding the questions assessing the eﬀect of
religion on public oﬃce and government decision making is in line with the above
ﬁndings (Figure 6.3). This is further supported by an optional question that asks
the respondents to assess the involvement of church/mosque in national politics on
a scale 1 ‘no, absolutely not’ to 4 ‘yes, absolutely’. The mean scores for seven coun-
tries are as follows: Luxembourg (2.98), Germany (2.89), Croatia (2.79), Turkey
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ish political system despite the young age of the republic and despite occasional
deﬁciencies in preserving democratic system.
It seems that the idea of a political system with a strong government and
where the army is a major ruling factor receives more support in Turkey than its
European counterparts (v216 and v218). While signiﬁcant, this ﬁnding needs to
be contextualized: The army is viewed by many in Turkey as a major force to
ensure the sustenance of a modern, secular (though authoritarian) nation state.
It is only recently that the Turkish political system has been able to function
without explicit reference to or intervention from the army. There is strong popular
support for the army as a major stabilizing force in Turkey’s system of governance
despite human rights concerns as a major issue for Turkey due to the army’s
periodic use of excessive force and political suppression to bring about order and
maintain the state apparatus. In this case our ﬁndings show that Turkey’s score
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ﬁnding is that in practical terms respondents in Turkey are not as religious as they
are believed to be as reﬂected by the indicators on attendance in religious services
(v105 and v106) which are close to the EU15 average. The evidence provided also
supports the view that religious belief system does not have signiﬁcant impact
on the ideology of the state (e.g., Balkir, 2001). Concerning the indicators on
democracy the results reveal mix evidence. The results reveal that more has to be
done to institutionalize democracy in Turkey (see Figure 6.6).
The most legitimate criticisms of Turkey’s weak democracy notwithstanding, it
appears that the objection by some EU member countries to Turkey’s membership
is based on a misperceived belief that Turkey’s mix of ethnicity and culture (includ-
ing religion) is incompatible with that of Europe in general (e.g., Lino, 2004; Wood
and Quaisser, 2005). Unfortunately these misperceptions are systemic and shared
by the European public, even those who hold a conciliatory view on Turkey’s
membership. For example, a recent speech by Jose Manuel Barroso, the president
of the European Commission, on the issue of the cartoons of the prophet Moham-
mad makes reference to Europe’s “common values and traditions” such as respect
for personal life and freedom, freedom of speech and a clear distinction between
politics and religion (Barroso, 2006). However, as the analysis clearly shows there
are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the common values and traditions of the EU member
states, including the relation between politics and religion (v129-v132). Moreover,
given the ongoing debate on what these common values are and the questions of
‘what is Europe?’ and ‘what is its identity?’ (e.g., Paasi, 2001) it makes little
sense to argue against Turkey’s membership based on as-yet-undeﬁned European
values and identity characteristics.
These misperceptions even have historical roots reaching back to 16th century.
In De bello turcico (On the war against the Turks, 1530) Erasmus refers to the
Turks as “wicked barbarians” who are trying to conﬁne Christianity to a narrow
land.13 According to Erasmus the Turks have established an immense empire not
because of their own merits but due to Christian sins as he wrote “...we have
angered God and caused him to send the Turks against us, just as he sent frogs,
lice and locust upon the Egyptians long ago...”. Having made such sharp com-
ments about the Turks the document as a whole has a rather positive conclusion
that war must never be undertaken unless, as a last resort, it cannot be avoided.
Nevertheless his conclusions do not change the fact that his perceptions regarding
the Turks were negative in nature. Since then, social, economic and political cli-
mate has changed in great extent. But have the perceptions regarding the Turks
changed as well? Is the European software of the mind, to paraphrase Geert Hof-
stede14, is programmed against the Turk? The ongoing debate on Turkey, Islam,
clash of civilizations and the EU is a ﬁne piece of evidence that in essence such
perceptions have not changed much in the past 500 years, although they have soft-
ened and evolved to another dimension. These questions invite a European wide
13 For an English translation see Erasmus ([1530] 1990).
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public discussion that would enable a healthy negotiation process between Turkey
and the EU. Given the strength of the against camp within Turkey, it is best to
complement these eﬀorts by enhancing Turkish public approach to Europeans and
EU institutions.
To sum up, there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity of views on basic values in EU15
and EU27, particularly when we compare northern and southern European coun-
tries. Rather than disappoint, this ﬁnding should be the beacon call for the EU
policy makers to recognize the diﬀerences and look for common grounds based on
a vast reservoir of strengths. The success of the European project signiﬁcantly
depends on the performance of the EU in bonding, bridging and managing this
heterogeneity. It is clear that a well-designed institutional system is a prerequisite
for success in this regard.
6.3 A sustainable institutional framework
There are two opposing views regarding Turkey’s EU membership: (i) why should
Turkey become a member, and (ii) why should not (Table 6.1). This section
provides evidence that diﬀerences between Turkey and the EU are of institutional
nature and thus best be addressed by investing in formal institutions. In other
words, unless Turkey is integrated in the EU institutionally, these two opposing
arguments will become obsolete. The real question then is whether Turkey will or
will not become a member rather than whether it should or should not.
As discussed in the previous sections there are two legitimate reasons against
Turkey’s membership. Frankly, the most important amongst them, i.e., that
Turkey is economically underdeveloped and poor, has been ruled out by the EU
itself by granting Bulgaria and Romania membership status. This has become
highly questionable now given the fact that the level of economic development in
Turkey is comparable (and even better) to these two recent EU member states. If
the reason is that Turkey’s ‘wrong’ cultural and religious mix as put forward by
many others, it has been shown in the previous section that this is largely exag-
gerated and based on historical perceptions rather than facts. Even if this is the
case, as the French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss argues “one culture has no
absolute criteria for judging the activities of another culture as low or noble”(cited
in Hofstede, 1997, p. 7). What, then, is keeping Turkey away from the EU? Is
there a sustainable path toward Turkey’s membership?
Figure 6.5 depicts a framework that enables a healthy discussion. The ﬁrst 40
years of EU-Turkey relations can be viewed as a game with repeated interactions
and information asymmetries (e.g., Spence, 1973; Axelrod and William, 1981)
which expected to be trust building in cooperation (e.g., Durlauf and Fafchamps,
2005) and which would eventually have resulted in Turkey’s membership. However
the rules of the game changed considerably due to political reasons (e.g., end of cold
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Figure 6.5: A framework for EU-Turkey relations: Past, present and sustainable
future
this period, labeled as the ‘past’ here, was the negative signals that both parties
sent to each other. For instance, Turkey did not meet the economic criteria to be
considered as a candidate country although having accomplished advancements,
such as the ﬁnancial liberalization and the customs union with the EU. Moreover,
state of emergencies and military takeovers have undermined the democratic values
(see Figure 6.7). The EU displayed a matching negative attitude towards Turkey’s
membership. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union the attention shifted
towards eastern European states and away from Turkey signaling how Turkey’s
membership was valued by the EU oﬃcials thus giving a ﬁne impression that EU
was not serious regarding the membership. There were other factors accumulated
through time that were seemingly unimportant but turned Turkish public opinion
against the EU.15 Consequently, membership expectations were not realized and
the rejection of Turkey’s application as a candidate country in 1997 marks the end
of this period.
The current situation resembles the past except the fact that now Turkey holds
15 For example, most of advancements of the 1958 Ankara agreement, such as the freedom of
movement of people, was never realized and Turkey is yet to receive most of the 2.5 billions of
euros promised by the union to compensate for possible adverse eﬀects of customs union on the
Turkish economy (see Manisali, 2004, for details).162 Investing in institutions: The case of Turkey and the...
a candidate country status. Current EU ‘wait and see’ position is that if Turkey
successfully deals with its shortcomings, the membership could be discussed. This
‘left-alone’ and ‘open ended’ policy pursued by the commission coupled with fre-
quent pronouncements that Turkey should rather be given a ‘privileged member’
status cast doubts on the sincerity of the EU. Under these conditions the ongoing
negotiations are unsustainable for two reasons. According to the ﬁrst scenario,
Turkey continues to struggle meeting Maastricht criteria. Moreover, the political
issues such as the problems in eastern Turkey with the Kurdish minority, the Ar-
menian genocide and the unresolved Cyprus issue will continue to be a burden. We
reckon that, in isolation, Turkey will have diﬃculty in dealing with this long list
of political and economic demands. Hence, negotiations will be delayed and with
a high probability Turkey will not become a member not even in the medium-long
run. This might result in a privileged membership, what most current contestants
pronounce these days. A more interesting scenario is that Turkey deals with its
major economic, social and political problems in isolation, follows a successful ne-
gotiation round and fulﬁlls the criteria to be an EU member. Most contestants
would argue that the ultimate outcome would be an EU membership in such a
case. But we do not because of a simple cost-beneﬁt analysis. If Turkey follows
such a path, Turkish public would inevitably question whether Turkey should be-
come an EU member and constrain its possibility space given the fact that Turkey
is able to solve major problems in isolation without deliberate help from the EU.
This inquiry is surely not idle. Well played by certain political parties and the
“against” camp, this seemingly innocent questioning may cause Turkey rejecting
an EU membership. This second scenario, if ever realized, would perhaps be a
shock to the European Union with rather important regional and global implica-
tions.
What labelled as “future” here relies on a more sustainable path that would
most probably result in Turkey’s membership. A preliminary analysis of the formal
and informal institutions in Turkey shows that many pieces of the institutional
puzzle for Turkey’s membership are in fact in place but require additional external
impetus to become fully embedded. Here institutions are viewed as structuring
phenomena and manifest at diﬀerent levels of inter-relation, scales of governance,
and spheres of the political economy (e.g., Parto, 2005b). Applying the levels-
scales-spheres perspective to institutions yields a loose but necessary typology of
institutions (Figure 6.6).
Implicit in the arguments that Turkey is not yet ready for the EU member-
ship is the largely justiﬁed claim that Turkey has fewer and less eﬀective formal
institutions for democratic government than industrialized economies of Western
Europe. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 depicts constraints on executives and institutional-
ized democracy for three EU member countries together with Turkey.16 As can be
16 Both indicators are taken from POLITY IV data set. The former has already been employed
in chapter 3 and discussed in details in the appendix to chapter 3. The latter is an index of 11
point (0 to 10) that is composed of four variables and measures at what degree democracy is6.3 A sustainable institutional framework 163
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Figure 6.6: Characteristics and manifestations of institutions
seen from the ﬁgures Turkey displays high degree of volatility in both indicators
as opposed to other countries that display a gradual shift (except Italy). This is
a preliminary evidence on how fragile the Turkish institutional landscape is. To
support this preliminary evidence data has been gathered from CESifo Database
for Institutional Comparisons in Europe (DICE). Table 6.3 presents data on for-
mal (legal, political, economic and education) and informal institutions (trust,
social capital, corruption) comparing Turkey with selected EU member states.17
To make the comparisons easier each indicator is rescaled so that ‘0’ represent
the lowest and ‘1’ to highest value. These ﬁgures reveal that for all indicators of
institutional landscape Turkey’s position is poor compared to other EU member
states. Table 6.3 and Figures 6.7 and 6.8 provide ﬁne piece of evidence that some
of the key existing formal institutions such as the military, the National Security
Council, and the Constitutional Court tend to serve an authoritarian state while
others such as the various amendments to the judicial code remain ineﬀective or
poorly implemented. A signiﬁcant portion of socio-economic activity is governed
institutionalized in a country. Higher values indicate that democracy is institutionalized. The
selection of these countries is due to the fact that they resemble to Turkey in some aspects
and also because that most other European countries do not display large variations in these
indicators. For more information see http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2006.pdf.
17 The detailed description of each indicator is given in Appendix C.164 Investing in institutions: The case of Turkey and the...
through “clientalism” and patronage (S¨ ozen and Shaw, 2003). However, Turkey
is not alone in this characterization. To illustrate, corruption is often cited as
one of the key undesirable institutions that play a major role in Turkish society.
No attempt has been made, as far as we have been able to determine, to com-
pare corruption in Turkey with well-documented corruption and organized crime
in southern Italy. That Turkey should be singled out for having an abundance of






























































































Figure 6.8: Institutionalized democracy in selected European countries
tutional change-making in Turkey requires policy making at a supra-national scale
of governance. The mode of governance at the EU scale is not (yet) conducive or
committed to institutional change-making in Turkey.
However, it is important to recognize that commitment by the EU to accept
and integrate Turkey as a full member will serve only as a ﬁrst step, albeit an
important one, in a long and challenging process of institutional change in Turkey.
The Republic of Turkey continues to be governed by a strong-handed, centralized,
and bureaucratic state apparatus inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Under this
system of governance, the society belongs to, and is expected to, serve the state.
This mode of governance severely limits the emergence and sustenance of inde-
pendent civil society organizations and other institutional forms characteristic of
democratic governments. S¨ ozen and Shaw (2003) point to the autonomous mili-
tary, the National Security Council, the Constitutional Court, and the civil service
as the (regulative and constitutive) institutions (Figure 6.6) of the state to main-
tain the status quo through their dominant role in the policymaking structure. In
Turkey “the views of the military normally dominate the decisions of the [National
Security Council] whose recommendations...have always become national policies”
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The insistence by the state apparatus that constitutive and regulative institu-
tions of governance should serve the sovereignty and authority of the Turkish state
above all else has had signiﬁcant repercussions for the emergence and legitimiza-
tion of civil society-based associations. For example, trade unions and business
associations are strongly discouraged from voicing opinions about public policy.
This could clearly be seen in Table 6.3. For instance, “voice and accountability”
measures the extent to which citizens and civil societies are able to participate
in the selection of governments and Turkey’s position is unquestionably low com-
pared to other EU countries. The modus operandi for engaged participation in
matters of policymaking seems to be through “a wide variety of clientelistic re-
lationships” (¨ Ozbudun, 1981), patronage, and sometimes corruption. Informal
institutions such as patronage, kinship, and even corruption play important in-
strumental roles in Turkey and numerous other less democratic societies. Change
in informal institutions is often slow and requires a time perspective that spans
generations rather than elected governments. Policy aimed at further integration
of Turkey into Europe needs to recognize the likely persistence of older, culturally
embedded informal (behavioural and cognitive) Turkish institutions and devise in-
novative incentives and disincentives to catalyze the formation of new institutional
forms that minimize or neutralize the role of older and less desirable institutions.
Where “culture” (e.g., Tabellini, 2005), or behavioural and cognitive institu-
tions according to this typology (Figure 6.6), acts as a major impediment to better
economic performance, policy should provide for investments in education, aﬀord-
able ﬁnance to facilitate the emergence of local entrepreneurs, and decentralization
of administrative and political powers to lower scales of governance to stimulate
the accumulation of social capital. For instance in decision making in education
Turkey’s system is mainly governed by the central authorities and only one fourth
of decision making is done at the school level (Table 6.3). More generally, insti-
tutions are created formally through actions of authority or emerge organically
to bring order and predictability to interactions among individuals and organi-
zations (e.g., Parto, 2005a). In either case, institutions are reﬂections of learning
by individuals and organizations and created to structure inter-relations (and thus
determine the mode of governance) among individuals and organizations. Much of
what remains to be done for Turkey in its attempts to develop institutional capac-
ity for the EU membership has to be prompted by the EU, not only as ideal type
models to be adopted by Turkey (as was the case with the legal system, for exam-
ple) but also through “interactive learning” and “learning by doing”, to paraphrase
Bengt Lundvall and Richard Nelson. To continue on its path of learning from the
EU member states, Turkey needs to interact with the EU Community socially,
economically, and politically as an equal partner in need of direct assistance from
the other members. EU membership for Turkey is likely to provide a much-needed
impetus for the emergence of an institutional landscape more compatible with Eu-
rope’s liberal democracies and capable of facilitating further economic expansion
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6.4 Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter has established that many of Turkey’s supposed diﬀer-
ences with EU in terms of fundamental values are exaggerated and unsupported.
Turkey is less likely to eﬀectively address the outstanding membership requirement
issues in isolation from the EU. The critical point is that it would be at best diﬃ-
cult for Turkey to overcome barriers to membership and integration into the EU
without the support from the EU. If the question is simply “why should the EU
help Turkey overcome its challenges?” it has been argued that there are numerous
political beneﬁts for Europe and the global community to justify direct and overt
assistance by the EU to integrate Turkey into Europe through full membership.
However, the formal acceptance of Turkey into the EU and the commitment
to assist Turkey to overcome its many issues are only the start of a long process of
structural and institutional change likely to span generations. The slowness in the
process of change is largely attributable to Turkey’s institutional landscape. Turk-
ish institutions, like institutions in other countries, are manifestations of historical
circumstances, learning, and evolution. One policy implication is that the EU
should recognize the many similarities between Turkey and the EU, as indicated
in the analysis, and assist Turkey to overcome its institutional capacity deﬁciencies
for membership through cooperation. It has been shown that regarding values on
religion and democracy, Turkey is not that diﬀerent from other EU member states.
Moreover, section 6.2.1 has shown that there is a high degree of economic inte-
gration between Turkey and the EU. Given the poor record of Turkey in various
indicators assessing the institutional landscape and institutional eﬀectiveness, we
argue that policies towards institutions should be the focus that govern the rela-
tions between Turkey and the EU. Major improvements could be accomplished in
this arena that would also aﬀect informal institutions in the medium long-run.
It has been shown in chapters 3, 4 and 5 that historical institutions and the
educational system have played signiﬁcant roles in shaping the current state of
European regions through their eﬀect on social capital. Collectively, these argu-
ments underline the importance of historical record of institutions and education
in shaping current social capital and thereby explaining the diﬀerences in regional
economic development. An immediate implication of these ﬁndings is that EU
policies such as provision of structural funds and framework programs should be
complemented with speciﬁc programs to enhance institutional capacity and hu-
man capital. In the long run, such policies will nurture the formation of formal
institutions in such arenas as education which in turn encourages the emergence
of informal institutions manifested as changed values and increased social capital.
The question is not which set of cultural values is “better” but to identify them
and ﬁnd ways to engage parties of fundamentally diﬀerent creed and religion in
equitable discourse about the future. To illustrate the main argument we note
that Turkey has experienced a similar change not so long ago. The early political,
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an authoritarian, traditional and religious society in to a modern society. Repre-
sentative democracy, secularism, reforms in family law and especially uniﬁcation
of education in the late 1920s have had immense impact on Turkish society and
at a later stage on societal values. Given this record of successful change, the
question whether Turkey is able to adapt European values and EU institutions is
idle. It was accomplished before, it could be done again.
That Turkey does not have a stellar record in modern times on dealings with
its ethnic questions, while not condonable, is not surprising given the young age
of the Republic. It took hundreds of years and much strife before most of the
industrialized nations of Europe managed to deﬁne themselves as cohesive nation
states. Rather than holding Turkey hostage for its poor record of addressing its
ethnic questions, the EU could cease the opportunity represented by the acces-
sion negotiations to promote and institutionalize economic progress, equity, and
democracy in the Turkish political economy to create the economic and political
foundations of a liberal democracy. By embracing Turkey as a member state the
EU can help the young Republic in eﬀorts to build the formal institutions that will
serve as the pillars of liberal democracy in Turkey. Carefully designed and cultur-
ally sensitive formal institutions that reconcile the cultural and political diﬀerences
between Turkey and industrially advanced European countries can, in time, nur-
ture the emergence of deeply rooted political democracy, and a ﬂourishing civil
society. Turkey has made a series of ﬁrst steps in reforming existing institutions
and establishing new ones. To bear fruit these institutions need to be seen as an
extension of the liberal democratic traditions that deﬁne most of the EU member
states, and as such supported by further engagement of Turkey in the EU aﬀairs
through institutional ties as soon as possible. A positive and timely response to
Turkey’s wish to join the EU would pre-empt the likely popular backlash against
joining the EU on the account of being rejected by the rest of the Community
despite demonstrated goodwill on Turkey’s part.Chapter 7
Concluding remarks
Social capital has a wide range of applications in social sciences. Researchers have
used the concept to explain various associations with socio-economic outcomes.
However two important aspects have largely been ignored: (i) what forms social
capital, and (ii) how social capital aﬀects outcomes. This study has provided
advancements on these relatively shallow aspects. The three main arguments of
the thesis can be summarized as follows. First, by reducing transaction costs,
creating new forms of information exchange and inﬂuencing behaviour through
norms, higher social capital induces innovation. The empirical ﬁndings suggest
that innovation works as a transmission mechanism that translates social capital
to economic growth. Second, we have provided a relatively original approach
to the measurement of social capital and used these new indicators to explain
diﬀerences in crime rates across geographical space. Social capital reduces crime
via network externalities, social support and by increasing the opportunity cost
of crime. Third, institutions are important in shaping social capital. We do not
focus on the complementary relation between informal and formal institutions, but
rather suggest that history and formal institutional settings aﬀect social capital in
the long run. The main ﬁndings of this study are summarized below followed by
suggestions and possible extensions for future research.
7.1 Summary of the main ﬁndings
The research trajectory of this study is introduced in chapter 2 by brieﬂy referring
to four diﬀerent sources that previously have used the concept of social capital
but have not referred to it as “social capital”. These, together with the examples
from British history given in the introduction, show that social capital is a mul-
tidisciplinary phenomenon. This fact has shaped this research to a great extent.
Although social capital is analysed in an economics framework, our approach uses
aspects of sociology including crime as a social outcome and even history showing
that past institutions are conducive to current social capital. The main ﬁndings
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of the thesis could be summarized as follows.
Chapter 2 is an extended introduction addressing some of the issues that have
kept social capital researchers busy for a long time and that are key to this study.
Section 2.3 has provided comparisons between physical, human and social capital
on nine dimensions. These have also helped to answer whether social capital is
a form of capital. Trust, for example, is an interesting concept as it is one of
the main components of social capital (e.g., Portes, 1998) and because it could be
regarded as an output as well as an input. It fulﬁlls the conditions to be treated as
capital. One can invest in relationships to build trust which needs maintenance.
Both investment and maintenance are costly (time lost) so there is an opportunity
cost. If not invested in, trust is not maintained and it eventually decays. Trust
facilitates economic transactions and thereby can transform resources to outcomes.
Another interesting ﬁnding of chapter 2 is the observation that cross disci-
plinary co-authorship among social capital researchers is rare. A simple network
analysis showed that there is little communication between disciplines. These ﬁnd-
ings have implications for future research. Social capital is understood and utilized
diﬀerently in diﬀerent disciplines which makes the concept hard to deﬁne and to
comprehend. It would be beneﬁcial for researchers working on social capital to
share information across disciplines. This information is diﬃcult and costly to
obtain if disciplines are not connected to each other.1
Having addressed the issue that social capital is a multi-faceted concept, the
following chapters have focused on three economic and social outcomes: innova-
tion, income growth and crime. There are numerous studies relating social capital
to economic outcomes, most of which have ignored the fundamental problem of
how social capital aﬀects outcomes. Both empirically and theoretically the litera-
ture oﬀered little insight on this issue, which has created room for further research
and improvement. Chapter 3 showed that innovation is one of the mechanisms
that transforms social capital to income growth. Social capital induces more inno-
vation by (i) reducing transaction costs such as monitoring costs, (ii) creating new
forms of information exchange, and (iii) regulating selﬁsh behaviour by instilling
group norms. Chapter 3 demonstrates that trust is a robust estimator of both
innovation and income growth. The second important contribution of this chapter
is testing the assertion that the state of formal institutions in the past is, to an
extent, important in shaping current social capital. A 2SLS strategy was employed
to show that political institutions, literacy rates and the presence of universities in
the 1880s have very strong positive correlations with current levels of trust after
controlling for other exogenous variables. But the most important contribution
of this study is merging the trust-innovation link with the existing trust-growth
link. This was accomplished by estimating a simultaneous system where trust,
1 The analysis in chapter 2 only includes prominent (star) researchers. In order to fully
understand the situation, these preliminary ﬁndings should be extended to include all social
capital researchers. See for instance Goyal, van der Leij, and Moraga-Gonzalez (2006) for an
application to all researchers in economics. A further analysis of citations among disciplines
could also reveal interesting patterns.7.1 Summary of the main ﬁndings 173
innovation and growth are treated as endogenous. Social capital directly aﬀects
income growth and also has an indirect eﬀect through innovation. The empirical
ﬁndings reveal that this indirect eﬀect is much stronger than the direct eﬀect.
Three studies that have been published recently support our ﬁndings that social
capital is conducive to innovation. By using structural equation modelling Kaasa
(2008) show that social capital induces innovation in 162 EU regions and that
diﬀerent forms of social capital have diﬀerent eﬀects on innovation. Using EU re-
gional level data and knowledge production functions de Dominicis, Florax, and de
Groot (2007) show that both social capital and geographical proximity inﬂuence
production of innovative output after controlling for spatial correlation. A similar
exercise has been conducted by Miguelez, Moreno, and Artis (2008) for Spanish
regions in the period 1989 to 2001 which returned analogous ﬁndings.
The empirical strategy to assess the robustness of the results has strengthened
the ﬁndings and resulted in novel interpretations. Using a robustness methodology
similar to Beugelsdijk, de Groot, and van Schaik (2004) to identify other indica-
tors that might be conducive to innovation and income growth, we have found
that perceptions in favour of the free movement of skilled labour and towards the
importance of forming individual opinion are signiﬁcantly associated with inno-
vation. The latter have also been found to be a signiﬁcant estimator of income
growth. In the appendix to chapter 3, these results has undergone a further new
robustness check. An analysis has been conducted on the estimation results of the
robustness analysis (similar to meta-analysis). In this way one could see whether
the presence of certain variables has impact on the probability of obtaining a sig-
niﬁcant trust coeﬃcient. To our knowledge this type of analysis has not been done
before, which makes it an interesting contribution to the existing literature. The
results show that almost all cases in which the trust coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant,
another social capital indicator is present.
Chapter 4 extended the above ﬁndings in two ways. First, social capital not
only increases the level of innovation, but also stimulates the growth of innovation.
By modifying an empirical innovation capabilities model by Furman, Porter, and
Stern (2002), we showed that social capital, measured as a multi-indicator social
capital index as well as generalized trust, is positively associated with the growth
of patent applications. Second, by treating EU structural funds as a form of ﬁ-
nancial capital, we have investigated the impact of objective 1,2 and 5b regional
support programmes on innovation and growth. Given the level of economic de-
velopment, higher levels of education and social capital imply stronger networks
where communication and production are more eﬀective. Norms that constrain
selﬁsh behaviour and values that support creativity result in an environment more
inclined towards innovation (e.g., Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004). In this en-
vironment, implementing policies is also much simpler and more eﬀective which
would in turn foster economic development. The ﬁndings imply that regions that
are rich in human and social capital are better able to able to manage the innova-
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The empirical ﬁndings in chapters 3 and 4 have important implications. First,
the presence of social capital creates an innovation-prone environment that in-
duces more innovation. However social capital is a stock concept and may take
decades to form. This may partially explain why it is so hard to induce inno-
vation in some EU regions as these regions might be lacking social capital that
establishes a transient environment for venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to
undertake risky R&D projects. In this case, it may not be the best strategy to
blindly ﬁnance innovation, through public R&D funding and EU support. Re-
ferring to the complementarities between human and social capital in chapters 3
and 4 (e.g., Coleman, 1988), it might be a better strategy to complement these
eﬀorts by investing in human capital. Investment in education especially in the
backward EU regions will enhance connectivity in the form of networks and form a
receptive atmosphere, which in turn will increase the level of social capital. Given
the fact that there is a large dispersion in educational levels between EU regions
(8 years of diﬀerence in schooling between northern and southern Europe) it is
puzzling to observe why education has not been among the primary targets of EU
policy makers. The ﬁndings suggest that addressing education policy would be an
eﬀective means of improving innovation and social capital concurrently.
So far the investigation in this study have focused on economic outcomes.
Having showed that social capital is conducive to innovation and income growth,
it is interesting to see whether social capital aﬀects social outcomes. As such it is
natural to extend our investigation to include crime. The reason for this is two-fold:
(i) crime is both a social and economic phenomenon. It has social (e.g., divorce,
loss of social network, weak family relationships etc.) and economic costs (e.g.,
unemployment and various opportunity costs), (ii) social and economic factors
aﬀect crime. Chapter 5 utilizes these preliminary observations. We collected novel
data on crime, social capital and historical indicators from 1859 household survey
for municipalities in the Netherlands. Several diﬀerent social capital indicators
have been employed, such as blood donations, voluntary contributions to charity,
electoral turnout and trust. We suppose that these indicators reﬂect diﬀerent
dimensions of social capital. The measurement of social capital is also new in the
sense that, by using principal component analysis, social capital is treated as a
latent construct that is composed of diﬀerent dimensions. The main argument
behind this measurement methodology is that it is hard to measure social capital
and, as such, using a single indicator as a proxy might render wrong conclusions.
Therefore, it is better to beneﬁt from diﬀerent indicators.
Chapter 5 oﬀers a framework by which social capital reduces crime. First, if
an individual is involved in criminal activity he/she risks to lose utility generating
capital. In the case of ﬁnancial capital this might be job loss and future unem-
ployment. In the case of social capital it might be damage to reputation and weak
family ties that might lead to divorce. In this sense the utility function here is
modiﬁed to include utility generating social capital as suggested by Williams and
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prevention. It has been shown that in communities where civic engagement is
high people feel more responsible to act in the case of a crime (e.g., Sampson and
Groves, 1989; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld, 2004).
Third, social network externalities may play important role in reducing crime. For
instance, crime could be prevented by exchanging information on malignant be-
haviour that may induce future crime. In a similar way, in communities where ties
are strong and people care for each other conﬂicts are resolved in peaceful ways
(e.g., Hirschi, 1969). This chapter has provided a thorough empirical investigation
on these grounds. It is found that social capital, measured both in terms of indi-
vidual indicators and as a latent construct, is negatively associated to crime. The
empirical results are robust, (i) to inclusion of other indicators, (ii) across diﬀerent
subsamples and regional deﬁnitions, (iii) across diﬀerent types of crime, (iv) to
exclusion of inﬂuential observations and, (v) to alternative speciﬁcations. Yet the
results could still be improved by taking geography and spatial correlation in to
account. This seems easy to handle at ﬁrst sight however it needs a thorough ap-
proach. It might be easier to argue that crime levels in a municipality are aﬀected
from unemployment and income levels of the neighbour municipalities. However
it is not straight forward to assume that this holds for social capital as well. In
line with the previous chapters, we also showed that the state of a municipality in
the mid 19th century in terms of education, population heterogeneity and religion
has a signiﬁcant impact on current social capital. This last point together with
the similar ﬁndings in chapters 3 and 4, needs further clariﬁcation.
We have already referred to the role of education in shaping social capital.
However education is not the only formal institution that is conducive to social
and economic outcomes. For instance, political institutions, universities, the intel-
lectual property rights and justice system play vital role in commercialization of
R&D eﬀorts. Where formal institutions are not binding, social capital and norms
could be a last resort to increase eﬃciency in economic transactions. Given the
complementarity between formal and informal institutions, this study provides
suggestive evidence that formal institutions and history aﬀect the formation of
informal institutions in the long run. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 provide strong evidence
for this claim in diﬀerent settings, for diﬀerent samples and regional units. Good
“social capital” forms in geographical areas where the power of the chief executive
is constrained, where the level of education is high, where universities existed as
repositories of culture and where the population was less heterogeneous. Using
novel data collected for EU regions and for municipalities in the Netherlands, we
showed that political institutions, education, universities and religion in the 1850s
aﬀected economic and social outcomes through their impact on social capital.
This ﬁnding has important policy implications which are illustrated in chapter 6
by analyzing the EU-Turkey membership issue in an institutional framework.
Chapter 6 shows that Turkey’s economy is well-integrated to the EU and argues
that economic deﬁciencies that were among the most important reasons against
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and Romania as member states. The second important argument against Turkey’s
membership has been the diﬀerences between Turkey and the EU member states
regarding fundamental values, such as religion and democracy. However as it
is shown in chapter 6, this is not supported by empirical evidence. Many of
these worries have largely been exaggerated and have been governed by historical
misperceptions. After providing evidence on these grounds, the main argument
in chapter 6 is that diﬀerences between Turkey and the EU are rather related to
the diﬀerences in institutional landscape and as such can only be addressed by
investing in formal institutions. This is a more sustainable strategy, that would
most probably result in Turkey’s membership, if deliberately supported by the
European Commission. The bottom line is that well-functioning institutions may
accomplish dual objectives: (i) short run economic gains, and (ii) inducing long-
run changes in informal institutions such as values and social capital. Comparisons
between EU countries on an institutional basis in chapter 6 showed that there are
quite signiﬁcant diﬀerences regarding the eﬀectiveness of formal institutions among
EU member countries that supposedly have a similar institutional environment.
Therefore, there is also room for improvement in designing and establishing correct
and well-functioning formal institutions.
7.2 Suggestions for future research
The ﬁndings of this study have several implications for future research. Four of
these are highlighted below.
First, this study has depicted that in order for social capital research to have
policy implications we should know how social capital forms and how social capital
aﬀects outcomes. Regarding the latter we showed that innovation is a channel.
However, our results are limited to developed EU regions and focus on macro out-
comes such as economic growth. Future research should focus on extending the
implications of this research to developing countries and other developed coun-
tries. Further research on developing countries could result in interesting conclu-
sions especially if the ﬁndings contrast to the ﬁndings in this study. Moreover,
future research should try to identify more channels that transform social capital
to socio-economic outcomes. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) showed that
ﬁnancial intermediation is a channel. This study has provided evidence that in-
novation is another channel. It is likely that there are more. One possible way to
proceed along these lines is to conduct research at the ﬁrm level. There have been
numerous studies in management science on added value of social capital for ﬁrms
and innovation (e.g., Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1997; Tsai, 1998; Bouty, 2000) many
of which are not acknowledged by similar literature in economics.
As discussed in chapter 3, social capital is linked to innovation via three mech-
anisms in a micro to macro framework. On the theoretical side, there is much to
be done. The framework in chapter 3 can be fully extended by having recourse
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in ﬁnancial markets (e.g., Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald, 2004; Erosa and Hi-
dalgo Cabrillana, 2008). For instance, in explaining economic development with
production of investment Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2007) argue that
entrepreneurs who cheat (or misreport) face a deadweight loss which is propor-
tional to the quality of the institutions. Hence, the eﬀectiveness of all institutional
features that protect investors explains investment decisions and thus economic
growth. However, this strand of research does not pay attention to informal in-
stitutional features such as social capital. On the empirical side, we conducted
research at the macro level. Therefore, the exact transformation of social capital
to innovation still remains unclear. Given the ﬁndings at the macro level, research
at the ﬁrm level is promising as it has the potential to ﬁll the gaps in this frame-
work. Especially research on the dynamic relation between trust, social capital
and the venture capital markets may render interesting ﬁndings. Social capital
may be complementary to formal institutions. In such cases, it may aﬀect the
functioning of venture capital markets. On the other hand, social capital might
be a substitute to formal institutions in the absence of such institutionalized seed
funding. For example, Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellman (2007) show that, in a set of
European countries, trust has a signiﬁcant impact on venture capital investment
decisions (see also Campo-Rembado, 2005). They further argue that trust and
sophisticated contracts are complements, not substitutes. Given this ﬁnding what
can we say about the optimal mix of formal and informal institutions? Do the
ﬁndings above also hold for developing countries? These questions may lead to a
research trajectory which is, as yet untouched.
Second, one of the main contributions of the thesis is regarding the relation be-
tween formal and informal institutions. This study has put forward the argument
that past formal institutions are crucial in shaping current social capital. Hav-
ing said that, this study does not cover the complex interplay between formal and
informal institutions. Are formal and informal institutions complementary in char-
acter or are they substitutes? What factors aﬀect complementarity? Considering
the fact that contemporary formal institutions are very long run reﬂections of past
values and norms, how do we disentangle the cause and eﬀect in an evolutionary
perspective? Currently, there is a lively debate on this issue which invites further
research (e.g., Beugelsdijk, 2006, 2008b; Uslaner, 2008). We made an attempt in
this study to highlight the importance of institutional landscape in forming social
capital. Given the arguments of Williamson (2000) that norms, values and beliefs
constrain formal institutions it is worthwhile investigating whether the causality
between formal and informal institutions runs both ways. Future research should
focus on a more encompassing approach, such as Zucker (1986). Social capital in-
corporates repeated interactions, general knowledge about the population (values,
norms), and the eﬀect of formal institutions. Unravelling these diﬀerent dimensions
to show which dimensions have become important and which have lost signiﬁcance
through time is another major research trajectory.
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in shaping current values, one could easily tie this study to recent research on
institutions (e.g., Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003;
Dixit, 2004; Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti, 2006). For instance, Rodrik (2008)
argues that appropriate institutions for developing countries could well be second-
best institutions that do not resemble institutions in developed countries. These
could even be a mix of formal or informal institutions, if such an environment is
conducive to investment, entrepreneurship, innovation and economic development.
Previous works of Fafchamps (2004) in Ghana and McMillan and Woodruﬀ (1999)
in Vietnam constitute good examples of such situations. They both show that what
sustains economic transaction is relational contracting (trust, reputation, personal
contacts) not formal legal institutions. In such cases where formal institutions
are not binding, the appropriate policy may well be strengthening these informal
environment rather than setting up formal institutions which may be costly to
establish and maintain (Rodrik, 2008). This suggestion does not undermine the
role of formal institutions as a ﬁrst-best solution (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 2002).
It rather means that they may not be appropriate solution for certain situations.
Getting the right institutions that maintain an optimal informal-formal institution
mix is challenging. Therefore, research along these lines is interesting, especially
in an environment where most developing countries are forced to create formal
institutions similar to the ones in developed countries.
A fourth possible extension is conducting similar research at the individual
level. There has been a recent revival in research linking institutions and social
capital to socio-economic performance (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson,
2005; Tabellini, 2005; Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2005a; Beugelsdijk, 2006). Dif-
ferences in economic growth among geographical units could be explained by the
diﬀerences in political and educational institutions in the 18th and 19th centuries
among them. This study has shown that institutions aﬀect social capital (or cul-
ture) and through this channel determine the regional performance. Despite these
recent advances at the macro level, there has been no substantial work at micro
level. Do institutions aﬀect social capital formation at the individual level? How
do institutions aﬀect/constrain individual behaviour? Are individual values and
norms aﬀected by institutional design and if so, how? These questions still need to
be thoroughly investigated. In other words, formal institutions, such as the educa-
tion system, universities, and political and governmental systems, shape individual
values and norms in the long run not only by enforcing constraints on the individ-
ual behaviour, but also by creating a clash between existing informal institutions
(culture, values, social capital) and rapidly evolving formal institutions.
Research on social capital is extending with very little cross-disciplinary work
(Chapter 2). Given the multidisciplinary character of social capital, this observa-
tion is interesting and a cause for concern. In this regards, further research could
beneﬁt considerably by collaborating across disciplines.Bibliography
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Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Variable deﬁnitions
Table A.1: Deﬁnitions of the variables and data sources
Variable Deﬁnition
growth Growth of per capita GDP 1990-2002, deﬁned as the log diﬀerence of GDP
per capita in the period 1990-2002. Source: Eurostat.
gdppc90 log GDP per capita in 1990. Source: Eurostat.
educ Education deﬁned as the share of tertiary level students (levels 5, 6 and 7)
in the total number of all students in 1993, according to the International
Standard Classiﬁcation of Education 1976 (ISCED76) deﬁnitions. ISCED
5 covers programs that generally do not lead to a university degree but
usually require successful completion of a program at the upper secondary
level. ISCED 6 covers programs that lead to an award of a ﬁrst university
degree and ISCED 7 covers programs that lead to an award of a second or
further university degree. Source: Eurostat.
pat91 Patent applications per million inhabitants centered around 1991 (average
of 1990, 1991, 1992). The number of patent application is measured as
“total number of patent applications to the European Patent Oﬃce(EPO)
by year of ﬁling, excluding patent applications to the national patent oﬃces
in Europe”. Source: Eurostat.
pat00 Patent applications per million inhabitants centered around 2000 (average
of 1999, 2000 and 2001). Source: Eurostat.
R&Dintns R&D intensity deﬁned as R&D personnel employment as a percentage of
total employment in the business enterprize sector in 1995. Source: Euro-
stat.
trust Generalized trust using the answer to the following question; “Most people
can be trusted or you cannot be too careful”. The answer category ranges
from (0) “you can’t be too careful” to (10) “most people can be trusted”,
with nine levels in between. The mean (std. dev.) of this measure for EU-
14 countries is 4.945 (2.395) N=25,268. Source: European Social Surveys
(ESS) ﬁrst round in 2002.
trust*educ Interaction variable of trust and educ.
literacy Literacy rates around 1880. See Appendix 2.1 for details.
199200 Appendix to Chapter 3
Variable Deﬁnition
trust0 Generalized trust from EVS 1990. The respondents are asked “generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t
be too careful in dealing with people”. The interviewees were given two
choices: (i) most people can be trusted or (ii) you can’t be too careful.
The mean value of this measure for 11 European countries is 0.369 (0.482),
N=17,322. Source European Values Survey (EVS) in 1990.
instXXXX Proxy for past political institutions as measured by “constraints on the ex-
ecutive” as deﬁned in the POLITY IV data set. This variable captures
“institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief exec-
utives” coded on a scale 1 to 7, 1 representing “unlimited authority” and
7 “accountable executive constrained by checks and balances”. Information
is available separately for ﬁve dates: 1600, 1700, 1750, 1800, 1850. See
Appendix 2.3 for details.
instAVR Average of inst1600, inst1700, inst1750, inst1800 and inst1850. See Ap-
pendix 2.3 for details.
instPC First principal component of inst1600, inst1700, inst1750, inst1800 and
inst1850. See Appendix 2.3 for details.
univF Measures the period of existence of a university in a region deﬁned as “univF
= 2000 minus the foundation date of the university”. Higher values reﬂect
the existence of universities in a region for longer periods. See Appendix
2.4 for details.
univN The density of universities deﬁned as the number of universities per 100,000
population around 1850. See Appendix 2.4 for details.
univAVR Average of the standardized values of univF and univN. See Appendix 2.4
for details.
univPC First principal component of standardized values of univF and univN. See
Appendix 2.4 for details.
urban Urbanization rates deﬁned as the share of population living in towns greater
than 30,000 in total population in 1850. See Appendix 2.2 for details.A.2 Further details on historical data 201
Table A.2: Deﬁnition of the variables employed in the stability analysis
Variable Deﬁnition
polactiv Could take an active role in a group involved in political issues.
trustlgl Trust in legal system.
trustep Trust in European Parliament
ginveco The less government intervenes in economy the better it is.
lawobey The law should always be obeyed.
ecohenv Economic advances harm the environment.
immig Immigration good or bad for country’s economy.
skill All countries beneﬁt if people can move where their skills are needed.
minority People of minority/ethnic group in ideal living area.
shrtrad Better for a county if almost everyone share the same customs and traditions.
shrreli Better for a country if almost everyone share the same religion.
help How often help others not counting voluntary work.
impsupport To be a good citizen: How important to support people worse oﬀ.
implaw To be a good citizen: How important to always obey in laws.
opinion To be good citizen: How important to form independent opinion.
social Take part in social activities compared to others in the same age.
cath Percentage of Catholic.
prot Percentage of Protestant.
orth Percentage of Orthodox.
othc Percentage of other Christian.
jewi Percentage of Jewish.
isla Percentage of Islam.
east Percentage of eastern religions.
olson Active member of Olson groups such as, trade unions, political groups or
parties and professional associations. These groups are believed to hamper
economic growth because of lobbying cost for instance. See Olson (1982)
for details.
putnam Active member of Putnam groups such as religious organizations, education
and cultural groups, and youth work associations. Putnam, Leonardi, and
Nanetti (1993) suggests that these groups enhances trust and civic life hence
are conducive to growth.
domgr Dominant religious group, share in total population.
lrscale Political opinion: Left-right scale.
shragremp Share of agricultural employment in total employment 1990. Source: Euro-
stat.
shrindemp Share of industrial employment in total employment 1990. Source: Eurostat.
Data source for all the variables, except shragremp and shrindemp, is ESS.
A.2 Further details on historical data
A.2.1 Historical data on literacy rates
Data on literacy come from diﬀerent sources. Below we present in detail the variable
deﬁnition and the data source for each country. For most of the cases the information
available is the percentage of the population that can read and write − including the
people who can read only − in 1870s and 1880s.202 Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A.3: Detailed information on literacy rates data
Country Variable deﬁnition and data source
Austria The literacy rate is deﬁned as the percentage of the population that is able
to read and write including people who can read only in 1880. The data for
West-Osterreich is the average of Salzburg, Tyrol and Voralberg. Data source:
Flora (1983).
Belgium Percentage of the population that is able to read and write in 1880. The
percentage of the population who can read only is higher than the percentage
of people who can read and write by about 15 percent. We therefore inﬂated
each regional ﬁgure by 15 percent. Data source: Flora (1983).
Denmark Percentage of the population that is not literate (100 − illiteracy). Information
available only for males in 1860. Data source: Cipolla (1969).
Finland Percentage of the population, 10 years or older, that is able to read and write
and read only in 1880. Data source: Flora (1983).
France We have used the average of three source of information available: (i) percent-
age of the population able to read (69.2%) in 1871/72, (ii) army recruits able
to read (83%), (iii) percentage of bridegrooms and brides able to write their
names (84% and 74%), respectively. No regional information available around
1880s. Data source: Flora (1983).
Greece Approximate ﬁgure: Greece was occupied by the Ottoman empire till the 1830s
and then ruled by the Bavarian Prince Otto (later changed name to Othon). In
several sources it is mentioned that, in the rural areas of Greece the education
level was very low in the second half of the 19th century. Given that urbaniza-
tion rates were well below the average and the similarity of the Greek regions
with other Mediterranean regions, (such as Southern Italy 20.4%, Southern
Spain around 20%, Serbo-Croation estimated as 22-29% in 1870s and 80s) we
suppose the literacy rate in Greece was about 20 percent in 1880s. No regional
information available. Data source: Cipolla (1969) and Flora (1983).
Germany Literacy deﬁned as (100 − illiteracy in population aged 10 years or older)
in 1871. For Baden-Wuttemberg, Bayern, and Thuringen we took the aver-
age of the neighboring regions Hessen-Nassau, Westfalia, Saxony. The ﬁgure
for Bremen and Hamburg is the average of Hannover and Schleswig-Holstein.
Since there is not an exact correspondence to Saarland in the source data,
we replace it with the available information on Rheinland-Pfalz. The cor-
respondence of the remaining current regions and regions in Cipolla (1969)
is as follows : Berlin (Berlin), Brandenburg (Brandenburg), Hessen (Hessen-
Nasau), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Pomerania), Niedersachsen (Hannover),
Nordrhein-Westfalen (Westfalia), Rheinland-Pfalz (Rheinland), Sachsen (Sax-
ony), Sachsen-Anhalt (Saxony) and Schleswig-Holstein (Schleswig-Holstein).
Data source: Cipolla (1969).
Ireland The data represent the average of percentage of people, +5 and +10 years old,
respectively who are able to read in 1880. Data source: Flora (1983).
Italy Literacy deﬁned as (100 − illiteracy in population aged 5 years or older) in
1881. For cases in which there are no explicit regional matches between the
current Italian regions and the source(s), we employed the following correspon-
dence: Valle D’Aosta (Piemonte), Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (Veneto). For Umbria
there are important diﬀerences between two data sources, so we have used the
average (in Cipolla (1969) 26%; in Flora (1983) 33%). Data source: Cipolla
(1969) and Flora (1983).
Netherlands Percentage of army recruits able to read in 1880. No regional data are avail-
able. Data source: Flora (1983).
Portugal Literacy rate as deﬁned by Tortella (1994). No regional information is avail-
able.
Spain Literacy rates for the population aged 10 and older. Data source: Nunez
(1990).A.2 Further details on historical data 203
Country Variable deﬁnition and data source
Sweden Percentage of army recruits able to read and write and percentage of recruits
able to read in 1880. Data source: Flora (1983).
UK Literacy ﬁgures are derived from the percentages of brides and grooms sign-
ing the marriage registers with marks in 1870. The numbers were aggre-
gated using the population statistics in Mitchell (1988). The correspondence
of current UK NUTS1 deﬁnitions and regions in Stephens (1973) are as fol-
lows: North East (Durham, Northumberland); North West (Cheshire, Cum-
berland, Lancashire, Westmorland); Yorkshire-Humber (Yorkshire); East Mid-
lands (Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Notting-
hamshire, Rutland); West Midlands (Herefordshire, Shropshire, Staﬀordshire,
Warwickshire, Worcestershire); East of England (Bedforshire, Cambrisdge-
hire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Norfolk, Suﬄok); Greater Lon-
don (London, Middlesex); South East (Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Hamp-
shire, Kent, Oxfordshire, Surrey, Sussex); South West (Cornwall, Devonshire,
Dorset, Gloucestershire, Somerset, Wiltshire); Wales (South Wales, North
Wales, Monmoutshire). Data for Scotland are for 1871 and from Cipolla
(1969). Data for Northern Ireland are from Flora (1983) and represent the per-
centage of people able to read in 1880. Data source: Cipolla (1969), Stephens
(1973) and Flora (1983).
A.2.2 Historical data on urbanization and population
The population of each region is calculated from the available data at
http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/populhome.html.
The original data sources can be found at
http://www.library.uu.nl/wesp/populstat/sources.html.
In general, the regional population data belong to years ranging from 1849 to 1861.
Speciﬁcally: Belgium (1849); Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland and Portugal (1850);
Netherlands and Spain (1849/50); Greece and Sweden (1850/51); France and UK (1851);
Italy (1861). For Greece we manage to ﬁnd regional information only for region Attiki.
The scores for other three regions are simply the country average.
The urbanization rate is deﬁned as the percentage of population living in towns
with more than 30,000 residents about 1850. The city population data are mainly from
Bairoch, Batou, and Ch` evre (1988). We also calculated urbanization rate considering
cities with more than 20,000 residents. The diﬀerence between the two variables is less
then 5% for most of the regions, excluding Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (DE8), Cantabria
(ES13), Navarra (ES22), Valenciana (ES52), Illes Balears (ES53), Andalucia (ES61),
Murcia (ES62), Nord-Pas-De-Calais (FR3), Puglia (ITF4), Sicilia (ITG1), Sardegna
(ITG2), Oost Nederland (NL2), Zuid-Nederland (NL4) and North East (UKC).
A.2.3 Historical data on institutions
To capture the impact of past political institutions on current social capital we em-
ployed the data on “constraints on the executive” as a proxy as deﬁned in the POLITY
IV, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. This variable captures
“institutionalised constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives, whether
individuals or collectivities”. It is coded on a scale 1 to 7, (1) representing “unlimited au-
thority” and (7) “accountable executive constrained by checks and balances”, categories
(2), (4) and (6) referring to intermediate situations. Below we summarize each category
according to the POLITY IV Project, Dataset Users Manual (pages 23-24) accessible also
via the POLITY IV web page available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.204 Appendix to Chapter 3
(1) Unlimited authority: Refers to cases in which there are no regular limitations on
the executive’s actions. For instance, situations in which constitutional restrictions on
executive action are ignored; constitution is frequently revised/suspended; there is no
legislative assembly or even if there is one it is dismissed at the executive’s initiative.
(3) Slight to moderate limitation on executive authority: Existence of some real but lim-
ited constraints on the executive. Example evidences: Legislature can initiate some
categories of legislation independently of the executive and is able to block implementa-
tion of executive acts and decrees or cases in which independent judiciary is present.
(5) Substantial limitations on executive authority: The accountability group has sub-
stantial constraints on the executive. For instance cases in which a legislature or a party
council can modify or defeat executive’s proposals or in which the accountability group
makes important appointments to administrative posts.
(7) Executive parity or subordination: In most areas of activity the legislature or the
parliament has eﬀective authority equal to or greater than the executive. Examples of
evidence: The accountability group initiates most important legislation; the executive is
dependent on the legislature’s continued support to remain in oﬃce.
We manage to compile information for most of the data points in our data set follow-
ing Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) and in particular Tabellini (2005). In case
of missing observations for some regions and countries the POLITY IV data set available
from the web page of the POLITY IV project has been consulted. Above data sources
enabled us to gather information on more than 70 EU regions in our data set. For regions
for which no data are available, we coded the variable “constraints on the executive” in
the same way as the POLITY IV dataset considering the political institutions in a 40-
year window around each date. Information is available for ﬁve dates: 1600, 1700, 1750,
1800 and 1850. Below we present detailed information on how we coded some regions as
well as the data sources for each country.
Table A.4: Detailed information on political institutions data
Country Variable information and data source
Austria At the end of 17th century most of the current Austrian lands were under the
control of Habsburgs, accept the ecclesiastical states Salzburg and Voralberg.
This situation did not change till the beginning of 18th century; the Habsburgs
gain more power and control over the territories. After the Habsburgs, the area
was dominated by the Austrain Empire. The states did not have individual
power and the political environment in this period can be identiﬁed as an
absolutist monarchy. Polity IV data set codes Austria as (3) only after 1860
and before that it is coded as (1). Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005)
code 1850 as (2) and all remaining years as (1). Since we are interested in
a 40-year window around 1850, we coded 1850 as (2) suggesting a transitory
period.
Belgium Data source: Tabellini (2005)
Denmark Data source: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005)
Finland Finland was an integral part of Sweden till 1803 and then mainly dominated by
Russia. As the executives of both countries were mainly absolutist, Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2005) codes Finland as (1) for all periods. We also
coded Finland as (1) for all of the 5 data points.
France Data source: Tabellini (2005)A.2 Further details on historical data 205
Country Variable information and data source
Germany For Baden-Wurttemberg, Bayern, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Niedersachsen,
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein we
use Tabellini (2005). Berlin and Brandenburg: Berlin was under the domi-
nance of Brandenburg (and later Prussia) in most of the period that we are
interested in. The period 1648-1790 is described as the period of absolutism for
Brandenburg and Prussia (Holborn, 1982). Therefore, 1600, 1700, 1750 and
1800 are coded as (1). The POLITY IV data set codes Prussia as (1) between
1800-1839; (2) between 1840-58; and (3) between 1859-1889. Therefore, we
coded 1850 as (2) suggesting a transitory state. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern:
Even after the separation in 1815, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern was mostly af-
fected by absolutism. Therefore, in line with the other German states we code
1850 as (2) and all four dates before 1850 as (1). Sachsen: Under domina-
tion of Saxony. POLITY IV codes Saxony as (1) between 1806-30 and (3)
between 1831-1871, except a period of 8 years between 1840-47. All dates
were coded as (1) before 1850 and 1850 is coded as (3). Sachsen-Anhalt:
Sachsen-Anhalt was part of Saxony. POLITY IV codes Saxony as (1) between
1806-30 and (3) between 1831-1871, except a period of 8 years between 1840-
47. However northern part of Saxony, which is roughly the current Sachsen-
Anhalt region, was lost to Prussia with the Congress of Viennna in 1814-1815.
Since POLITY IV codes Prussia as (2) between 1840-1858, we therefore coded
Sachsen-Anhalt as (2) in 1850. All other dates are coded as (1). Thuringen:
Coded as (1) for 1600-1800 and (2) in 1850 in line with the other German
states. For Germany we beneﬁted from Tabellini (2005), POLITY IV dataset
and Holborn (1982), as well as various historical maps in Holborn (1982) and
at http://www.zum.de/whkmla/index.html.
Greece Greece was under the domination of the Ottoman Empire during most of the
period and only after 1830s emerged as a separate country (by the Convention
of May 11, 1832), but still under the dominance of the Bavarian prince Otto
of Wittelsbach. The administration and the army of the country was mainly
ruled by the Bavarian oﬃcials, until 1843 when a revolt broke out in Athens
due to accumulated Greek discontent. King Othon (Otto adopted the name
Othon) had to convene the National Assembly and granted a constitution in
1843. The POLITY IV data set codes Greece as (3) after this date. However
the Greek territory in the 1840s and 1850s does not match with the current
Greek territory. According to the historical maps, Voreia Ellada and Nisia
were still under the control of the Ottoman Empire for about another 30-40
years. Considering this we coded Voreia Ellada and Nisia as (1) for all years.
Kentriki Ellada and Attiki are coded as (3) in 1850 and as (1) for the remaining
years.
Ireland Both regions, Border-Midland-Western and Southern and Eastern are coded
the same. Data source Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005).
Italy Data source: Tabellini (2005)
Netherlands Data source: Tabellini (2005)
Portugal Data source: Tabellini (2005)
Spain Data source: Tabellini (2005)
Sweden Regions of Sweden did not have political autonomy. For this reason, the re-
gional scores represent the country score. The POLITY IV data set codes
Sweden as (3) between 1812-1854 and (4) between 1855-1869. We coded Swe-
den as (3) for 1850 and as (1) for all the other periods. Data source: Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2005).
UK Data source: Tabellini (2005)206 Appendix to Chapter 3
A.2.4 Historical data on universities
We employed two diﬀerent variables to capture the possible impact of universities (as
historical institutions blending educational, cultural and social aspects) on current social
capital. First, to measure the period of existence of universities in a particular region
we formed the univF variable deﬁned as “univF = 2000 − the foundation date of the
university”, the latter part referring to the date of foundation of the ﬁrst university
established in a region. In forming this variable we carefully examined the foundation
dates (and re-foundation dates if applicable) of all the universities in a region to make
sure that for the whole period at least one university was operational. Higher values
reﬂect the existence of universities in a region for longer periods.
The second variable, univN measures the density of the universities in a particular
region deﬁned as the number of universities per 100,000 inhabitants around 1850. We
started from the 13th century and matched each university to a corresponding region.
The original data sources present information on the city and we matched cities to cor-
responding regions. Details on the population data can be found in Appendix 2.2. We
had to pay special attention on three points to avoid double counting: (i) whether the
university ceases to exist at a later time, (ii) whether the university was re-founded at a
later date under the same name (or under a diﬀerent name), (iii) whether the university
is merged with another university. We formed two other variables, one is simply the
arithmetic average of the standardized values of univF and univN and the other is the
ﬁrst principal component of the standardized values of the two variables. The major
sources for these variables are Ridder-Symoens (1996), and Jilek (1984).
A.3 Further analysis on the stability
In this appendix we discuss in more detail the robustness analysis conducted in Section
5.3. We investigate whether the signiﬁcance level of trust in the growth regressions is
aﬀected by the presence of particular switch variables. We conducted an analysis (similar
to meta-analysis) of the 4,090 regressions estimated in the robustness analysis in which
every coeﬃcient constitutes one observation.
Meta-analysis is a quantitative literature review aiming at harmonizing and evalu-
ating empirical results of an existing literature (e.g., Stanley, 2001; Florax, de Groot,
and de Mooij, 2002). In meta-analysis the dependent variable is usually an estimated
coeﬃcient reported in earlier studies and the independent variables are moderator vari-
ables measuring diﬀerent features in the original studies (for instance, existence of certain
variables, research design, sample etc.). Despite its disadvantages and limitations meta-
analysis has been widely used in economics in recent years. We stress that the analysis
in this section is not a meta-analysis in the usual sense because all observations originate
from the same source. This means that the research design, variable deﬁnitions and
sample are exactly the same for all observations in the analysis. We are only interested
whether the presence of certain switch variables have an impact on the likelihood of
obtaining a signiﬁcant trust coeﬃcient.
We deﬁned a dummy variable for trust taking a value of 1 whenever trust is signiﬁcant
in a regression and 0 otherwise. For all the other switch variables we deﬁned dummy
variables in the same manner. The analysis then constitutes of estimating a probit model,
regressing the trust dummy on all other dummy variables created for each switch variable.
This type of analysis is common in other meta-analyses (e.g., Waldorf and Pillsung, 2005;
Koetse, de Groot, and Florax, 2006). We put special emphasis on the switch variables
that returned a high fraction of signiﬁcant estimates as it is not worthwhile to assess the
eﬀect of switch variables that are signiﬁcant in only few regressions.A.3 Further analysis on the stability 207
Table A.5: Results of the probit analysis on the stability regressions
coeﬃcient marginal eﬀect
polactiv 2.159 (0.180)*** 0.716 (0.035)***
immig 2.563 (0.336)*** 0.772 (0.036)***
skill -1.522 (0.257)*** -0.181 (0.010)***
opinion 1.187 (0.075)*** 0.410 (0.028)***
cath -0.789 (0.148)*** -0.147 (0.017)***
orth -1.184 (0.347)*** -0.166 (0.018)***
jewi -1.002 (0.278)*** -0.159 (0.020)***
isla -1.783 (0.227)*** -0.219 (0.009)***
east -0.915 (0.335)*** -0.150 (0.027)***
shragremp 0.823 (0.077)*** 0.273 (0.029)***
shrindemp -0.627 (0.197)*** -0.124 (0.026)***
constant -0.897 (0.032)***
Psuedo R square 0.205 0.205
LR χ2(15) / Wald χ2(15) 844.4 605.3
Standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
The results of the probit analysis is presented in Table A3.
1 The variables are deﬁned
in Appendix 1.2. The results suggest the following. First, few variables were dropped
from the analysis automatically as the presence of these variables predicts a failure (i.e. a
non-signiﬁcant trust coeﬃcient) perfectly (not shown in the table below). Among them
the most important is help. All 250 regressions in which help is signiﬁcant, trust is
insigniﬁcant. This suggests that the presence of help reduces the likelihood of obtaining
a signiﬁcant trust coeﬃcient. On the other hand, results of the probit analysis show
that including two other cultural factors, polactiv and opinion increases the chance of
obtaining a signiﬁcant trust coeﬃcient. What is more interesting is that the simple
correlation between these three variables and trust is lower than 0.20 but the correlation
among them is higher than 0.50. Moreover all three variables in all growth estimations
return a positive coeﬃcient.
2 This suggests that these variables might be capturing
another element of social capital other than trust. However given the complex nature of
social capital it is not straightforward to test this claim.
Second, the presence of variables on religion reduces the probability of obtaining a
signiﬁcant trust coeﬃcient although most of these variables do not survive in the stability
analysis. Similarly, there are only a few cases in which immig and skill return signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients in the main regressions, however the former seems to augment and the latter
seems to reduce the probability of obtaining a signiﬁcant trust coeﬃcient. Finally, the
share of agricultural employment aﬀects the signiﬁcance level of trust positively whereas
the share of industrial employment decreases it.
In sum, the detailed analysis reveals that certain switch variables have an impact
on the signiﬁcance level of the coeﬃcient of trust. There are 530 (13% of all estimated
regressions in the stability analysis) cases in which trust is not signiﬁcant but social
capital might be captured by the presence of opinion, help and polactiv. This supports
our ﬁndings in the sense that at least one proxy for social capital has a positive and
signiﬁcant impact on growth in about 95% of all 4,090 regressions estimated in the
stability analysis.
1 To save space, we present only the results for the variables that returned signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cients. The detailed results are available upon request.
2 In almost all regressions opinion has a signiﬁcant positive impact on growth. When only
these regressions are considered, the coeﬃcient of trust is signiﬁcant in 223 cases and insigniﬁcant

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)212 Appendix to Chapter 3
A.5 Estimation results with internet use as an in-
dicator to innovativeness
In this appendix we show the results of applying internet use as a measure of innova-
tiveness. It is impossible to ﬁnd an independent source of regional data on ICT diﬀusion
at the regional level. The new version of the Eurostat database, the previous version
of Eurostat CRONOS database and the regional innovation scoreboard do not provide
such data at the regional level. Hence, we apply a measure from the ESS 2002 database
that could serve as a proxy for ICT diﬀusion. The variable netuse is obtained from the
question “How often do you use the internet, the World Wide Web or e-mail - whether
at home or at work - for your personal use?”. The answer categories are given as (0) No
access at home or work, (1) Never use, (2) Less than once a month, (3) Once a month,
(4) Several times a month, (5) Once a week, (6) Several times a week, (7) Every day. The
answers are aggregated for individuals to the level of the 102 EU regions. The variable
netuse thus represents the average Internet use within regions.
Table A.8: Pairwise correlations between innovation indicators
netuse pat91p pat91lf pat00p pat00lf
netuse 1.00
pat91p 0.79*** 1.00
pat91lf 0.78*** 0.99*** 1.00
pat00p 0.83*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 1.00
pat00lf 0.81*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.99*** 1.00
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Pat91p and pat00p stands for
patent applications per million inhabitants in 1991 and 2000 respectively. Pat91lf and pat00lf
stands for patent applications per million labor force in 1991 and 2000, respectively.
Table A.8 presents the pairwise correlation coeﬃcients between patent measures and
netuse. The correlation coeﬃcients are large and signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
The mean netuse for each country is presented in Table A.9. The numbers show a clear
distinction between Northern and Southern European countries, the former displaying
ﬁgures of more than two times larger than the latter.
Next, we use netuse as an indicator for regional innovativeness in our regression
model. Table A.10 is similar to Table 3.6 in the main text and Table A.11 is comparable
to Table 3.10. Table A.10 shows that the estimates do not diverge from the results in
the body text: trust is still an important determinant of innovativeness. One important
diﬀerence from the original results is that the explanatory power of the model diminishes
by about 10 percent. Table A.11 presents the 3SLS estimation results. The netuse and
the trust equation display qualitatively similar results. The major diﬀerence between
these results and the ones in the main text is that now there is a small direct eﬀect of
trust on income growth on top of the indirect eﬀect through the innovation channel.
The results in this appendix should be taken with caution for two reasons. First,
measurement error in netuse. Individuals do not necessarily depend on Internet usage
because other channels of information and communication could be more eﬃcient. It
could also be the case that in some countries or regions there is a government policy
(or services) to facilitate use of ICT (for instance, e-government applications). It could
simply be the case that the cost of these services are high hence consumers may avoid
using these technologies. Second, the indicator is only for available for 2002. The use of
it in a regression trying to explain per capital income growth between 1990 to 2002 is
not optimal.A.5 Estimation results with internet use as an... 213
Table A.9: Summary statistics for internet use
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Austria 3.19 0.24 2.92 3.35
Belgium 3.08 0.81 2.47 4.00
Denmark 3.97 3.97 3.97
Finland 3.26 3.26 3.26
France 2.32 0.49 1.90 3.45
Germany 3.06 0.58 1.81 3.96
Greece 0.86 0.29 0.56 1.18
Ireland 2.30 0.60 1.87 2.72
Italy 1.96 0.84 1.13 4.39
Netherlands 3.35 0.36 2.89 3.66
Portugal 1.51 0.81 0.31 2.47
Spain 1.46 0.67 0.61 3.10
Sweden 3.79 0.43 3.28 4.63
UK 2.72 0.48 2.19 3.86
Overall 2.41 1.00 0.31 4.63
Table A.10: Social capital and innovation
(1)(OLS) (2)(1st stage) (3)(2SLS)
netuse trust netuse
R&Dints 0.322 0.035 0.27
(0.077)*** (0.099) (0.091)***
(0.074)*** [0.047] [0.078]***















N 102 102 102
R-squared 0.77 0.66 0.7
Adj R sqr 0.73 0.58 0.65
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered standard errors in brackets. Clustered standard
errors are clustered at the country level to allow arbitrary correlations within a country.
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix to Chapter 5
B.1 Details on variable deﬁnitions and data sources
Table B.1: Deﬁnitions of variables and data sources
Variable Deﬁnition
young Percentage of people aged 15-24 in 2001. Source: Centraal Bureau voor
de Statistiek (CBS).
density Log of population density in 2001. Source: CBS.
unemp Young unemployment deﬁned as percentage of people who are under
30 years old and unemployed in 2001. Source: CBS
education Percentage of people with medium and high level of education in 2001.
Source: CBS.
inequality Income inequality deﬁned as the proportion of the percentage of people
in the highest %20 income percentile to percentage of people with lowest
income in 2001. Source: CBS.
recrat Percentage of total area devoted to recreation in 2001. Source: CBS.
shop Percentage of total area devoted to shopping in 2001. Source: CBS.
cofshop Number of coﬀeeshops per 10,000 inhabitants in 2002. Source for the
absolute ﬁgures: (Bieleman and Nayer, 2005).
charity Voluntary contributions per household in euros. Average of six years
from 2000-2005. Source: Central Bureau on Fundraising. See Appendix
B.1.1 for details.
blood Blood donations per 100 inhabitants in 2005. Source: See Appendix
B.1.1 for details.
vote Voter turnout in the election of the lower house (tweede kamer) in 2003.
Source: CBS.
trust Trust indicator calculated as the average of three indicators: ppltrst,
help and fair. See Appendix B.1.1 for details. Source: European Social
Survey (ESS) 2002 and 2004 rounds.
ppltrust Generalized trust indicator constructed from the answers to the ques-
tion “Most people can be trusted or you cannot be too careful”. See
Appendix B.1.1 for details. Source: ESS 2002 and 2004 rounds.
Note: If otherwise indicated all variables are averages of years 2000, 2001 and 2002.
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Variable Deﬁnition
help Social capital indicator obtained from the question “Most of the time
people are helpful or mostly looking out for themselves”. See Appendix
B.1.1 for details. Source: ESS 2002 and 2004 rounds.
fair Social capital indicator obtained form the question “Most people try
to take advantage of you, or try to be fair”. See Appendix B.1.1 for
details. Source: ESS 2002 and 2004 round
trustplc Conﬁdence in police. See Appendix B.1.1 for details. Source: ESS 2002
and 2004 rounds.
SC1 First principal component of six social capital indicators: charity,
blood, vote, trust, foreign and divorce. See Appendix B.1.1 for de-
tails.
SC2 First principal component of four social capital indicators: charity,
blood, vote and trust. See Appendix B.1.1 for details.
SC3 First principal component of three social capital indicators: charity,
blood and vote. See Appendix B.1.1 for details.
divorce Percentage of divorces in total population. Source: CBS.
immig Immigration as a percentage of total population. Source: CBS.
emmig Emigration as a percentage of total population. Source: CBS.
movers Sum of immigration and emigration as a percentage of total population.
Source: CBS.
foreign Percentage of foreigners in total population. Source: CBS.
foreign1859 Percentage of foreigners in total population in 1859. See Appendix
B.1.3 for details. Source: Volkstellingen Archive.
protestant1859 Percentage of Protestants in total population in 1859. See Appendix
B.1.3 for details. Source: Volkstellingen Archive.
#school1859 Number of schools per 100 inhabitants in 1859. See Appendix B.1.3 for
details. Source: Volkstellingen Archive.
crime Crime rates including all recorded crimes in 2002. See Appendix B.1.2
for detailed information on crime data and how crime categories below
are formed.
homicide Homicide per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
assault Assault per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
rape Rape per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
robbery Robbery per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
theft Theft per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
autotheft Motor vehicle theft per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
burglary Burglary per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
domestic burglary Domestic burglary per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
drug Crimes related to hard drugs per 100 inhabitants in 2002.
Note: If otherwise indicated all variables are averages of years 2000, 2001 and 2002.
B.1.1 Social capital indicators
Four social capital indicators is used in this chapter. First, as an indicator of altruism
voluntary contributions per household is used. The data is available from Central Bureau
on Fundraising at the municipality level from 2000 to 2005.
1 However in order to minimize
the risk of high variability from year to year and because of missing values for some
municipalities for diﬀerent years, the average value of the available data is calculated
1 http://www.cbf.nl//Database goede doelen/2 Collectegegevens Gemeenten.phpB.1 Details on variable deﬁnitions and data sources 217
for each municipality. Second, as a measure of civic participation the voter turnout of
the elections for the Lower House (Tweede Kamer) in 2003 is employed. This data is
available at the municipality level via Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) website.
2
and is calculated as the number of votes divided by the number of inhabitants eligible to
vote multiplied by 100.
The next indicator, blood donations, could also be viewed as an indicator of altru-
ism (number of blood donations at the municipality level). The data is recorded under
two diﬀerent headings: blood donations to blood centers and hospitals, and blood do-
nations to the mobile centers. Not every municipality in the Netherlands have a blood
bank and/or a hospital and some of these municipalities are frequently visited by mo-
bile services. However there are some municipalities rather smaller in size that do not
have blood centers and have not been visited by mobile blood centers. Therefore the
following correction has been made. If there is no record for a municipality it is assumed
that the inhabitants of the municipality donate blood in the closest municipality in the
neighborhood. However in all cases there are more than one neighbor municipality that
the inhabitants can possibly donate blood. In such cases we divided the population of
that municipality by the number of neighbours and recorded the inhabitants of that mu-
nicipality to other neighbour municipalities as if they reside there. Once this has been
replicated for all the municipalities that there is no record for, we end up with base pop-
ulation for all the municipalities in the data set. Then the number of blood donations is
divided by the base population constructed, as explained above, to calculate the blood
donations per 100 inhabitants for each municipality. Finally, for all the municipalities
that there is no record the average of the neighbour municipalities is calculated and used
as a proxy. Among 63 municipalities with a population over 50,000 only 5 are subject
to such a correction and among 142 municipalities that has a population over 30,000, 31
are subject to this correction. For NUTS 3 aggregation there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the corrected and non-corrected blood donation data suggested by the simple
correlation coeﬃcient of 0.89 (signiﬁcant at %1). However for reasons of symmetry with
the analysis at the municipality level the corrected blood donations data is aggregated
to 40 NUTS3 regions. The analyses for 40 NUTS 3 regions employ this measure.
Fourth, a set of indicators from the European Social Surveys (ESS) rounds 2002 and
2004 is employed. In order to maximize the number of individual data the ﬁrst and
the second rounds of the data set for Netherlands are merged. The data is available
for 40 NUTS 3 regions. The raw data is aggregated on individuals (2364 individuals in
the ﬁrst round and 1881 individuals in the second round, a total of 4245 data points)
to 40 regions. The raw data is adjusted by population weights to reduce the problems
that may arise due to oversampling. The questions and the answer categories to these
questions are exactly the same in both rounds. From the answers to three question below
an equal weighted average trust index is constructed (trust): (i) people trust (ppltrst)
is a generalized trust indicator obtained from the answers to the question “Most people
can be trusted or you cannot be too careful”. The answer category ranges from (0)
“you can’t be too careful” to (10) “most people can be trusted”, with nine levels in
between. The mean (s.e.) for this indicator is 5.75 (2.09) for n=4243, (ii) people help
(help) is constructed from the question “Most of the time people are helpful or mostly
looking out for themselves”. The answer category ranges from (0) “people mostly look
out for themselves” to (10) “people mostly try to be helpful”, with nine levels in between.
The mean (s.e.) for this indicator is 5.30 (1.97) for n=4242. (iii) people fair (fair) is
an indicator obtained from the question “Most people try to take advantage of you, or
try to be fair”. The answer category ranges from (0) “most people would try to take
advantage of me” to (10) “most people would try to be fair”, with nine levels in between.
2 http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/cijfers/statline/toegang/default.htm218 Appendix to Chapter 5
The mean (s.e.) for this indicator is 6.20 (1.85) for n=4233. The mean (s.e.) for the
trust index is 5.75 (1.58) for n=4229. The question on conﬁdence to police (trustplc)
is also used for robustness reasons. The question is “How much you personally trust in
police”. The answer category ranges from (0) “no trust at all” to (10) “complete trust”.
The mean (s.e.) for this indicator is 5.89 (1.94) for n=4213. One particular weakness
of these measures is that they are observed at the regional level and when conducting
the analysis at the municipality level these indicators have the same number for all the
municipalities belonging to the same NUTS3 deﬁnition.
In addition to these four indicators two others are employed- percentage of divorces
and percentage of foreigners in total population -as they display high and signiﬁcant
correlations with the above four indicators. Out of these seemingly unrelated indica-
tors several social capital indices are constructed by using principal component analysis
(PCA). The ﬁrst principal component of each PCA analysis is taken as an indicator of
social capital. First index includes 6 indicators, charity, blood, vote, trust, foreign and
divorce, which forms an all inclusive measure (SC1). Second index, SC2, includes only
four social capital indicators, excluding divorce and foreign, to form SC2. Finally, a
third index is constructed out of the three indicators, charity, blood and vote, which
labeled as SC3. The reason for this is that trust is measured at the regional level as
discussed above and especially in the analysis at the municipality level this might result
in measurement error.
To check the robustness of the above indices, all possible combinations of these indices
are experimented by interchanging between indicators. For instance, one can use ppltrust,
help, fair separately instead of trust or one can use immig instead of foreign. All
constructed indices behave in a similar way. Similar indicators in content (for instance,
including ppltrust, help or trustplc) are not included at the same because PCA tends to
give similar weights to these indicators and the resulting index becomes very powerful
(i.e., the probability of obtaining a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the social capital index in
regressions increases considerably).
Table B.2 below displays information on the principal component loadings of the ﬁrst
principal component and the explained variance for each social capital index for diﬀerent
samples. As visible from the table the indicators that are suggested as proxy to presence
of social capital have positive loadings. On the contrary indicators that is associated
with the absence of social capital have negative loadings as expected. The PCA tends
to put more (and similar in terms of quantity) weight on charity, vote, foreign and
divorce and less weight one blood and trust. The reason for this is that blood and trust
involve data corrections and interpolations and this is picked up by the PCA so that
these indicators have less weight in the overall index. This can be easily seen from the
table. For instance loadings to blood decreases considerably in all three social capital
index as we move to the right of the table (i.e. the number of corrected/interpolated
data points increase as the sample size increases from 40 NUTS3 regions with no data
corrections to 142 municipalities with some data corrections which reduces the robustness
of the indicator). After all this can be viewed as a positive outcome and helps to produce
a healthy social capital indicator by speciﬁcally placing less weight on the problematic
indicators. All indices are expected to display a negative relationship with crime.
B.1.2 Crime data
Crime data reﬂects data on 27 diﬀerent types of crime. It is available at the municipality
level at http://www.ad.nl/misdaadmeter/. However due to under-reporting and reliability
problems of the data for certain crime types, beside analyzing total crime rates diﬀerent
subgroups are formed according to European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice,B.1 Details on variable deﬁnitions and data sources 219
Statistics 2006. All crime numbers are calculated as per 100 inhabitants. Throughout
chapter 5, the following subcategories are used in the analysis.
Table B.2: Principal component loadings for the ﬁrst component and the explained
variance
NUTS3 regions muncp. pop>50,000 muncp. pop>40,000 muncp. pop>30,000
SC1 SC2 SC3 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC1 SC2 SC3 SC1 SC2 SC3
charity 0.42 0.49 0.58 0.48 0.55 0.63 0.47 0.55 0.66 0.49 0.59 0.69
blood 0.32 0.46 0.50 0.25 0.40 0.46 0.17 0.34 0.36 0.10 0.25 0.22
vote 0.47 0.58 0.65 0.47 0.57 0.63 0.48 0.58 0.66 0.49 0.63 0.69
trust 0.28 0.46 0.30 0.47 0.31 0.50 0.21 0.44
foreign -0.48 -0.47 -0.48 -0.50
divorce -0.44 -0.41 -0.43 -0.47
explained variance 0.56 0.57 0.65 0.55 0.56 0.63 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.54 0.49 0.58
N 40 40 40 63 63 63 95 95 95 142 142 142
Table B.3: Deﬁnitions of subgroups of crime
Indicator Deﬁnition
crime Crime rates including all 27 categories.
homicide Homicide.
rape Rape.
assault It is deﬁned as activity causing bodily injury with intent on another person. We
include sexual assault, threatening, armed-attack, mis-treat and act on person
and mugging.
theft Includes auto theft, motor/scooter theft, theft from any kind of business (oﬃce,
shop etc.), school and sport complex, and pickpocketing.
autotheft Theft of a motor vehicle excluding handling/receiving stolen vehicle. We in-
clude auto theft, motor/scooter theft, theft from a motor vehicle.
robbery The general deﬁnition is stealing from a person with force or threat. We include
robbery and mugging category from our data set.
burglary Includes theft from any kind of business (oﬃce, shop etc.), school and sport
complex.
domestic burglary Domestic burglary deﬁned as gaining access to private premises with intent
to steal goods. This subcategory excludes theft from an oﬃce, shop, garage,
factory etc. We only included break in to a house.
drug Hard-drug trading. We did not include soft-drug trading as soft-drugs, such as
marihuana, are legal in the Netherlands and we suspect that the records are
highly aﬀected by under-reporting.
B.1.3 Historical data
The major source of the historical data is the Volkstellingen archives (Dutch census),
which is an invaluable data source comprising basic population and household data start-
ing from 1795. The ﬁrst round that present information at the municipality level is 1859.
This year has a particular municipality deﬁnition presenting data on about 1200 local area220 Appendix to Chapter 5
Table B.4: Distribution of criminal activity for diﬀerent samples
city pop>50,000 pop>40,000 pop>30,000
crime 52.57 70.41 77.04 83.19
homicide 50.84 66.48 74.30 84.36
rape 49.44 67.89 75.09 81.35
assault 51.91 70.86 77.50 83.49
robbery 76.82 90.13 93.26 94.97
theft 54.30 71.37 77.93 83.98
autotheft 55.99 71.30 77.82 83.85
burglary 43.58 64.21 72.16 79.17
domestic burglary 45.13 64.13 71.49 78.49
drug 75.98 84.69 87.26 90.19
N 22 63 95 142
units. Therefore a correspondence table is constructed matching the local area names in
1859 to current municipality deﬁnitions. In doing this three sources were used: (i) in-
formation on the historical evolution of the municipality deﬁnitions, (ii) correspondence
table linking each current local area unit (about 6,000 places regardless of size that are
even much smaller than a municipality) in the Netherlands to a municipality deﬁnition
in 2002, (iii) historical maps as matching for about 10 local area units to a municipality
was problematic. The main reason for this is that the statistics were recorded in histori-
cal names that do not exist in current correspondence tables. For these local area units
historical maps are used to match the historical local area name to a current local area
name and then to a corresponding municipality. Information on the ﬁrst two is available
at the CBS website.
First, data is collected on the percentage of foreigners in a local area unit in 1859.
Foreign1859 is deﬁned as the number of foreigners per inhabitant multiplied by 100.
Then information is gathered on the percentage of Protestants in a municipality in 1859.
The names and the data availability for diﬀerent Churches and Protestant groups (most
of which are smaller denominations and constitute less than 0.01 percent of total pop-
ulation) diﬀer in great extent from the current classiﬁcations therefore all inhabitants
belonging to a Protestant denomination are summed up, divided by the number of total
inhabitants living in the municipality and multiplied by 100 to arrive to our indicator
protestant1859. The ﬁnal, indicator is the formed from the data on the number of schools
per local area unit in 1859. #school1859 is deﬁned as the number of schools per 100 in-
habitants, which is assumed to be a proxy to education in 1859. One particular problem
with the historical data is that some current municipalities were gained from the North-
ern sea: Noordoostpolder in 1944, Oostelijk Flevoland in 1957 and Zuidelijk Flevoland
in 1966. Obviously, there is no information for these regions before these dates, therefore
ﬁgures from the 1971 census are used as a substitute for earlier years. Only four munic-
ipalities are subject to this correction: Almere (476), Dronten (381), Lelystad (439) and

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix to Chapter 6
C.1 Deﬁnition of institutional indicators
Deﬁnitions of the indicators employed in Chapter 6, Table 6.3 are presented below.
1
“Rule of Law” is a composite index that measures the extent conﬁdence, eﬀectiveness
and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. This indicator
supposedly measures the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair
and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions, and importantly,
the extent to which property rights are protected. Higher values indicate that societies
are successful in setting up such an institutional environment.
“Impartial courts” is an indicator assessing the existence of a trusted legal framework
for private businesses to challenge the legality of government actions or regulation. Higher
values represent the existence of such an institutional framework.
“Judicial independence” is an index that measures whether the judiciary is indepen-
dent and not subject to interference by the government or parties in disputes. Higher
values indicate independence of the judiciary.
“Protection of property rights” measures the degree of intellectual property protec-
tion. Higher values indicate more eﬀective protection.
“Government Eﬀectiveness” combines small the quality of public service provision,
the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the
civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment
to policies in one index. The main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the
government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.
Higher values indicate more eﬀectiveness.
“Voice and accountability” represents the process by which those in authority are
selected and replaced. It is a composite index composed of indicators measuring various
aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights that measure the extent
to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments.
We also include in this category indicators measuring the independence of the media,
which serves an important role in holding monitoring those in authority and holding
them accountable for their actions. Higher values indicate higher ability to participate
in the selection of governments.
1 http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/a-winfo/d3iiv. As appear in the
DICE webpage
227228 Appendix to Chapter 6
“Business regulation” is a composite index of several indicators, such as the extent
of price controls, administrative procedures and obstacles for business and the ease of
starting the business. Lower values associate with higher degree of business regulation.
“Economic freedom” is a composite index of more than 50 independent economic
variables such as trade policy, ﬁscal burden of government and government intervention
in the economy. Higher values represent more represses economies.
“Barriers to entrepreneurship measures the ease of establishing new ﬁrms. Higher
values reﬂect obstacles for entrepreneurship and new ﬁrm creation.
Decision making at the lower secondary school represents the responsibility and de-
cision making at various levels from central authority to school level. Source is OECD.
“Trust” is constructed from the answers to the following question “Generally speaking
would you say that most people can be trusted or can’t be too careful in dealing with
people?”.
Social capital is an index of generalized trust, importance of voluntary work and
the extent of participation in to voluntary associations. It is akin to the social capital
index in chapter 4. For both indicators higher values associate with higher trust or social
capital.
“Corruption perception” index measures the overall extent of corruption (frequency
and the amount of corruption) in the private and public sectors and in the political arena.
Higher values represent lower corruption.
“Control of corruption” is another measure for corruption. Higher values represent
better and more eﬀective controls for corruption. These last two indicator are from
CESifo DICE and the deﬁnitions above are taken from DICE webpage.
C.2 Detailed result of analysis of EVS
This section presents the detailed results of the analysis conducted in chapter 6, section
6.2.2. The ﬁrst row in the following tables indicates the variable names as in the European
Values Study (1999) Methodological Questionnaire. The yes-no questions are coded as
[1: yes, 0: no] and the coding is reversed in some questions. Such cases are denoted with
an asterisk and the coding of each variable is represented in the last row of the table. The
values indicate the average score for diﬀerent country groups and Turkey. The numbers
in parentheses are the standard errors. The country codes are as follows:
France FR Luxembourg LU
United Kingdom UK Ireland IE
Germany DE Estonia EE
Austria AT Latvia LV
Italy IT Lithuania LT
Spain ES Poland PL
Portugal PT Czech Republic CZ
Netherlands NL Slovakia SK
Belgium BE Hungary HU
Denmark DK Malta MT
Sweden SE Slovenia SI
Finland FI Romania RO





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sociaal kapitaal is een concept dat breed wordt toegepast in verschillende sociale
wetenschappen. Onderzoekers hebben het concept gebruikt om socio-economische
resultaten te verklaren en te vergelijken. Twee belangrijke aspecten hebben echter
weinig aandacht gekregen: (i) waardoor wordt sociaal kapitaal eigenlijk gevormd?
en (ii) wat is het mechanisme waardoor sociaal kapitaal uitkomsten be¨ ınvloedt?
Deze studie gaat expliciet in op deze twee vragen vanuit een economische inval-
shoek.
De drie belangrijkste bevindingen kunnen als volgt worden samengevat:
(1) Sociaal kapitaal leidt tot lagere transactie kosten, eﬃci¨ ente informatieuitwisseling
en betrouwbaar gedrag wat een positieve impact heeft op innovatie. Empirische
bevindingen laten zien dat innovatie een transmissiemechanisme is tussen sociaal
kapitaal en economische groei.
(2) Het op verschillende manieren meten en deﬁni¨ eren van sociaal kapitaal heeft
geleid tot nieuwe indicatoren waarmee het verschil in misdaadcijfers tussen ge-
ograﬁsche gebieden voor een groot deel kan worden verklaard. Sociaal kapitaal
vermindert criminaliteit dankzij netwerkeﬀecten, sociale ondersteuning en de ver-
hoging van de kosten van misdaad.
(3) Geschiedenis en instituties spelen een belangrijke rol bij de vorming van sociaal
kapitaal. Regio’s waarin instituties die zich richten op onderwijs, gemeenschapszin
en cohesie langer bestaan, hebben een hoger niveau van sociaal kapitaal dan regio’s
waarvoor dit niet geldt.
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vijf inhoudelijke hoofdstukken. In Hoofdstuk twee
wordt een overzicht gegeven van het onderzoek over sociaal kapitaal in verschil-
lende wetenschappelijke disciplines. Door het uitvoeren van een netwerkanalyse
blijkt dat verschillende onderzoeksdisciplines een ander begrip van sociaal kapi-
taal hanteren en eigenlijk nauwelijks op de hoogte zijn van elkaars onderzoek. Het
sociaal kapitaal van de sociaal-kapitaal-onderzoekers lijkt dus geconcentreerd en
beperkt tot de eigen kring. Een duurzame toekomst van de sociaal kapitaal theo-
rie is afhankelijk van de versterking van de banden tussen verschillende disciplines
zoals economie, sociologie en politieke economie. De analyses in dit proefschrift
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maken gebruik van de ingredi¨ enten uit de verschillende bloedgroepen om tot een
meer evenwichtige deﬁnitie en analyse te komen binnen de economische weten-
schap. Het is echter slechts een eerste stap.
Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat innovatie ´ e´ en van de mechanismen is vertrouwen om
te zetten in economische groei. Een belangrijke bijdrage van deze studie is het kop-
pelen van de “vertrouwen-innovatie” relatie met de bestaande “vertrouwen-groei”
relatie. Sociaal kapitaal leidt tot meer innovatie door (i) de verlaging van trans-
actie kosten zoals monitoringkosten, (ii) eﬃci¨ ente informatie-uitwisseling, en (iii)
het stimuleren van gedrag dat rekening houdt met groepsnormen. De bevindingen
laten zien dat sociaal kapitaal een direct en indirect eﬀect (d.m.v. innovatie) heeft
op de economische groei in de regio’s van de Europese Unie.
Hoofdstuk 4 voegt twee punten toe aan deze bevindingen. Ten eerste verhoogt
sociaal kapitaal niet alleen het niveau maar ook de groei van innovaties. Ten
tweede wordt de eﬀectiviteit van EU-doelstellingen op het gebied van regionale
ondersteuningsprogramma’s onderzocht. De schattingen laten zien dat regio’s die
meer sociaal kapitaal hebben (gegeven inkomen) meer proﬁteren van iedere Euro
aan fondsen dat zij ontvangen.
In de volgende hoofdstukken wordt de link van sociaal kapitaal naar inkomen
verbreed door te kijken naar andere socio-economische uitkomsten. In Hoofdstuk
5 wordt de relatie tussen sociaal kapitaal en criminaliteit onderzocht voor Neder-
landse gemeentes. De redenen hiervoor zijn dat (i) criminaliteit zowel een sociaal
als een economisch verschijnsel is en (ii) sociale en economische factoren van in-
vloed zijn op criminaliteit. De gegevens over sociaal kapitaal voor dit onderzoek
zijn uniek en bestaan uit informatie over bloeddonaties, vrijwillige bijdragen aan
liefdadigheid, opkomst bij verkiezingen en vertrouwen. Deze meting is nieuw in de
zin dat het sociaal kapitaal wordt behandeld als een latente variabele die bestaat
uit verschillende dimensies. De schattingen laten zien dat gemeentes met meer
sociaal kapitaal een lagere criminaliteit kennen.
Al deze schattingen in Hoofdstukken 3-5 zijn uitgevoerd door historische in-
formatie over instituties te gebruiken om causale verbanden te vinden. Door em-
pirische analyse ontstaat het beeld dat er een sterke complementariteit bestaat
tussen formele en informele instituties en dat er hysterese in deze relatie is. Soci-
aal kapitaal ontstaat in gebieden waar de invloed van de uitvoerende macht beperkt
is, waarbij het niveau van het onderwijs hoog is, waar universiteiten bestaan als
centra van cultuur en waar de bevolking minder heterogeen is. Door gebruik te
maken van originele gegevens verzameld voor EU-regio’s en gemeentes in Neder-
land blijkt dat de politieke instellingen, onderwijs, universiteiten en religie in de
jaren 1850-1859 invloed hebben op de huidige economische en sociale uitkomsten
van deze regio’s en gemeentes via hun impact op sociaal kapitaal.
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt ingegaan op de verschillen tussen Turkije en de Europese
Unie om te kijken in welke mate Turkije en Europa van elkaar verschillen en
waarom het zo moeilijk is voor Turkije om toe te treden tot de EU. Deze verschillen
uiten zich op vele manieren; de focus hier is op verschillen in sociaal kapitaal235
en formele instituties die kunnen worden teruggeleid naar de geschiedenis van
beide gebieden. Dit is consistent met de aanpak in de eerdere hoofdstukken en
toont een mooie, actuele en praktische beleidstoepassing van dit proefschrift. De
analyse laat zien dat de verschillen tussen Europa en Turkije vooral van politieke
en economische aard zijn. Deze verschillen kunnen slechts worden overwonnen
door het versterken van de institutionele banden en niet door het isoleren van
Turkije en het afdwingen van hervormingen die niet passen bij de cultuur van het
land. Toekomstige pogingen tot toenadering zullen dan ook slechts vruchtbaar
zijn wanneer Turkije instituties bouwt die passen bij een modern land en wanneer
Europa de waarde erkent van het sociale kapitaal tussen de EU en Turkije dat zijn
oorsprong vindt in de overeenkomsten en verschillen in cultuur en diversiteit.Curriculum Vitae
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